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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the impact of Latinidad in Latino political participation, especially in 
regard to voting behavior. Although Latinos often have been portrayed as a decisive electoral 
group, the reality is they have not fulfilled the expectations imposed upon them. Therefore, I argue 
Latinos with different levels of group consciousness will engage differently in politics, which 
affects the voting statistics of the ethnicity in Censuses, reports and surveys. The use of pan-ethnic 
terms and the constant stereotypes of Latinos all being “the same,” has caused separation rather 
than cohesiveness within the minority group, which has resulted in low political engagement. I 
propose that those Latino immigrants and their descendants who do not have a strong attachment 
to the pan-ethnicity will behave differently than those who identify themselves in pan-ethnic terms.  
Consequently, I have come to wonder how Latinidad impacts those who are not part of the 
main Latino subgroups —Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans— and have been denominated the 
“other Latinos” when engaging in politics? South Americans, Central Americans, and Caribbean 
immigrants have been smashed into a group where they do not occupy a significant place. I suggest 
that differences in country of origin will have an impact on how Latin American immigrants will 
participate in American politics. To test my hypothesis, I have made a secondary analysis of 
existent literature. This analysis includes crosstabulations of data obtained from the 2012 National 
Survey of Latinos, conducted by the Pew Research Center. 
 
vii 
 
Through the analysis of the data and the existent literature, I have concluded that the pan-
ethnic terms are not strongly entrenched in Latino’s regular use of identity. Respondents mostly 
said to not have a preference for either term, still their vote intention was high. Differences are 
noticeable among Latinos/Hispanics that have different ancestries, however, these are sometimes 
stabilized by citizenship. The data proved that the identity categories used for surveys directed at 
Latinos/Hispanics are not specific enough, given that a considerable percentage of participants 
were confused about how to classify themselves, which altered the results. This current study will 
contribute to the work of Latino studies, that for more than 50 years have tried to get to know those 
who make up the Latino community, by approaching identity and Latino politics from a different 
perspective. A perspective where those called Latinos/Hispanics can identify themselves instead 
of being randomly categorized.   
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
From Latin American to Latino 
 Becoming a Latino is not a process that is initiated by the mere fact of immigration. 
However, Latin American immigrants and their descendants are racialized and stereotyped under 
labels that account for their “otherness.” Either an immigrant identifies or does not with the label 
he/she was assigned when arriving to the United States, Latino or Hispanic will be their social 
labels. As an immigrant myself, I went through the racialization process all immigrants experience 
when arriving to the United States. As a Latin American immigrant, I was assigned an ethnic label, 
and for any institutional purposes I became a Latina. This label has accompanied me during the 
years I have been living in the United States, however, I have never felt like a Latina. I came to 
wonder then, do other Latin American immigrants feel the same? And if they do, how does this 
impact their life?  
The categorization of immigrants from Latin America as Latinos or Hispanics does not 
come solely from state institutions; media organizations and politicians have also influenced the 
spreading use of the term. Consequently, other aspects related to Latin American immigrants have 
been stereotyped and trivialized. The vague use of the pan-ethnic terms has impacted those labeled 
as such. As bizarre as it sounds to have to explain to somebody that you are not Mexican or Puerto 
Rican, and that even when you are Latino/Hispanic you do not call your friends “ese” or eat tacos 
every day, those labeled with pan-ethnic categories have had to explain and clarify their origin. 
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Not only culture has been trivialized, Latino attitudes towards important issues, state policy, and 
political perspectives have been generalized as well, which has made the Latino vote an often 
evoked “thing” that not many know what it means or entails.   
Being portrayed as a single community has not created a strong connection between 
subgroups, or people from different countries. Solidarity and group consciousness are relevant for 
political mobilization, but what happens when group identity is not strong? Can we still talk about 
the Latino vote, the Latino wave, the Latino power? Election after election, since 
Latinos/Hispanics have reached an important percentage among the American population, the 
power of the Latino community has been invoked, discussed, and called to be decisive. At the 
same time, election after election, Latinos are still a minority group with a low percentage of 
electoral participation. Although different elements can impact political engagement, identity has 
precisely become a problem when studying Latinos through the lenses of identity politics. The 
broadness of the Latino community entails not only differences framed by country of origin, but 
of race, social class, ethnicity, culture, and language. 
Race is indeed a problematic issue when theorizing about Latino politics. First, because of 
the different racial backgrounds comprised in the Latino community, and second because of the 
racial hierarchies established in each Latin American country. As argued by Dávila, despite “the 
Pollyanna-like views shared by many Latin American nationalist leaders and laypeople alike, race 
and racism are very much alive in Latin America, strengthened by the very silence that has 
characterized discussions of race in the area.” (Dávila, Latino Spin 2008: 16) The racialization of 
Latinos as an ethnic group is not only contested because of differences in regard to nationatity, but 
because of the racial connotation of being a Latino immigrant. 
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Unlike other minorities, the sense of a shared fate based on race and discrimination does 
not have the same incidence among Latinos. While a white foreign born Latino/a who migrated 
from Venezuela and lives in Miami with his/her family might not have an issue with being called 
Latino/a and might find shared traits with other co-ethnics; a black native born Dominican who 
lives in New York might not find the term Latino close enough to his life experiences. In the same 
way, an indigenous woman from Guatemala who left the country after the civil war does not hold 
the same social, cultural, or political visions as a Chicana who was born in Texas. The intersection 
of all these variables will result in different political positions that cannot be just grouped under 
Latino politics.  
This research aims to find out to what extent the sense of Latinidad has had an effect among 
Latinos when participating in politics. However, the very generalization of Latinos in the United 
States has made this group a semi representative of three dominant subgroups: Mexicans, Puerto 
Ricans, and Cubans. How does Latinidad work amongst those who are not part of the dominant 
groups, but mostly how has the concept impacted their political engagement. Assuming that a 
group based consciousness influenced the political mobilizations of Mexican and Puerto Rican 
immigrants in the 1960s, it is necessary to know what is the situation for those who are newer 
immigrants and those who arrived to the United States later on time.  
Importance of the Study 
 This research is important because it seeks to analyze the experience of Latinos/Hispanics 
from a broader perspective. Much of the research, lacks broader categories of self-identification. 
Indeed, Latino studies have for a long time concentrated on the three major Latino subgroups. 
Political institutions have tried to portray the Latino community as cohesive, integrated, and 
multicultural. The reality is that recognition of diversity within the Latino community most of the 
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time does not go beyond a prime-time telenovela where the actors have different Spanish accents. 
It is important for Latino studies to see beyond the established categories of identification and 
consider self-identification.  
 This study is important because is an attempt to find out how those identified as “other 
Latinos” participate in politics. It is necessary to give visibility to those who are part of the 
Latino/Hispanic community and that are not represented by the pan-ethnic labels. The Latino vote 
has been called “decisive” in American politics, although Latino participation has been 
disappointing. Researchers and scholars have tried to find out why. Many causes have been 
proposed, including low rates of naturalization, strong ties to the country of origin, low levels of 
acculturation, etc. However, as the Latino studies literature points out, there is a gap regarding 
identity politics that needs to be covered. This thesis seeks to contribute to close the gap with 
regard to knowledge about those labeled as “other Latinos.” Only when Latino studies understands 
the uniqueness of those who participate in politics, will we be able to talk about the real power of 
Latino American immigrants and their descendants. 
Research Design and Methodology 
 In this thesis, I argue that the sense of Latinidad is approached differently depending on 
how the immigrant —or immigrant descendant— identifies himself/herself. This self-
identification then impacts the levels of political participation, particularly voting behavior. Latino 
studies scholars (DeSipio 1996; Beltrán 2010; Oboler1995; Mora 2014) have noticed before how 
immigrants tend to identify themselves in terms of country of origin, more than in pan-ethnic 
terms. I suggest that those who identify themselves by their country of origin, will not hold the 
same political visions as those who have embraced the pan-ethnic terms —Latino or Hispanic—. 
To test my case, I made a secondary analysis of existing data. I used the 2012 National Survey of 
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Latinos conducted by the Pew Research center. I used the available data to cross tabulate different 
variables related to identity, voting behavior, and acculturation. 
 The report published by the Pew Research Center only offered the results of the three major 
subgroups and the “other Latinos”. Therefore, I considered it important to make a larger analysis 
of the data, including other subgroups. For this reason, as independent variables, I used the 
questions related to ancestry and origin, in which the survey respondents identified themselves as 
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, other Central American, other South 
American, or other country. As dependent variables, I utilized a series of questions which I grouped 
under three categories: (1) identity, (2) voting behavior, and (3) acculturation. Then I performed 
an analysis of the results, comparing the responses of those who identified in the three main 
categories and those who identified themselves with the other labels. By doing this, I expected to 
find differences among respondents who were from different countries, as well as between those 
who identified as Hispanic or Latino with those who did not.  
Concepts 
 Throughout this thesis, I frequently use the terms Latino and Hispanic, and sometimes I 
use them interchangeably. Both terms have different implications and understandings, yet they 
have been socially confounded into the same meaning. State institutions use both terms as 
descriptive of a person who can trace his or her ancestry or origin to a Spanish speaking country. 
(Falconi and Mazzotti 2007) However, the term Latino has become more accepted and widely 
used among Latin American immigrants, given that the term Hispanic has been charged with more 
conservative stances. (Beltrán 2010) The association with Spain, as well as the neo-colonial 
connotation of the term Hispanic have been causes for this rejection. As Latino studies scholars 
like Suzanne Oboler have argued, the term Hispanic replaced more progressive ethnic labels like 
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“Chicano,” “Boricua,” or “Nuyorican.” Despite of such connotations, the term “Hispanic” has 
been widely utilized and it is still a reference for Latino American immigrants, which is why I 
considered it necessary to include it in my research along with Latino. For such reason, I have used 
both terms when I refer to the pan-ethnic label. 
 Another important concept in this document is Latinidad. As clearly defined by Cristina 
Beltrán, Latinidad is “the sociohistorical process whereby various Latin American national-origin 
groups are understood as sharing a sense of collective identity and cultural consciousness.” 
(Beltrán 2010: 4) Latinidad is a vital concept in this research because it helps to explain the 
establishment of the pan-ethnic label and its political implications.  
Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 is an introduction to the concept of Latinidad. In this chapter I explore Latino 
group identity, and how the pan-ethnic terms were established in the 1960s after Chicano and 
Puerto Rican groups mobilized for political rights. The history of the first Latino immigrant base 
groups in the United States helps to explain why the pan-ethnic terms were adopted, but at the 
same time why they have been contested. The establishment of a pan-ethnicity has created more 
division than group solidarity among Latinos/Hispanics, which as I suggest is one of the causes 
for low political engagement. Ironically, even when pan-ethnic labels were established to obtain 
more visibility and resources, the very perception of homogeneity that pan-ethnic labels implied, 
eclipsed other subgroups that were more politically active. The vagueness of the pan-ethnic 
concepts poses a problem for Latino politics itself.  
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Chapter 3 explores the rise of Latino politics, and the role of group identity in ethnic 
politics. As a minority group, Latinos/Hispanics are called to follow the steps of the other 
representative minority in the country, African Americans. However, as the chapter explains, the 
social, cultural, and political conditions of the two groups are different. The latter explains why 
Latinos have struggled to find their place in American politics. This chapter exposes the 
functioning of minority politics and the different elements that are part of it, as well as the different 
frameworks used to study it. Finally, the chapter addresses the problems of smaller ethnic groups 
in a pluralist political system.  
Chapter 4 contains the data analysis and the methodology that framed this research. In this 
chapter I made an analysis of the tables I obtained after tabulating the data from the 2012 National 
Survey of Latinos. Here, I also point out the results and suggestions for possible future research.  
Chapter 5 gathers the final conclusions of this research. It explains why other identity 
categories are needed to do a more complete analysis of Latino political participation. It also 
addresses the issues with the design of surveys that are directed to Latinos/Hispanics respondents. 
Finally, I address possible future research framed by self-identification labels, instead of pre-
established categories.  
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Chapter II 
Group Identity: The Construction of the Hispanic/Latino Pan-Ethnicity 
 
Introduction 
Today Latinos represent the largest and fastest-growing minority population in the United 
States. According to the Pew Research Center, 41.3 million documented and undocumented 
immigrants were living in the U.S. in 2013, and by 2015 the United States Census Bureau 
estimated that Hispanics were the biggest minority in the U.S. with a population of 55.4 million 
vs. 45.7 million African Americans. (Pew Research Center 2016) The Latino community’s 
influence over American society has been socially, culturally, and politically studied, with Latino 
political participation attracting the most interest from academics and politicians. The constant 
mentions about the importance and decisiveness of the Latino vote in the American electoral 
process, has placed large expectations of what Latinos can and should do, especially as 
immigration has become an important topic in the current political debate. Perhaps, one of the 
most discussed topics in academic circles is the role of ethnicity in the electoral process, since 
Latinos/Hispanics constitute an ethnically and racially diverse community.  
Terms like “Latino” or “Hispanic” are no longer unknown or ignored by American society. 
However, it is hard to tell until what point U.S. society ̶ including Latinos/Hispanics themselves ̶ 
fully understand the category. Often related to immigration —which is not entirely wrong—
Latinidad has been defined as a social, cultural, and political consciousness among the different 
Latino immigrant subgroups within the United States. Such consciousness can be as cohesive as it 
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is divisive, and does not imply unity or solidarity. (Mora 2014) This ambiguity is most pronounced 
in the realm of politics. Latinidad appeals to identity, and in American politics group identity has 
been determinant to the study of minorities and their political behavior. (McClain and Stewart 
2014) In this sense, it is important to ask how accurate it can be to assume that Latinos would 
behave cohesively because they are labeled a minority group? Further, how can we accurately 
predict the electoral behavior of such a distinct group formed by immigrants that come from 22 
different countries, that do not see themselves represented by an exclusive racial group, and that 
are culturally diverse. To understand the role of ethnicity and identity in Latino political 
participation and voting behavior, it is necessary to address the configuration of ethnic categories 
in the multicultural map that makes up the American population. 
The Immigrant Ethnic Configuration: Hispanic/Latino, American, or the Hyphened Origin. 
 By establishing the population’s identity through groups identity, it has been posited that 
it is possible to determine people’s social and political behavior. In the same manner, 
categorization has been the way to organize the different identity configurations, which can be 
framed by race, ethnicity, religion, language, or nationality. Ethnicity and race became important 
concepts in American politics since they help to establish categories that allow the government to 
approach the population in more concrete ̶ but often simplified ̶ ways. As argued by Rogers 
Brubaker, “categories permit ̶ indeed entail ̶ massive cognitive, social, and political 
simplification.” (Brubaker 2004: 71) In a country where immigration waves from different parts 
of the world have been taking place for the last two centuries, it can be institutionally effective to 
study and assess the population through groups and categories.  
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However, as Brubaker himself has criticized, there is a tendency for grouping, that in the 
long run can affect the reality we all perceive. He argues that race and ethnicity are ways to 
perceive the world not things in the world. He particularly considers it to be a problematic tendency 
“to reify such groups, […] as if they were internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, 
even unitary collective actors with common purposes.” (Brubaker 2004: 8) In the same way, Mary 
C. Waters points out that ethnicity, contrary to what many believe, is not a biological trait linked 
to ancestry. Instead she calls it a social phenomenon. (Waters 1996) Understanding ethnicity in 
such terms is important because ethnic traits should not be assumed as inherent to people who are 
passively grouped under a particular ethnicity. Just as with race, ethnicity is a social construction. 
(Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Waters 1996) In other words, what should be understood is that those 
elements have been socially established as grouping traits to define a population either culturally, 
socially, or politically. Whether there is an institutional need, or a political interest posed in this 
process, ethnic configurations do not always represent identities that individuals have chosen for 
themselves. These classifications often rely on official and institutional organizations. 
In the United States case, ethnic configurations were framed by early immigrant waves of 
Europeans, which as Portes and Rumbaut assert, provided “the fundamental matrix of American-
based politics for subsequent generations.” (Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America 1996: 102) 
Through the European waves of immigration in the Nineteenth Century the United States received 
Italian, Irish, Polish, Russian, and German immigrants, which at the same time could be Jewish, 
Catholic, or Protestant, and who were mainly concentrated in northern states. These immigrants 
were perhaps the ones to first pose the idea of ethnicity in American politics, since African 
Americans were categorized as a racial group. European immigrants were the ones to have 
hyphened identities tied to their countries of origin. As Waters (1990; 1996) has pointed out in her 
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studies about ethnic groups in the U.S., white ethnicities easily acculturated to American society 
and by the third generation, most of the immigrant descendants were able to utilize the ethnic 
identity by choice. On the other hand, with other waves of immigration ̶ especially of Latin 
Americans and Asians ̶ the process has been different.  
Unlike white ethnics’ processes of acculturation, non-white groups of immigrants had to 
go through different processes to obtain social recognition. For white ethnics, it was easier to blend 
in with a white society, which in institutional terms secured those communities access to certain 
privileges, but most of all it granted them no racialization processes. In other words, they did not 
have to use their ethnicity to be socially recognized and obtain the state’s support, which was not 
the case for African Americans and other minorities. As pointed out by Portes and Rumbaut 
(1996), a salient case of ethnic mobilization happened when Mexican American youth activists 
started to protest the state’s discrimination, mirroring the civil rights movement started by African 
Americans. In the 1960s, consciousness about otherness empowered incipient activists to articulate 
a discourse where a collective identity based on race, language, and culture could be embraced, in 
order to become a political force. “Chicano” became then an important form of identity because it 
encapsulated what Mexican-Americans perceived as representative of their culture and their social 
ethos as immigrants or descendants of immigrants. Unlike what other ethnic groups did before 
them, Chicanos adopted an anti-assimilation discourse while developing racial consciousness. 
(Beltrán 2010) The movement brought changes within the Mexican-American community, which 
can be seen in the election of Mexican descendants to the House of Representatives, as well as 
governors and mayors in different states. Yet, despite the pan-ethnic discourse that some scholars 
wish to attribute to the Chicano movement, the reality is that while it did gain terrain in the political 
 12 
 
realm, it was mostly for Mexican descendants. Despite being the largest immigrant group, 
Mexicans do not represent the whole Hispanic/Latino community. 
The Chicano movement, as well as the incipient Puerto Rican mobilizations uncovered the 
state’s need to categorize and define the growing number of people of Latin American descent. 
Even when Mexicans were the largest portion, there were also Puerto Rican and Cuban 
communities growing in the northeast and southeast. According to Rumbaut, “in the 1950s, the 
Census Bureau first published information on persons of Puerto Rican birth or parentage; 
tabulations of people of Cuban birth or parentage were first published in 1970. Efforts to demarcate 
and enumerate the Hispanic population as a whole, using subjective indicators of Spanish origin 
or descent, date back to the late 1960s.” (Rumbaut 2006: 20) But it was not until the 1970s that 
the U.S. Congress finally established the pan-ethnic term, “Hispanic”, as part of their statistical 
publications. Through the Public Law 94-311 Congress mandated the collection and dissemination 
of “economic and social statistics” of Spanish origin or descent.  
Race or Ethnicity?  
After the mentioned governmental disposition, the Hispanic category has changed mostly 
with regards to how the Hispanic question was implemented in Census Bureau questionnaires. 
Hispanics have posed a challenge to American statistical institutions because it was clear since the 
beginning that the Hispanic category could not be described as a racial category; therefore, it was 
necessary to establish it as an ethnicity. Yet, given the broad racial configuration of Hispanics, not 
allowing those who self-identified in racial terms to do so in the Census posed a problem, which 
it was noticeable in census responses. Before the U.S. Census Bureau established “some other 
race” as a category, most Latinos identified themselves as white. This was interpreted at the time 
as a sign of social mainstreaming, but the reality is that a large percentage of Latin Americans see 
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themselves as white. When having to choose between being Latino or being white, many Hispanic 
immigrants valued more their racial identity than the ethnic one. While the former has been 
internalized, the second one has been imposed. This is inherently related to the social and racial 
hierarchies, as well as the sense of privilege they are carrying over from their countries of origin.  
Unlike the biological criteria that the United States established as crucial for the definition 
of racial categories, Latino categorization of race does not solely respond to such conceptions. 
Clara E. Rodriguez argues, “Latinos’ views of race are dependent on a complex array of factors, 
one of which is the racial formation process in their country of origin. Other variables also 
influence their views of race, for example, generational differences, phenotype, class, age, and 
education.” (C. E. Rodriguez 2000: 7) It is not rare that Hispanics/Latinos when responding to the 
Census Bureau Censuses question about race provide answers such as mestizo, mulatto, indígena, 
or Indian (which does not refer to Indians in Latin America, but American Indians). The mutually 
exclusive categorization of race in the U.S. does not give space for Latino constructions of race 
that are usually more fluid. The latter does not mean that Latinos do not understand the connotation 
of the existent race categories, but it does mean that those terms are not descriptive of the Latinos 
self-identity.  
As immigrants, Latinos go through processes of racialization at the time of their arrival, 
where they are assigned a racial category. In most cases this given identity does not match with 
the vision they carry of themselves. As the 2010 Census Bureau shows, “51% of Latinos say their 
race is either “some other race” (26%) or volunteer that their race is “Hispanic or Latino” (25%). 
Meanwhile, one-third (36%) say their race is white and the remainder, 10%, identify their race as 
black, Asian or mixed race.” (Pew Research Center 2012: 15) These numbers are interesting given 
that the 2010 Census Bureau offered 15 different boxes to check to answer the question “what is 
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this person’s race?” None of these boxes included classifications where Latin American 
immigrants could fit. That is why most of the respondents ended up answering either “some other 
race” or “Hispanic or Latino,” which was not a valid category for the race question, as the Census 
Bureau explained. 
Similarly, the ethnic question, also posed many issues for the Census given that the label 
“Hispanic” was new for those ethnic groups knitted together under the category, and the 1990 
Census results demonstrated a high level of confusion among Hispanics. As Marrow points out, in 
the 1990 Census “significant proportions of some official Hispanic immigrant groups identified 
themselves as “not Hispanic,” including Venezuelans and immigrant groups from the Southern 
cone (Paraguayans, Argentines, Uruguayans, and Chileans).” (Marrow 2007: 45) The reason for 
this confusion is tied to the fact that some of these sub-groups of immigrants come from countries 
with large European, Asian, and Middle East immigration, and subsequently with complex racial 
relations. Thus, immigrants of these countries do not see themselves represented by a “Hispanic” 
or “Latino” category either, mostly because they have classified themselves in racial terms, not in 
ethnic ones. This represents a conflict to those who have been mainly classified as “white” or 
“European” back home. In fact, many indigenous immigrants who do not speak Spanish are also 
categorized as Latinos or Hispanics, despite of their Quechua, Mayan, or Aymara heritage. 
(Falconi and Mazzotti 2007)  
It is then necessary to acknowledge the differences between racial and ethnic 
classifications. As argued by Zulema Valdez, “ethnic identity is distinct from racial identity in the 
United States; each produces and reproduces different aspects of the social structure.” (Valdez 
2011: 470) Even when both are socially established categories, ethnicity has been socially and 
politically assigned as a way to recognize and organize groups of immigrants. On the other hand, 
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race has deeply defined the United states sociopolitical foundations. Using Anthony Marx’s words, 
“not only did states reinforce race to unify the nation, but race also made nation-states. The political 
production of race and of particular forms of nation-state were linked processes.” (Marx 1998: 
268) In this sense, the United states used racialization as the way to establish what America was 
ought to be, framed by white Anglo Saxon terms. However, as the United states established its 
imagined community1 parameters, other nations did as well. The result was a wide variety of 
national regimes, as well of racial classifications. 
Latin America is interesting because contrary to the racial binary established by the United 
States, Latin American nations were not solely framed by binary racial hierarchies. As Oboler 
argues, “the underlying religious, racial, and social bases of colonial Latin America’s history of 
miscegenation and consequent racial continuum were in sharp contrast to the black/white division 
of the United States” (Oboler 1995: 27). The intersection of race, class, and ethnicity has not been 
the same in Latin America as it has been in the United States. Likewise, these processes have been 
different throughout Latin America, and each country has used race, gender, class, status, origin 
and ethnicity in different ways, not only giving it different meaning but positioning them 
differently in social scales. To say that in Latin America class supersedes race and ethnicity can 
be narrow and misleading. What is certain is that the United States and Latin America have had 
different racial experiences, which has influenced the way in which Latin American immigrants 
and Latino descendants have constructed their identities. In this sense, it cannot be expected that a 
white Cuban immigrant experiences race in the same way as a black Dominican. Not only because 
of their skin color, but also because of the differentiated racial hierarchies in their origin countries. 
                                                          
1 As defined by Benedict Anderson (1983), a nation it is “an imagined political community.” As he 
argues, nations are imagined, modelled, adapted and transformed. Further, Anderson argues that is within 
national boundaries that racism manifest itself, justifying repression and domination. (Anderson 2006) 
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For instance, Dominicans have a large racial spectrum. A large number of shades can fit into a 
“white” classification. As put by Oboler: 
“Latin American immigrants in the United States, like people everywhere, are a very 
complex group whose class and race values, differentiated gender experiences, national 
differences, and political convictions and beliefs may interfere again and again with the 
construction of group solidarity among themselves […] people of Latin American descent 
also bring with them their socialization within Latin American hierarchical societies.” 
(Oboler 1995: 162) 
Carrying all this baggage, Latino immigrants encounter a new nomenclature, where they are no 
longer white, “light brown”, “bronzed”, “almost white”, “morenito”, “mestizo”, nor 
“indigenous.” It is not unexpected that racial and ethnic classifications in the United States result 
arbitrary to those Latin Americans who must use them, even more when back in their countries of 
origin they might have identify themselves with other ethnic categories such as Middle-eastern, 
Asian, or Jew.  
Although each country has a different racial regime, and except for indigenous 
communities who have always seen themselves excluded from society, it is quite shocking for 
some Latin American immigrants to be excluded from mainstream white society. In her own 
research about Peruvians in the United States, Karsten Paerregaard concluded that, 
“many Peruvians, particularly upper and middle-class migrants, are reluctant to comply 
with the expectations of the receiving society by assuming the status of a minority group. 
They find the category Hispanic problematic because it brackets them together with the 
predominant minority groups in the United States, homogenizes national and cultural 
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diversities, and classifies them as marginalized and stigmatized Latin American 
immigrants.” (Paerregaard 2005: 81) 
The underlying problem here is not that Latinos/Hispanics are being classified as Latino or 
Hispanic, it’s that these labels have been racialized. Being Latino or Hispanics becomes a social 
problem for those who do not see themselves as a minority, who do not see themselves as “brown,” 
and to who this classification contrast with the position they occupied in the racial hierarchies back 
home. Acculturation has been equated with whiteness, which leads to wonder if being American 
is being white? Are those of Hispanic/Latino descent condemned to be outsiders forever? Such 
complexities cannot and should not be obviated. It is neither accurate to dismiss Latinos racial 
constructions, nor it is not precise to put them all under the same “ethnic label.”  
It is important then to recognize that “Hispanic” or “Latino” are labels that most of the 
time, are imposed by the state, government institutions, the media, ethnic group leaders, and even 
the recipient society. As Portes and Rumbaut argue, states can create ethnic minorities by acting 
towards groups as they were internally bounded and externally different to mainstream society. 
(Portes and Rumbaut, Immigrant America 1996) “Latino” and “Hispanic” respond to official 
classifications that might or not appeal to peoples’ identity, but that are the result of the negotiation 
between the state’s necessity to categorize people of different descent, and the mobilization 
processes for political and social recognition of minorities. As Brubaker points out,  
“Ethnic categories […] not only structure perception and interpretation in the ebb and flow 
of everyday interaction but channel conduct through official classifications and 
organizational routines. Thus, ethnic categories may be used to allocate rights, regulate 
actions, distribute benefits and burdens, construct category-specific tributes, “cultivate” 
populations, or, at the extreme, “eradicate” unwanted “elements.”” (Brubaker 2004: 26) 
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As a result, Latin American immigrants have gone through a complex process of self-identity 
classification, which has determined the socio-political configuration of the Hispanic/Latino 
community. In this sense, the cultural complexities within the pan-ethnic group, the different 
contexts of reception, the different times of migration, and the unequal proportions of some 
subgroups have impacted the lack of cohesion between sub-groups. Similarly, the external 
conceptions and stereotyping of Hispanics/Latinos as being all “the same,” has caused internal 
disagreements that have ended up pushing Hispanics further away from the pan-ethnic label. 
To understand the conflicts between the different subgroups within the Hispanic/Latino 
category, it is necessary to understand its composition, how is it structured, and the history that 
shaped the ethnic label as we understand it nowadays, in the pan-ethnic sense. The process requires 
the confluence of different elements: the social struggles of minority groups, the need of political 
representation, the institutional needs for categorization, and the constant growth of the immigrant 
population plot for the establishment of a new census category.  
Hispanics/Latinos Composition: Who Are They? And Where Do They Come From?  
The main subgroups defining Latino ethnicity are Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. 
On the other hand, South Americans, Central Americans, and Dominicans make up a large 
percentage of the group. The former group has been largely studied and their importance has been 
explicitly stated. However, it is important to recall that the other three subgroups have been 
growing more rapidly. For example, nationwide, the number of Dominicans does not compare to 
Mexicans, but the number of Dominican immigrants’ living in New York City is high, which has 
granted them an important role in the city. According to a Pew Research Center report in 2015, 
“about eight-in-ten Dominicans (79%) live in the Northeast, and nearly half (47%) live in New 
York.” (López and Patten 2015: 27) To understand the origins of the term Latinidad, and the 
 19 
 
Latino/Hispanic label, it is necessary to assess the history of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban 
communities and their process of ethnic recognition, since it was partly through their political 
activism that recognition of Latinos/Hispanics as a demographic category was established. (Mora 
2014; Beltrán 2010) 
By the 1960s, there were three major minority subgroups in the United States that shared 
certain commonalities, and that were often referred as “Spanish speakers”. Mexican Americans, 
Cuban Americans, and Puerto Ricans “made up the overwhelming majority of the Latin American 
diaspora, but they lived in separate parts of the country” (Mora 2014: 2) which made their political 
influence less certain. African Americans’ fight for civil rights was not ignored by these groups 
that also saw themselves as politically, culturally, economically and socially isolated from 
mainstream American society. In this context, Chicano based civil rights organizations started to 
protest a government that did not recognized their rights as workers. As worded by Beltrán, in a 
beginning Latinidad came to represent “an effort to expose group-based inequality, providing 
people with shared history of racial struggle and a powerful sense of linked fate that has emerged 
as the basis for collective politics.” (Beltrán 2010: 7) In the same way, Puerto Rican groups started 
to focus on political based activism. However, it was not until the 1970s that U.S. government 
took more seriously the activism of “Spanish speakers.” During this time, activists saw the 
necessity for a bigger structure, that compelled both Mexican Americans or Chicanos, and Puerto 
Ricans.  
The National Council of La Raza (NCLR) was not the first organization that thought of a 
pan-ethnic vision, but it “was the first organization to embody the notion of pan-ethnicity and 
actively court Puerto Rican, Mexican American, and Cuban American constituents at a national 
level.” (Mora 2014: 51) The NCLR grew and went national, which is criticized by scholars like 
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Mora. She argues that going national took possible funds to invest into local communities, and it 
opened the door for lobbying agencies to divert attention to other issues. Indeed, the NCLR 
achieved one of its main goals, which was to be pan-ethnically recognized by the Census Bureau, 
and after the 1970 Census, being organized under the Hispanic pan-ethnic label paid off, because 
through minority group recognition, activist and civil rights organizations were able to apply for 
governmental grants and publish their own reports in regards the Hispanic community. As Beltrán 
puts it, “by defining themselves in terms of Latinidad, Latino political elites and their advocates 
believe they are better able to both secure federal resources and gain national exposure.” (Beltrán 
2010: 7) 
It is important then to distinguish the different actors involved in the process of establishing 
the ethnic label. Although the government and its institutions, represented by the Census Bureau, 
were greatly involved, Hispanic-based organizations, activists, and bureaucrats were also 
implicated; in fact, they were propellers of this adoption. In this sense, even though homogenizing 
tendencies were clearly embedded by the Latinization of Spanish speaking immigrants, this choice 
was neither random nor unplanned. On the contrary, it was politically embraced. Even though 
those groups were struggling for recognition by the U.S. government, it was unfortunate that this 
recognition was only granted through a broader group identity definition. It seems like important 
particularities had to be, and are still being, sacrificed for a “greater” political good. Interestingly, 
Cuban Americans were not charmed by these grass roots movements, which made the 
establishment of a pan-ethnic organization a difficult task to achieve. They serve as a good example 
of what pan-ethnic became: an idea of inclusiveness that turned into a constant disagreement.  
With a category label established, it was then necessary appeal to people in order to 
convince them to make use of that label. At the time —and still— Hispanic descendants did not 
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see themselves as Hispanics/Latinos. They kept either using the subgroup —Chicano, Mexican 
American, Puerto Rican, Cuban American— label, or the country of origin to describe themselves 
and their group identity. As Mora describes, “the charge that pan-ethnicity was an artificial 
construct was difficult to deflect, if only because there were no surveys that asked subgroups 
whether they felt pan-ethnic and no studies that examined which identity subgroups preferred.” 
(Mora 2014: 77) However, the ethnic questions did not only pose issues with regard to cultural 
heterogeneity or country of origin variations, it also resulted in problems with racial identification. 
Again, the Hispanic label does not say anything about the individual’s racial identification, and 
the definition of Hispanic/Latino as an ethnicity prevented many from defining themselves racially 
given that the Census Bureau did not allow —until the 2010 Census—  double [racial/ethnic] 
identification.  
It is also important to discuss the conflict caused by the term chosen by the Census Bureau 
as the category to classify Latin Americans immigrants. The term Hispanic “was tied to the notion 
of Hispano, a term used by the purported descendants of Spanish families in the Southwest to 
distance themselves from Native Americans and other groups […] having a Hispanic identity 
became a way for established families of Spanish and even Mexican descent to distance themselves 
from poor, undocumented, first generation Mexican immigrants.” (Mora 2014: 107) However, the 
term was added by the Census Bureau in the 1970 Census. Recently, the term Latino has acquired 
strength, and it is largely used by media, politicians, activists, and bureaucrats. Yet, the shift of 
terminology has not affected or change the meaning and implications of the pan-ethnicity. 
Although, according to the Pew Research Center “51% say they have no preference for either term 
[Hispanic or Latino]. A third (33%) say they prefer the term “Hispanic” and fewer than half as 
many (14%) say they prefer the term “Latino.”” (Pew Research Center 2012: 14) Above all, both 
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terms are used, and despite their different implications, they both have been assumed and 
institutionalized. 
 It is then clear why grassroots organizations, activists, and incipient Hispanic politicians 
advocated for the establishment of a pan-ethnicity. Social recognition and political participation, 
a Hispanic agenda, and government investment were the main reasons. The government needed to 
collect better and more accurate data about this growing group of immigrants. After this long 
process, it is fair to ask if such classification has worked out for the good of the Hispanic 
population, or if it has diminished opportunities for certain subgroups. More importantly, it is 
necessary to analyze how the pan-ethnic label influences “newer” Latino subgroups such as South 
Americans, other Central Americans, and Dominicans. Equally important is to assess other groups 
like Brazilians or Haitians, which are commonly grouped into Pan-ethnic labels. However, their 
geographical origin is not an indicator of similarity with other Latin American countries. Both 
countries speak languages other than Spanish, which sets them apart from the “Spanish speaking” 
Latino groups.  
How strong is the attachment to the pan-ethnicity for all these groups and subgroups? How 
does the pan-ethnicity affect their political engagement? How does it work for smaller subgroups 
that formed years after the term was officially established? Do they see themselves represented 
and recognized within the pan-ethnic category? As Beltrán explains, “activists’ critique of racism 
and political and economic inequality represents one of the most important and successful aspects 
of the movement’s legacy […] but while both movements put forward a powerful critique of the 
problems facing Chicanos and Puerto Ricans, they proved less effective political strategy.” 
(Beltrán 2010: 33) At least one that would embrace heterogeneity, not only as a cultural element 
but as a political tool.  
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The Pan-ethnicity Issue: Inclusive or Divisive? 
 Portes and Rumbaut argue that the ethnic identification process starts with “the application 
of a label to oneself in a cognitive process of self-categorization, involving not only a claim to 
membership in a group or category but also a contrast of one’s group or category with other groups 
or categories.” (Portes and Rumbaut, Legacies 2001: 151) In this sense, and as it has been formerly 
assessed, identity is framed by one’s perception, as well as for the others’ perceptions, then comes 
the categorization process. Such a process can take two routes: the individual categorization 
coincides with the established categories, or it does not. Although this process seemed to work 
with European white ethnicities, the situation clearly changed with the waves of migration from 
Latin America and Asia. If we consider the idea that part of the process of finding out how to 
identify ethnically is to answer the question of where do I come from? For those of Hispanic/Latino 
ancestry the answers will be numerous and different. The answer will also be different from 
European white immigrants. Hispanics/Latinos and Asians, have been labeled under pan-ethnic 
and racial categories instead of country of origin.  
Even when governmental systems and institutions insist on constructing ethnic labels 
framed in cultural traits, Latin American immigrants and their descendants have different 
perspectives on their ethnic identity. It is evident that Hispanics/Latinos are aware of the label that 
has been imposed upon them, although it does not mean that they embrace it or use it in their 
regular daily routine, nor does it mean they reject it; more likely they use it whenever best suited 
or necessary. However, it is not uncommon to hear Latinos complain about improper or inaccurate 
characterizations of their identity. As argued by Flores-González, Aranda, and Vaquera, Latinos 
go through “processes of racialization that forces [them] to negotiate racial boundaries—or to “do 
race”—in a society that devalues their identities and imposes racial identities that they may not 
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embrace.” (Flores-González, Aranda and Vaquera 2014: 1848) Further, they are regularly assigned 
the wrong country of origin, and have their country’s culture trivialized. More explicitly, Latinos 
are often all included within the Mexican nationality, or it is implied that they all “eat tortillas” 
and “like mariachis”. But the trivialization of cultural traits and homogenization of the 
Latinos/Hispanics does not solely come from inattentive white American citizens; contrarily, it is 
also a deeper issue rooted in political interests of Latino/Hispanic activists, politicians, and media 
entrepreneurs. (Mora 2014; Beltrán 2010) As mentioned before, the categorization of 
Hispanics/Latinos should be also understood as a label that only applies to Latin American 
immigrants and/or descendants of these within the United States context. In other words, Latino 
or Hispanic are not concepts that have a meaning outside the U.S. context; in other continents, 
Latin Americans might be just called Latin Americans, South or Central Americans, and would 
probably be individualized by country of origin.  
The understanding of identity should go beyond the categorization of ethnicities and racial 
groups; however, as Herbert J. Gans pointed out, “ultimately, ethnic and racial identities exist in 
America because Americans label, stereotype, and rank each other in part by behavior patterns, 
values, and attitudes that they associate with skin color, visible facial and other physical features, 
and ancestral country or region of origin.” (Gans 2007: 98) It seems then inexorable to try to escape 
the stereotyping upon people that look different to the mainstream population, either by their 
phenotypical characteristics or because of how they act, the place they come from, their name, or 
the language they speak. Arlene Dávila makes an interesting argument about the pervasiveness of 
dominant stereotypes upon the Latino/Hispanic category, as she reflects on the pressing urgency 
of media, economic, and political elite organizations to maximize an image that portrays 
Latinos/Hispanics as potential consumers-citizens. In this sense, Latinos are not only stereotyped 
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as the “other,” they are expected to respond to a category not consciously adopted, but generated 
for them and imposed upon them. In Dávila’s words “as an imposed category, Hispanic/Latina is 
subject to constant negotiation with regard to the multiple identifications of Hispanics as also 
Mexican, Colombian, or “Nuyorican.”” (Dávila 2001: 90-91) The complexity of group identity for 
Hispanics/Latinos is then framed by the diverse characteristics of Latin Americans, who despite 
sharing cultural traits such as language, cannot homogeneously be described by a category. The 
broadness of the concept becomes then more divisive than cohesive, threatening the project of 
Latinidad.   
Scholars have used pan-ethnicity to describe “when different ethnic or tribal groups 
cooperate, organize, and build institutions and identities across ethnic boundaries.” (Okamoto and 
Mora 2014: 220) These are processes that, as they explain, “have taken place among immigrant 
groups who have entered host societies with regional, national origin, and language differences 
and, over time, have come together and developed pan-ethnic identities.” (Okamoto and Mora 
2014: 220) This is the case for Hispanics and Asians in the United States, who under the pan-
ethnic term comprise different ethnic sub-groups. As posed by Okamoto and Mora (2014), 
diversity is an inherent characteristic of pan-ethnic grouping; further, they argue, it needs to be 
promoted. The problem is that such promotion is not complete, and still seems to be framed around 
the notion of Hispanics being mostly Mexican or Caribbean descendants. Culturally, such 
promotion might have more outlets; but politically, the Hispanic/Latino category is still 
monolithic, and largely represented by the three major subgroups.   
As explained by Beltrán, “the process of Latinidad is both complex and contradictory, 
involving issues of immigration, colonialism, conquest, race, color, gender, sexuality, class, and 
language […] Understood as a political category, Latinidad presumes that Latinos as a group share 
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a common collective consciousness.” (Beltrán 2010: 5) It is certainly complex and somehow 
dangerous to assume this if you consider the vast differences among its members; in this sense, 
you cannot expect a unified outcome when exposed to political decisions. Latinidad or Hispanidad 
says nothing about citizenship status, country of origin, economic class, or level of education. 
Therefore, the Hispanic/Latino category does not only entail a possible problem of cultural identity 
but also of political representation, which is ironic given that the category was essentially created 
as part of a process of socio-political recognition. In other words, there is always a chance of 
disconnection between those who are part of the political elite and the rest of the Latino community 
which they represent. In his research, Louis DeSipio has noticed that particularly in the last 
decades, political elites ̶ except for Cuban elites ̶ have adopted the pan-ethnic label as a political 
voice, instead of using their national-origin identities. On the other hand, he noticed at a mass 
level, Hispanics still identify themselves with their country of origin; although these perceptions 
can vary across generations. (DeSipio, Latino Civic and Political Participation 2006) 
The latter is visible in a city like Miami where Latino political representation is evidently 
taken by a sub-group of a certain origin. As described by Aranda, Hughes, and Sabogal, despite 
its cultural diversity, “Miami is politically stratified as the result of unequal contexts of immigrant 
arrival. [Therefore] left without a voice, vote, or representation from someone of their community, 
many of Miami’s newer immigrant residents perceive formal political exclusion as a long-term 
condition.” (Aranda, Hughes and Sabogal 2014: 162) It is clear, by Miami’s example which it is 
comparable to other metropolis situation, that some subgroups of immigrants have not been able 
to achieve complete incorporation to the political realm, and have to adjust their agendas to the 
political agendas of other “dominant” subgroups, such as Cubans in south Florida. Yet, scholars 
like DeSipio argue that the changes experienced in Latino composition and the efforts made by 
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political elites to promote unity have allowed the creation of what he calls a “modestly cohesive 
Latino issue agenda;” however, this modest foundation, he also acknowledges, is not a guarantee 
for a strong political or civic participation, and it is also not determinant for partisan identification.  
(DeSipio, Latino Civic and Political Participation 2006) It seems then, that Latinidad as a political 
force is still incipient and framed by other characteristics like demographic composition and the 
area of residence.   
Using pan-ethnic or “umbrella” labels, either as a marketing or a political strategy, only 
encourages stereotypes based in the assumption that sharing a language, a colonial past, and a 
religion, which it is not entirely true and has become now a regular stereotype, are enough elements 
to talk about a homogeneous minority group.(Gimenez 2006; Dávila 2001; Beltrán 2010) Not only 
is the term Latino/Hispanic a misrepresentation of those who get labeled by it, but the term itself 
encloses a certain ambiguity since the term has received many different definitions, and different 
characteristics have been attributed to it. On one side, many scholars agree on a common ground 
that refers to a shared language, shared culture, and Hispanic ancestors. Others just talk about a 
shared set of values represented by culture, religion, and family values. On the other side, as 
defined by the Census Bureau ““Hispanic or Latino” refers to a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto 
Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of race.” (United 
States Census Bureau 2011: 2) The Census Bureau definition is clear, but not broad enough since 
it only attains the concept to a geographical characteristic. The conceptualization of Latinidad is 
very important, and I will be assessing it later, however, it is vital here to understand the conflict 
surrounding the very concept itself.  
The terms Latino/Hispanic have ended up being indistinctively and interchangeably used, 
which also proves the ambiguity of the pan-ethnic labels. As Mora argues, “over time, the 
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ambiguous category becomes more popular as more actors enter the field and use the new 
classification to achieve their organizational goals […] By then, the category is completely 
institutionalized, and the new classification is, like other classifications, assumed to have existed.” 
(Mora 2014: 159) In this sense, government officials, the media, and politics activist have helped 
to institutionalize the meaning of an ambiguous concept that seeks to define what this heap 
[citizens, non-citizens, foreign born, native born, first, second, or third generation, black, white, 
indigenous or mixed, etc.] of Latin American immigrants implies in American society. What 
results more interesting is the political appointment that Latinos/Hispanics have been given: “The 
sleeping giant.” (Montoya 1999) This term is as ambiguous as the pan-ethnic one, and does not 
help to represent Latinidad in other concepts beyond stereotypes. Still, interests have been posed 
in the importance of “waking up” the giant.    
Terms like Latino, Hispanic, or Latinidad reference those elements that allow the 
government, the media, and politicians to group Latin American immigrants or their descendants 
into the same category, but at the same time imply the ambiguities within the different subgroups 
inhabiting the Hispanic/Latino “melting pot.” Thus, despite of the institutional categorizations, the 
concept of identity goes beyond imposed categories. As Gans points out, “identity is one half of a 
twin concept, the other half being identification. People not only identify themselves but are 
identified by others […] As a result, racial and ethnic affiliations have to be looked at with both 
concepts.” (Gans 2007: 99) As much as the pan-ethnic terms that have been established and are 
utilized by government institutions, Latino political elites and the media, in both Spanish and 
English, it does not mean that such terms have been assimilated or accepted by the Hispanic 
population. What happens then when “the giant” does not wake up? How can be explained that 
Latinos like to watch telenovelas from Univision or Telemundo, but still follow the news from 
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their countries of origin? How can the politicians and political parties translate the certain cohesive 
cultural elements of the ethnic community into politics? It is arguable to think that the mere fact 
of speaking the same language would in fact shape political participation. It is important then to 
make an analysis of Latino group identity in order to understand the variations of this group 
perceptions of identity in comparison to the theories of group identity developed in the United 
States which have defined in the most part the political analysis of ethnic and racial groups political 
participation.   
Latinidad: Hispanic/Latino Group Consciousness  
 Latinidad has served to “essentialize” what Latinos/Hispanics are. At the same time, 
Latinidad encompasses the shared characteristics of Latino/Hispanic immigrants, who trace their 
roots to Spanish-speaking countries. As defined by Idler, “a Hispanic in American society is 
someone who has a particular cultural or national origin […] a Hispanic or Latino is a person of 
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American or other Spanish culture or origin 
regardless of race.” (Idler 2007: 125) In this sense, a shared language, a colonial past, religion, and 
the fact of being conquest by Spain have been the characteristics established as common and 
descriptive of Latinos/Hispanics. Beyond the establishment of the Hispanic/Latino category by 
governmental institutions, the pan-ethnicity has transformed the identity imaginary of those who 
claim national identity from countries of Latin America. In other words, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that by claiming the pan-ethnic label, Latinos/Hispanics are accepting that they not 
only fulfill the characteristics of Latinidad, but also that they agree with them. It is not strange that 
the majority of adult Hispanics prefer to identify themselves with their countries of origin, instead 
of using the pan-ethnic term. (Pew Research Center 2012) However, second and third generation 
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Latino, who have not gone through an immigration process, might have a different perspective. 
After processes of acculturation the self-identity term preference can vary. 
 As it has been mentioned before, the term Latinidad has found in electoral politics its best 
ally. In part, the pan-ethnic label was finally established because of the necessity of providing a 
more accurate sample at the time of analyzing voting behavior reports. Statistical portraits were an 
important reason for the development of the pan-ethnicity. (Mora 2014) However, as argued by 
scholars such as Mora (2014) and Beltrán (2010), the legitimization of the pan-ethnic category was 
not only imposed by the government, pan-ethnic advocates were highly involved in the process: 
For advocates of pan-ethnicity, the assumption is that Latinos in the United States share 
not only cultural and linguistic characteristics but also a political perspective […] This 
confliction of cultural and linguistic characteristics with a shared political perspective is 
not simply a phenomenon of the mass media. In academic and political forums, 
sympathetic to the concept of Latinidad, Latinos have long been characterized as a political 
community identifiable by a shared sense of mutual obligation, unity, and a commitment 
to the common good of the group. (Beltrán 2010: 106) 
Nowhere has been the concept of Latinidad more used than in politics, and it is precisely in this 
sphere where misconceptions and stereotypes of Latinos/Hispanics are affecting the most their 
political involvement. Based on group identity politics theories, it is expected that Latinos behave 
alike, consequently it is also expected that Latinos will vote similarly.  
Such expectation is founded in the claim that pan-ethnic identification allows proper 
political socialization. Thus, “enhanced political power is conflated with enhanced group 
identification. In this view, Latinos represent a potential electorate whose developing group 
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identity holds the potential for increasingly cohesive political action.” (Beltrán 2010: 123-124) 
Contrarily, pan-ethnic identification does not seem to tell a lot about partisan identification or 
voting choices.  This interpretative paradigm comes from an analysis of African Americans civil 
rights movements, but as stated before, African Americans case cannot be equated to the 
Latino/Hispanic process in the U.S. politics. This is not only because of the different reasons for 
each group to be in the United States, but also because of the cultural broadness of the latter. What 
is important to recognize is that Latinidad tries to work a dual paradigm. On one side, Latinidad 
evokes a homogeneous framework, but on the other side, recognizes the heterogeneity of those 
who get to be called Hispanic/Latino. The reality is that Latinidad has not been strictly defined, 
not because there are not enough definitions of the term, but because the concept is vague and 
ambiguous. When is it proper or necessary to be homogeneous, and when is it acceptable to be 
heterogeneous?  Who dictates such switches between paradigms, and to what point is the pan-
ethnic label just contributing to cultural stereotypes of Latin American descendants?  
Cristina Beltrán describes the concept of Latinidad from an interesting approach, she 
argues that this concept is “itself fugitive, with roots in the transgressive histories of excluded 
subjects who come to understand themselves as political actors.” (Beltrán 2010: 73) Further, she 
uses Wolin’s concept of “evanescent homogeneity” to explain how Latinidad is an “experience of 
commonality whose existence is forever possible yet never guaranteed.” (Beltrán 2010: 74) This 
conceptualization of Latinidad accurately describes what happens within the Latino/Hispanic 
community, where there is a sense of commonalities and shared experiences among people, which 
do not seem to be enough to guarantee a bloc voting or electoral behavior. In other words, the fact 
that Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans speak the same language or profess the same 
religious beliefs does not guarantee that they will have the same political agenda, nor will they 
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vote for the same political party. There are several conditions that can influence the attitudes of 
Latinos/Hispanics towards politics.  
As Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand explain in their approach of Latino attitudes variation 
towards immigration, there are different independent variables that are expected to influence such 
changes:  
(1) economic self-interest and labor competition; (2) subgroup differences based on 
national origin; (3) measures of ethnic attachment and acculturation (e.g., generation status, 
Latino and language identity, attachment to American culture); (4) political and 
demographic attributes; and (5) contextual variables. (Rouse, Wilkinson and Garand 2010: 
858)  
Even though, their research is centered in immigration issues, I consider this a good example of 
the variety of elements that can influence political attitudes, voting behavior, and partisanship. 
From these categories, national origin, acculturation, and demographic context, I believe, are 
important variables that are left out by the pan-ethnicity. As the Pew Research Center 
demonstrates, Hispanics visions and values are not constant or predictable. For instance, the usage 
of Spanish as a main language drastically changes per generation, as well as if the population is 
foreign born or native born. Accordingly, the variations are also visible in politics, religion and 
values. (Pew Research Center 2012) 
 For instance, “foreign-born Hispanics are more likely than native-born Hispanics to 
describe their political views as conservative—35% versus 28%. Meanwhile, native-born 
Hispanics are more likely than immigrant Hispanics to describe their political views as “very 
liberal” or “liberal”—34% versus 27%.” (Pew Research Center 2012: 31) Moreover their 
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particular vision of certain topics such as abortion and homosexuality, are also diverse, and might 
not align with either “liberal” or “conservative” categories. Further, that classification might not 
even affect partisanship, as it is the case of Mexicans that despite their religiousness. they have 
been historically aligned with the Democratic party. When it comes to electoral predictions, 
simplistic assumptions of the Latino culture usually take over facts, and ignore the diverse reality 
of Latino/Hispanic voters.  
Conclusion: Latino/Hispanic Unidentified 
 
Pan-ethnic identification not only fails to represent the variety of the group members, but 
does not get to engage Latinos into using the pan-ethnic term. Latinos/Hispanics are not fully 
committed, and do not seem to embrace the pan-ethnic term as it was intended. According to the 
Pew Research Center:  
Only about one-quarter (24%) of Hispanic adults say they most often identify themselves 
by “Hispanic” or “Latino.” [Further,] about half (51%) say they identify themselves most 
often by their family’s country or place of origin—using such terms as Mexican, Cuban, 
Puerto Rican, Salvadoran or Dominican. And 21% say they use the term “American” most 
often to describe themselves. The share rises to 40% among those who were born in the 
U.S. (Pew Research Center 2012: 9) 
Similarly, Latinos differ in their views about a shared Hispanic culture. To this point, just 29% of 
Latinos think that Hispanics share a common culture, on the other hand 69% say Latinos in the 
U.S. have many different cultures. (Pew Research Center 2012) This trend is consistent among 
first, second, and third generation of Latinos, although there are some variations in numbers, the 
tendency is to embrace more other identity terms rather than the pan-ethnic label. 
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 As previously stated, the distribution of Hispanics/Latinos within the country is an 
important element for the analysis of pan-ethnic identity. Yet, the geographical distribution of 
Hispanics has changed in the recent years. According to Durand, Telles, and Flashman the 
distribution “no longer seems to obey traditional patterns of concentration, in which networks of 
social relationships, ethnic enclaves, and niches in labor markets function as mechanism of 
attraction and permanence for this population.” (Durand, Telles and Flashman 2006: 88) As argued 
by DeSipio, geographical and demographic distribution affect the foundations of a pan-ethnic 
community, the fact that the distribution of Hispanics is not the same it was in previous years, the 
configuration of a pan-ethnic political agenda is less certain than what pan-ethnic advocates seem 
to accept. More important is the “newer” composition of the ethnic group, because it evidences 
the dissonance between the actual composition of the Hispanics and the perception of the same. 
The 2010 U.S. Census Bureau shows that “among the 12.3 million Hispanics who were classified 
as Other Hispanic in 2010, 1.4 million were of Dominican origin, 4.0 million were of Central 
American origin, 2.8 million were of South American origin.” (United States Census Bureau 2011: 
3) However, the other Latinos are still largely unrepresented, not only politically but culturally.  
 As posed by Beltrán, even though advocates and politicians have tried to focus their 
discourse on diversity and inclusion, “the political logic of pan-ethnicity continues to harbor its 
own homogenizing impulse.” (Beltrán 2010: 100) Simply because the mere fact of speaking to 
Latinos supposes the existences of a cohesive group that responds to such category. The problem 
is not only the homogenizing nature of the label, but the vagueness of the concept. As it has been 
explained through these pages, the categorization of Latin American immigrants and their 
descendent as Latinos/Hispanics it might be institutionally accepted, but socially contested. 
Previous cases of immigration have demonstrated that acculturation is an unavoidable step, and 
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that by the third generation it is likely that those descendants of a certain ethnic group end up 
negotiating and shifting their identity category. Similarly, those who are foreign born are expected 
to maintain their attachment with the origin country. Although they might end up acknowledging 
the new category imposed upon them, they will probably shift identities back and forth.  
 The use of the pan-ethnic label is too vague. As Beltrán puts it, “if pan-ethnicity is a flawed 
paradigm for analyzing public health issues such as reproductive and child-rearing habits, it 
becomes even more problematic when trying to assess something like “Latino political interests” 
or a “Hispanic political viewpoint”” (Beltrán 2010: 108) Vagueness and ambiguity, are the 
strongest flaws of adopting a pan-ethnic label. (Mora 2014; Beltrán 2010; Gimenez 2006; Dávila 
2008) However, it is certain that such adoption has worked to cluster the attention over 
Latinos/Hispanics, and their increasing role in American society. It is then necessary to ask if it is 
not Latinidad what predicts Latino political behavior, what is it? And further, if the main three 
subgroups —Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans— were the ones to establish this pan-ethnicity 
and its correspondent agenda, what is the role of the other subgroups that are also part of what is 
now known as Latinos/Hispanics. The complexity of the Hispanic/Latino community leads us to 
direct our attention to those subgroups that have not been as largely studied since their study might 
reframe the understanding we have of Latinidad. 
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Chapter III 
Latino Politics: Ethnic Politics vs. American Integration 
 
 Group identity has been established as a crucial element in the acceptance and adoption of 
ethnic labels. Likewise, the establishment of pan-ethnic labels has been the way minority groups 
have achieved institutional recognition. That is why when talking about Latino politics, it is 
impossible to escape a discussion of identity. As a minority group, Latinos have been politically 
addressed and interpreted through the lenses of African American political movements, which are 
strongly linked to identity politics. Factors like size, geographic concentration, civil rights 
participation, and economic well-being influence how racial and ethnic minority groups are treated 
and perceived within American politics. As explained by McClain and Stewart “a consideration of 
these factors identifies the commonalities and the differences among the various groups that are 
often lumped together under the rubric ‘minority group politics.’” (McClain and Stewart 2014: 31) 
The African-American case is perhaps the most salient when talking about minority politics in the 
United States, but there are important differences between Blacks and Latinos that cannot be 
overlooked. Identity works out as a prominent mobilization factor for African American 
communities, but does it work the same for Latino groups? As argued in the previous chapter, 
Hispanic/Latino labels have not been embraced by all members of the Latino community, and 
previous efforts to build a strong Latino political movement have not had the expected outcomes. 
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Latino Studies’ scholars (DeSipio & De la Garza 1996; Dávila 2001; Mora 2014), have 
concluded that ethnicity has not always been a decisive factor in Latino political behavior; 
although other authors (Barreto 2007; 2014) defend the idea of ethnicity as the central component 
of Latino politics. Significant or not, it is certain the ethnicity issue turns out to be more complex 
than race when talking about identity politics. African American group consciousness is inherently 
linked to race, but Latinos group consciousness is linked to the idea of cultural commonalities. In 
this aspect, Rodney E. Hero explains: 
Culture may suggest a sense of shared memories and history and notions of community, 
and/or a distinct convergence of opinions, if only in the aggregate, about various issues of 
public concern; it may orient but not necessarily determine affinities in every case all the 
time. Latinos also have many differences attributable to experience and self-perception as 
an ethnic group, and as a result of immigration status, and/or attachment to one’s home 
country, which complicates and are additional dimensions of Latinos’ group sense or 
culture. (Hero 2007: xi) 
According to Hero, the study of Latino politics has emphasized the cultural frame, instead of other 
aspects, which makes it especially complex given the ambiguity of the concept itself. In this sense, 
the association of ethnicity with culture can be either cohesive or divisive, given that it is up to the 
individual to recognize the commonalities or to racialize the differences. Furthermore, the 
discussion about Latino politics does not only imply the ethnic issues within Latinos, it also implies 
the separation of Latino politics from American politics. As Espino and Leal explain “the study of 
Latino politics is grounded in the more general study of American politics […] Latinos do not exist 
in Latin America; the term only has meaning within the United States.” (Espino and Leal, 
Introduction 2007: 4) Accordingly, Hero addresses the debate recognizing the importance of 
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studying both since they are intrinsically related, “neither American politics nor of Latino politics 
are by themselves sufficient, though both are necessary to understand contemporary circumstances 
in the United States.” (Hero 2007: xiv) Which is clear is that the binary paradigm between black 
and white in traditional American politics is no longer functional, instead, a more complex 
multiethnic perspective is surfacing.  
Minority Politics and the Immigration Implications 
As previously addressed, population size, socioeconomic status, and population 
concentration are key factors in American politics, and especially determinant in minority politics.  
Despite that Latinos have surpassed African Americans as the largest minority group in the U.S., 
it should not be ignored that such growing has diversified the group, and the demographics of the 
Latino community are not only framed by the major subgroups —Cubans, Mexicans, and Puerto 
Ricans—. As McClain and Stewart notice “immigration from Central and South America and the 
Caribbean has reduced the proportion of Latinos of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban Origins 
among Latinos.” (McClain and Stewart 2014: 33) Likewise, the US Census Bureau (2011) reported 
that by 2011 Dominicans, Colombians, Ecuadorians, and Central American countries comprised 
more than 25% of the Latino population in the country. However, in electoral politics, population 
size is not the only important condition. There are legal restrictions framed by age and citizenship 
in regards who can vote. Thus, even though Latinos are a considerable large group, not all its 
members can vote.   
Socioeconomic status is another salient condition in electoral politics is, besides is a 
determinant factor in people’s levels of political participation. The higher the socioeconomic level 
the most likely a person will vote. Historically, Latinos income and educational attainment levels 
are not comparable to white citizens, which turns out to be a political disadvantage. According to 
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the Pew Research Center, between 2000 and 2014, Hispanics/Latinos lagged behind U.S. public 
on income and wealth and have higher poverty rates. (Lopez, Morin and Krogstad, Latinos 
Increasingly Confident in Personal Finances, See Better Economic Times Ahead 2016) In this 
sense, Hispanic household in 2014 was $42,491, which has not changed since the Great Recession, 
opposed to the mainstream household income that has leveled an average of $53,700. In the same 
manner, poverty rates were higher among Hispanics/Latinos, while the all the other households 
have a rate of 14.8%, Hispanics poverty rate in 2014 was 23.6%. 
The third condition, which relates to population concentration, is an important factor to 
consider in Latino politics. Latino communities show higher concentrations in border states like 
New Mexico, Texas, Arizona, Southern California, as well as in large metropolitan areas like New 
York city, and South Florida. As McClain and Stewart point out, “in many cities the concentrations 
of minority populations in certain areas could be used by these groups as powerful political and 
economic resources,” (McClain and Stewart 2014: 47) which can be evidenced through voting, 
but also through participation in civil movements. On the other side, in local levels, when Latinos 
live in districts where there is an overlapping majority of other non-Hispanics/Latinos, the levels 
of participation in electoral politics tend to be lower. (Valenzuela and Michelson 2016) The 
Chicano movement is perhaps the most salient case of a Latino social movement seeking political 
empowerment. Targeting fellow Mexican immigrants or Mexican American citizens, the Chicano 
movement appealed to ethnic and social discrimination against Mexicans to create a broad base 
for the political movement. Using terms such as “La raza” Mexican Americans appealed to the 
ethnic identity to gain political terrain.  
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However, the Chicano movement cannot be considered a pan-ethnic movement, because it 
developed a solely Mexican American political agenda. Achieving a successful pan-ethnic 
movement has been an issue for Latinos. While the goal has been to spread a sense of ethnic 
solidarity, the reality is that group solidarity has developed unevenly among individuals that share 
the same nationality or legal status. Intra-group disagreements are more common than what the 
public opinion, even scholars admit. Class and race hierarchies are not completely erased from 
immigrants’ social relations, which can be evidence in the way how some subgroups and 
individuals classify themselves as whiter, more educated, as “citadinos” —from the cities—, or 
better-socially related. Erynn Masi de Casanova ethnographic research in a Latino organization in 
Queens, New York offers salient insights in regards this matter: 
From her style of dress to the opinions she expressed, Sonia made every effort to identify 
herself with high-class status and whiteness. Perhaps this attempt to create social distance 
between her and other immigrants was a way of resisting the downward social mobility 
and racialization she had experienced upon moving from Colombia to the United States. 
Not surprisingly, given her commitment to presenting herself as different from the other 
Latin American immigrants with whom she came into contact at the organization, Sonia 
did not take part in LAIC’s mobilizations, marches, or protests. (Casanova 2012: 429) 
It is necessary then, to see the larger spectrum of ethnic relations within Latinos/Hispanics and do 
not underestimate the differences that divide them before stating any absolutes in regards their 
political behavior. 
In the same way, it is necessary to understand the different aspects of political attitudes and 
participation of minority groups in contemporary American politics to explain how racial and 
ethnic minorities participate in politics in the United States. Pluralism is the political paradigm that 
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prevails in politics in the United States, and even though is supposed to be open and fair, sometimes 
it can be exclusionary of those who are not part of powerful and influential groups. Although some 
describe pluralist systems as ideal for all sorts of groups, such as neighborhood groups, student 
groups, educational groups, economic groups, ethnic groups, ideological groups, religious groups, 
and many other, what pluralist systems have done is to “encourage and reward those who band 
together in attempt to influence the government.” (Garcia and Sanchez 2008: 18) However, as 
Brubaker argues “reducing the complex and dynamic heterogeneity of American society and 
history to a formulaic pluralism of identity groups hinders rather than helps the work of 
understanding the past and pursuing social justice in the present.” (Brubaker 2004: 60) The 
pluralist system has pushed the creation of labels where more than pursuing social equality, new 
hierarchies are established, not only socially but politically. Given the diversity within the 
established minority groups in the United States, it is important to recognize that the frameworks 
used to assess and study such groups have not been ideal. 
Thus, ethnic and racial politics need to be examined through different aspects. In this sense, 
political behavior can be assessed through different fronts, organizational participation, ethnic 
organizational participation, electoral participation, political ideology, and partisan identification. 
As explained by McClain and Stewart, political attitudes and participation can be addressed by: 
(1) group identity or cohesion—the extent of feelings of solidarity with other members of 
the group—and perceptions of discrimination; (2) political ideology, the underlying beliefs 
and attitudes of a group that shape its opinions and actions on political issues; (3) partisan 
identification, the attachment to and intensity of feeling for a particular political party; (4) 
voting behavior, the way people vote in elections and the forces that influence these votes; 
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and (5) interest group activities, actions taken by organized groups seeking to influence 
public officials and policies. (McClain and Stewart 2014: 70)  
Although this research will be particularly addressing two of those categories ̶ Group identity and 
voting behavior ̶ it is important to understand how the other aspects influence ethnic political 
behavior. These “other” categories cannot be separated from the analysis of Latino politics and its 
influence should not be diminished. However, as group consciousness has been established as a 
primordial element for political identity formation, is inherent to socio-political studies to question 
whether is identity decisive, and to what extent the political behavior of certain subgroups can be 
taken for granted within the analysis.  
Political Ideology 
It is not uncommon in American politics to attach a political ideology to particular groups. 
Class, socioeconomic status, geographic location, among others can be characteristics utilized to 
bestow labels such as “liberal” or “conservative.” However, as argued by McClain and Stewart, 
“it is inappropriate to use standard political ideology labels of liberal, moderate, and conservative, 
which were developed from national studies that contained few nonwhites, and apply them to the 
black and Latino populations.” (McClain and Stewart 2014: 82) It results arbitrary to define a 
complex group like Latinos with categories that do not fully define their attitudes or behavior. 
Terms such as liberal or conservative might not entirely describe Latinos/Hispanics ideologies, at 
least not in the same way as they describe non-Hispanics political attitudes. For instance, despite 
of their strong religious beliefs, Mexicans have been historically allied to the Democratic party, 
which is considered to be more liberal. In this case religion, does not dictate party allegiance. In 
the same way, Cuban immigrants who left the country running away from a “communist” country, 
would be expected to be liberals. On the contrary, they have carried the conservativism associated 
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to anti-communism. Their reasons are linked to state policies more than to the party ideology. 
Similarly, other subgroups of Latinos might not identify with these ideological labels.  
The Pew Research Center has reported in different surveys that Latinos do not 
conceptualize the terms liberal and conservative in the same way whites do. In the same way, 
within Latino subgroups, there are clear differences between ideological orientations. It is 
important to remember that a big percentage of Latinos are immigrants, which means that those 
who migrated to the United States might have already a set of political convictions. Being a 
conservative or a liberal may not have the same meaning in their countries of origin as it has in the 
U.S. Similarly, second and third generation of Latinos will not hold the same political ideologies 
of their immigrant families. Although it cannot be dismissed, this variable has proven to be 
unsteady through the years and across generations.  
Partisan Identification 
Partisan identification can be similarly misleading, and sometimes arbitrarily assigned. 
Although many political surveys heavily concentrate in trying to figure out minority groups 
political parties, the Latino community poses an issue in this category. The African American 
community has been historically linked to the Democratic party, but Latinos ties to the main 
political parties in the U.S. have not been so thoroughly studied. Even though Latinos have tended 
to identify with the Democratic party, such assumption cannot be blindly accepted in all cases. As 
it has been previously addressed, Latinos constitute a large array of subgroups, who despite sharing 
cultural traits, differ in other aspects. In this sense, it has been established that Mexicans and Puerto 
Ricans will more likely to affiliate to the Democratic party, while Cubans tend to sympathize more 
with the Republican party. However, there have been situations where Latino vote swung from 
Republican to Democrat or vice versa. For example, the election of George W. Bush (R) as 
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President in 2000, where non-Cuban Latino voters supported his election, to then elect Barack 
Obama (D) eight years later. Despite political science scholars and media insist on talking about 
the Latino vote, it is uncertain when and why Latino voters will swing their vote. In the same way, 
partisan identification information of other Latino subgroups is limited.  
Despite the different assertions with regard party affiliation, it is necessary to consider that 
partisan identification will be influenced by different factors such as national origin, gender, and 
socioeconomic levels. Surveys have shown that Latinos do not hold strong feelings towards a 
particular political party, and will be up to cross party and ethnic lines when voting; however, what 
is certain is that partisanship is still a strong predictor of electoral behavior in Latinos as much as 
it is for non-Latinos. Although political ideology is too ambiguous to be solely defined by 
ethnicity, most scholars agree that partisanship can be defined by ethnic boundaries. As put by 
Geron and Michelson, “ethnicity predicts partisanship, partisanship predicts issue positions, 
partisanship and issue positions affect candidate evaluations, and partisanship and candidate 
evaluations directly affect vote choice.” (Geron and Michelson 2008: 333) This sequence seems 
logical and can be successfully tested, notwithstanding, what are the limits of ethnic identity? 
Group Identity: The Foundations of Ethnic Politics 
As posed in Chapter 1, the concept of group identity is crucial to study and understand not 
only Latinos as a group, but Latino politics. Known as group cohesion or group solidarity, group 
identity is perhaps the most important aspect analyzed in minority politics, since it is expected to 
be the most mobilizing element within Latinos. As McClain and Stewart point out “the more 
individuals identify with other members of a group, the more likely they are to participate in 
politics and to coalesce around candidates and policy issues they perceive as being beneficial to 
the group.” (McClain and Stewart 2014: 78) However, the level of cohesiveness of Latinos should 
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not be compared to the group identity concept attached to African Americans, which is linked to 
discrimination and racial identification. Although discrimination is a strong mobilizing force, is 
still imprecise to assert that feelings of being discriminated against will affect Latinos in the same 
way that they impact the black community. The racial and national fragmentation of Latinos is still 
the stone in the shoe for those who will like to see all Latinos united as a political force. If as 
discussed in the first chapter, it is not possible to talk about one Latino identity, the unresolved 
question is then, can we talk about a Latino political identity? Further, can we talk about Latino 
politics?  
Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans have defined their political identity not through 
Latinidad, but through their national origins. (DeSipio 1996) Even when labeled under the 
umbrella term, the demarcation of their political engagement is clear. Immigration, is perhaps the 
more salient issue where differences can be noticed. Mexicans have largely supported candidates 
and laws that alleviate the immigration process for undocumented immigrants, who mostly come 
from Mexico and other Central American countries. On the other side, Puerto Ricans do not 
actively engage in this type of issues because of their status as citizens. Similarly, Cubans, who 
until the beginning of 2017 were protected by the “dry feet, wet feet” law, have not supported 
immigration reforms as Mexicans have. The immigration issue has provoked constant quarrels 
between these major subgroups. Beyond this three-pointed discussion, it is important to wonder 
about those Latino subgroups that started to migrate later in time, mostly between 1970s and the 
2000s, and come from different geographical contexts. If those groups keep defining themselves 
as South Americans, Central Americans, Argentineans, Colombians, Dominicans, etc., how 
accurate is to comprise them in a group where their presence tends to be overlooked. Knowing that 
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high levels of group solidarity influence political participation and voting behavior, it is necessary 
to understand how the pan-ethnicity or Latinidad has translated into Latino subgroups.  
Journalists, politicians, academics, and citizens in general, have often portrayed the Latino 
electorate as a compact bloc that will vote accordingly to the expectations assigned to the ethnic 
group. Such assumptions represent a constant issue for Latino subgroups that are not as big as 
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. Michael Jones-Correa argues that “ethnic politics focuses 
on Latinos as citizens, albeit citizens whose attachments may be to their own co ethnics,” (Jones-
Correa, Fuzzy Distinctions and Blurred Boundaries 2007: 45) which exemplifies one of the 
problematics of Latino politics within American politics. The constant dichotomy of being an 
American citizen, a Latino, and a Mexican, or a Colombian, or a Dominican, etc. produces 
confusion and frustration with the political system they are supposed to embrace. As discussed 
before, the pluralist system has forced labels upon individuals that might be rejected, mediated, or 
partially accepted. The created necessity to be categorized in order to be part of the political 
spectrum, has taken individuals to either exert politics through channels that might not represent 
any benefit to them or their community, or just to not participate in politics at all, pushing 
themselves away from a system that expects assimilation while exerting racialization. The fact that 
minority groups can only be influential if perceived as an organized voting bloc, has affected the 
ability of Latinos to incorporate specific issues into politics. (Navarro and Mejia 2004) 
Whether ethnic labels are indeed an effective way to predict voting behavior, their 
symbolic importance has been established. As the literature explains, high levels of group cohesion 
usually translate to higher levels of political participation and voting registration. Group cohesion 
usually means there are high levels of group identity. As explained by Benjamin Márquez, 
“because identities influence political behavior and help determine the distribution of power and 
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resources, identities are particularly important in societies like the United States.” (Marquez 2007: 
17) Thus, Latino politics as American politics, are studied from theories of identification. Indeed, 
most studies about Latino politics have been concentrated in the influence of the ethnicity 
identification on the Latino electorate. However, other aspects are commonly left out when 
studying Latino politics like race, citizenship status, immigrant generation, and country of origin. 
Furthermore, the broadness of sub-nationalities and subcultures of the Latino ethnicity have been 
poorly studied. As Beltrán explains:  
Despite the existence of such complex statements of identity and identification, in much of 
the current literature, Latino diversity is acknowledged only to be quickly sidestepped 
through a renewed emphasis on the growing size and potential influence of the Latino 
electorate. (Beltrán 2010: 123) 
Identification is in fact an important part of political behavior, but its influence can vary. As 
pointed out by De la Garza, “ethnic factors are, in general, less significant than partisanship, issues, 
and class variables in explaining Hispanic voting.” (Garza 2004: 26) For instance, while in the 
1990s, ethnicity seemed to be a mobilizing factor in Latino electoral behavior; in 2004, according 
to the National Survey of Latinos (LNS) (Pew Research Center 2004) ethnicity was not 
determinant when voting for a candidate, since Latinos did not see themselves as politically united. 
However, there are scholars like Barreto who insist in the important role of ethnicity in mobilizing 
Latino voters. He argues that “ethnic candidates increase the level of physiological engagement 
and interest in the election among ethnic voters,” (Barreto 2007: 67) which as he also asserts will 
mostly work upon Latinos with high levels of ethnic identification. Thus, for those Latinos with 
low levels of ethnic identification, electoral engagement remains standard.  
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According to Barreto’s argument about ethnic identification and Latino voters, there are 
three conditions that have made ethnicity a central player in Latino politics:  
First, the Latino community has witnessed and increase in ethnic-based discrimination, 
making it more likely that ethnicity will have a distinct influence on the political behavior 
of Latinos […] Second, the number of viable Latino candidates for public office has 
increased dramatically over the past decade, creating the opportunity for ethnic identity to 
emerge in the political sphere. Third, rapid growth in naturalization, registration, and voter 
turnout among Latinos has given legitimacy to the size and significance of the Latino 
electorate. (Barreto 2007: 68) 
As McClain and Stewart point out, although discrimination is an element commonly used to 
measure African American’s group cohesion, in the case of Latinos the circumstances can be 
somehow different, since Latinos perception of ethnic discrimination is not always the same. 
According to the 2000 National Survey of Latinos in America “82 percent of Latinos responded 
that discrimination against Latinos is a problem in America;” (Barreto 2007: 75) yet, “according 
to the 2007 Pew Foundation Latino National Survey, regardless of national origin, the majority of 
Latinos believed they had not personally been discriminated against because of their ethnicity.” 
(McClain and Stewart 2014: 79) While it may be true that discrimination can be a determinant 
factor in group identity, it seems to play a circumstantial role, different to what happens with other 
minority groups like African Americans. Since sense of discrimination is an unsteady variable, 
and can change from time to time depending on how adverse state policies are, discrimination 
cannot be considered as a dependable variable that will produce electoral political participation. 
Rather, scholars like DeSipio argue that assimilation plays a more salient role in Latino politics, 
since the higher the level of assimilation of American politics is, the less likely of ethnicity to be 
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influential. In this case, ethnicity would only play an important role under unique circumstances 
like discrimination, or as Barreto suggests when there is a presence of a viable Latino candidate.  
However, as I have pointed out previously, it is necessary to fill the gap in regards the study 
of group identity of the growing Latino subgroups that comprise South Americans, Central 
Americans, and Dominicans. Thus, considering the different theoretical frameworks, as well as 
the different research approaches developed by other scholars, I propose to approach the subgroups 
analysis, not from the assumption of ethnicity identification to be the sole factor impacting Latino 
political behavior, but instead to acknowledge the differences within the ethnicity where country 
of origin and citizenship status play a significant role. As Marquez points out “there is an urgent 
need for survey research that probes the complexity of Latino identity politics and clarifies the 
degree to which Latinos are receptive to a given identity construction.” (Marquez 2007: 22) It is 
then important to find out to what extent are Latinos subgroups cultural similarities enough to 
lower the gap of their differences? Knowing that those differences can be accentuated by the 
group’s reception experience, the government policies of the recipient society, and the educational 
attainment of the immigrant subgroup.  
As pointed out by Barreto and Segura the country of origin influences Latino attitudes 
towards American politics in three different ways: 
First, embarking on the path to migration and citizenship is a profoundly self-selecting 
choice. Those who migrate are arguably different from their countrymen who do not, and 
moving from immigrant status to citizenship is even more demanding […] Second, foreign-
born citizens may hold beliefs and expectations about politics that are rooted in their home-
country experience […] Finally, for obvious reasons, immigrants who arrive after school 
age become familiar with the US political system as adults. (Barreto and Segura 2014: 25)  
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Likewise, citizenship status plays a major role in Latino political behavior, not only for the obvious 
reason that only citizens can vote but also because not being a native citizen implies that political 
acculturation has occurred in adulthood. Barreto and Segura agree that political engagement of 
foreign-born Latinos is lower than in native-born Latinos: 
Foreign-born citizens—naturalized immigrants—generally come to the United States with 
only limited familiarity with the US political system, its key players, and US political 
history. Unlike those attending K–12 school in this country, naturalized citizens begin their 
engagement with the US political system as adults with almost no background information. 
(Barreto and Segura 2014: 55-56) 
      Consequently, assuming the Latino community is a homogeneous group, not only hurts 
Latino politics but American politics as a whole. The fact that American society does not know or 
recognize the differences within the ethnic groups that are part of the United States social picture 
only perpetuates prejudice and stereotypes, which as many recognize, prevent Latinos from fully 
enjoy their rights, as well as to fulfill their duties as citizens. The ignorance about the Latino 
community conformation ends up causing separation of the Latino community from the 
mainstream politics. As Connaughton argues, “Latinos may have a different image of themselves 
than parties present them as having. But like other marginalized groups, if Latinos do not work at 
defining themselves politically, elites will do it for them. Consequently, elites will control the 
relationship. (Connaughton 2005: 142) These elites should not only be understood as Anglo 
political elites, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Latino elites have also been established. In this sense, 
Cubans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans have acquired a relevant power within Latino politics, 
leaving the other subgroups unrepresented, and mostly relegated. Further, as Valdez points out, 
the problem is not solely represented by identity politics, but also by how these identities are 
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established. Instead of fluid and dynamic, identities have been constrained by single choice 
categories. (Valdez 2011)  
The constant questions are then, how do Latinos vote? Who are they likely to vote for? Are 
they Democrats or Republicans? And once again, all these questions are solely answered through 
the cases of the Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban populations, and then generalized as ethnic 
behaviors. As Beltrán points out, “the fascination with the Latino vote displaces larger questions 
of power and the fact that most Latinos remain alienated spectators to America’s political system.” 
(Beltrán 2010: 126) In the case of smaller subgroups from Central and South American countries 
tends to happen even more, given that their attachment to the pan-ethnicity is not strong and their 
time of acculturation has not been as long compared to other subgroups. It becomes then important 
to find out how does the pan-ethnicity —Latinidad— influences those subgroups political 
participation, since they are clearly not part of the voting demographic statistics. 
Voting Behavior: Latinos Low Turnout Rates 
Political participation is not only determined by electoral processes. However, the idea of 
voting is perhaps the most salient concept when people think about politics and democracy. 
Although political participation also includes activism and organizational engagement, voting is 
the only process statistically measured by the U.S. government, other kinds of political 
engagement tend to rely on partisan and non-governmental organizations. As argued by DeSipio 
and de la Garza: 
Voting is just one way of exerting influence, but unlike many others—such as making 
campaign contributions, lobbying, taking part in personal networks, and running for 
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office—it offers the poor, less well educated, and less politically sophisticated an 
opportunity to participate at high levels. (DeSipio and de la Garza 2002: 399) 
Scholars, politicians, and the media have insisted in the determinant role Latinos can play in 
elections, and as it has been seen in the past elections, Latinos are indeed an important force in 
states like Florida and California where there are large concentrations of Latino enclaves. 
However, Latino registration and voting levels are significantly lower than those of other 
minorities as African Americans, and certainly lower than those of White race. As pointed out by 
McClain and Stewart, “in 2012, approximately 235 million Americans were eligible to vote. Non-
Latino African Americans accounted for 12.20 percent of the total voting age population, and 
Latinos for 14.96 percent of that population;” (McClain and Stewart 2014: 101) yet, only a 48 
percent of voting-age Latino citizens actually voted, against a 66.2 percent African American 
turnout.  
It results necessary to Latino and American politics scholars and politicians, to assess the 
lower participation rates of minorities in electoral processes. Rates that are shaped by three 
conditions: age, socioeconomic status, and educational level. As well other conditions like 
citizenship status, language comprehension, and knowledge of U.S. politics, affect registration and 
voting turnout for Latinos. Given the situation, and without dismissing the importance of social 
movements and activist groups, it is important to realize the accurate composition of the Latino 
community, and to what extent and how the different subgroups within the minority participate in 
politics. Establishing to what extent is the Latino electorate as decisive as it has been portrayed for 
years becomes crucial nowadays but more importantly, it is necessary to find out how do such 
assumptions of decisiveness apply to the different subgroups that shape the pan-ethnicity.  
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According to the Pew Research Center, 23.3 million Hispanics were eligible voters in 2012, 
and this number is projected to grow to 27.3 million by 2016. The fact that 27 million Latinos are 
eligible voters does not mean they would indeed vote in the next elections. Academics have offered 
different explanations of why Latinos do not vote at the high levels they are expected to do, and 
conclusions have been diverse. The first explanation is related to the economic conditions of 
Latinos. This situation is mainstreamed by the lower levels of education and income, as well as by 
occupation and age. As argued by Garcia and Sanchez, “Latinos have a greater share of those 
socioeconomic characteristics that ordinarily depress voter turnout in populations, including the 
white population.” (Garcia and Sanchez 2008: 139) Further, scholars like DeSipio argues that 
formal channels of inclusion, such as naturalization, do not guarantee political participation. 
Naturalization rates greatly influence the Latino vote, but other variables remain important like 
acculturation levels —which can affect the decision of naturalizing or not—, legal status —since 
many undocumented immigrants cannot become citizens—, and country of origin. 
Latino Representation: Co-Ethnic Support vs. Issues Approach 
Jason P. Casellas uses two notions of representation in his article Latino Representation in 
Congress which he takes from Hanna F. Pitkin: descriptive and substantive. According to Casellas, 
“descriptive representation involves Latinos having a Latino represent their district, while 
substantive representation involves a representative of any race or ethnicity voting the way Latino 
constituents prefer.” (Casellas 2007: 220) Similarly, Garcia and Sanchez portray descriptive 
representation as a “very common type of measurement that determines representation is based on 
a simple counting or enumeration of the number of representatives who are of Hispanic heritage;” 
(Garcia and Sanchez 2008: 201) and substantive representation as the kind that “involves 
representatives being actively engaged in articulating Latino (or other) group interests in the group 
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policy-making arena.” (Garcia and Sanchez 2008: 207) Pitkin also distinguishes a third type of 
representation, symbolic representation where “legislators have the confidence of those they 
represent and are trusted.” (Orey, King and Bilingsley 2016: 57) In accordance to these postulates, 
Latinos are at serious disadvantage: first because the numbers of Latino representatives in 
governmental institutions are not numerical congruent with the percentage of Latinos in the 
country; and second, because Latinos are not “politically monolithic”. In this sense, Latinos are 
not solely committed to one political party, but are up to switch lines if needed. The problem is 
that many politicians appeal to Latino communities seeking for their vote, but their compromise 
with these communities is not transcendental. Solely committing to the Latino electorate can be 
perceived as somehow divisive.   
Descriptive or symbolic representation does not imply that all the members of each national 
origin group would be benefited by the election of a co-ethnic. (Aranda, Hughes and Sabogal 2014) 
In fact, in cities like Miami, where the political presence of certain groups is stronger than other 
subgroups minorities, co-ethnic representation means little for those who do not belong to the 
particular national origin group of the elected official. As Beltrán reflects, “advocates and 
politicians who claim to speak for or on behalf of Latinos continue to put forward theories of 
empowerment that rely in presumptions of Latinos as a cohesive electorate.” (Beltrán 2010: 100) 
By no means should this be interpreted as a recommendation for the opposite situation, one in 
which there are no Latino/Hispanic immigrants or Latino descendants participating in politics. 
However, portraying descriptive representation as the ideal situation lacks validity.  
Perhaps, as scholars like Barreto and Geron argue, low political participation of Latinos 
may be related to the lower quantity of representatives in the government, but it is uncertain under 
what conditions would they follow this pattern and when would they not. Barreto argues that “the 
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presence of a viable Latino candidate may represent a circumstance in which shared ethnicity 
becomes a salient factor in Latino political behavior;” (Barreto 2007: 86) but what is a viable 
candidate? Viability is not framed by ethnicity in the first place, so co-ethnic rhetoric will 
presumably only work if the person ready to vote considers the candidate’s promises fulfill his 
expectations, in the case the voter has indeed calculated his decision to vote. Once again, there are 
other elements interjecting the voter decision. Race, class, and socio-economic status would 
greatly affect the conscious decision. Despite the different reasons, most academics who work with 
Latino politics, acknowledge there is an important misrepresentation of the Latino community and 
that such gap needs to be fulfilled in order to have a better understanding of the different subgroups 
within the Latino ethnicity. Further, the distribution and constitution of government institutions 
like Congress, contribute to the lower representation of minority groups like Latinos. Rodolfo 
Espino points out that legislative victories that have benefited minority groups, such as the Civil 
Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act, have not been only achieved by the minority groups will, 
but “because the majority of white Americans shared the same sentiments, thus allowing the 
legislation to pass” (Espino, Is there a Latino dimension 2007: 199). It is necessary then to 
understand how Congress and other governmental institutions of representation influence Latino 
political behavior.  
Since U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives “are responsible not only for making 
laws but also for determining budget allocations to the entire federal government,” (McClain and 
Stewart 2014: 158) their work is of vital importance for Latino and other minority groups issues. 
By 2004 only two Latino descendants were elected for Senate, Ken Salazar (Mexican American) 
of Colorado, and Mel Martinez (Cuban American) of Florida. In 2008, Ben R. Lujan from New 
Mexico was elected as a member of the House of Representatives, which completed a total of 
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twenty-seven Latinos in the House of Representatives in the 111th Congress. By 2014, three Latino 
descendants were serving as U.S. Senators, Robert Menendez, Marco Rubio, and Ted Cruz. All of 
them of Cuban American descent but representing three different states, New Jersey, Florida, and 
Texas, respectively. Interestingly, two of them, Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz presented their 
campaigns for the Republican Party nomination for President in 2016. The House of 
Representatives also increased the number of Latinos for the 113th Congress, with thirty 
representatives. Unfortunately, none of those representatives were of other origin but Mexican, 
Cuban, or Puerto Rican. By 2016, only one Congress representative is from an origin different 
from Mexican, Puerto Rican or Cuban; Norma Torres of Guatemalan origin (foreign born 
immigrant) is the only representation of subgroups like central Americans —different than 
Mexicans—, and South Americans.    
Is also interesting the percentage of statewide Latino officials, and Latino governors and 
majors. By 2010, 32.4 percent of State officials were Latinos comprised in the following states: 
Texas, California, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, New Jersey, Illinois, and New York. 
In regards Latinos who served as governors, there have been only three states that have had full 
term elected Latino descendant governors: New Mexico, Arizona, and Florida. According to 
McClain and Stewart, “New Mexico is the only state in which Latino political representation is at 
least equal to the state’s Latino population proportion,” (McClain and Stewart 2014: 172) which 
it is reflected by its six Latino descendant governors.  
Conclusion: The “Other Latinos” Underrepresentation in the Pluralist System 
     It is a fact that racial and ethnic minority groups are growing, and that as Latinos 
concentrate in certain states or specific areas, their political influence can be more visible. But 
being “the number one” it means more than just being the largest minority group in the country. 
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As argued by Garcia and Sanchez, “when Latinos became ‘número uno,’ no longer could they be 
ignored or overlooked in the historical black and white picture of America. Latinos could not 
possibly continue to be the ‘invisible minority.’” (Garcia and Sanchez 2008: 58) However, the 
understanding of Latinos as a broad ethnic group is still limited, which at the same time, limits the 
understanding of Latino politics. While the terms “Latino” or “Hispanic” are regularly used by the 
media, there is little understanding of the Latino community, not only culturally but socially, and 
politically. As I have argued before, the different conceptions held of Latinos, stereotypes, and 
expectations might not be suitable for the whole community. The Latino community comprises 
individuals from 22 different Latin American countries, and as much as they share cultural traits, 
their sociopolitical process in the United States has been different. It is that the reason why my 
research focuses on those Latino subgroups that are still far from the Latino politics mainstream.  
Mexican Americans, Cuban Americans, and Puerto Ricans continue to be the most studied 
groups among Latinos, not only because of their size but also because of his long history of 
immigration. However, I wonder how the “other Latinos”, that group shared by Central Americans, 
South Americans, and Dominicans, exert political participation in a pan ethnic Latino polarized 
political realm. Segura and Bowler point out the importance of minority groups engagement in 
American politics, which further makes me wonder about those minorities within the minority. 
But more importantly, it is inescapable to think beyond ethnicity and wonder if those who do not 
strongly identify as Latinos participate in politics by other meanings or through other channels, 
distinct to those established by and used by the political elites.   
How ̶ and indeed whether ̶ minority populations engage with the mainstream political 
process are crucial issues for American public and political life in the coming years. If 
minority populations become somehow separated from the mainstream of politics ̶ either 
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because the mainstream politics does not respond or because minority populations, choose 
not to engage ̶ the resulting distance could present long-term problems for legitimacy of 
American political institutions as a whole. (Segura and Bowler 2005: 3-4) 
The analysis of Latino politics should then go further ethnic politics, since it has been 
acknowledged by Latino scholars that group cohesion is not the strongest condition of the Latino 
community, and a lot less of the subgroup identified as “other Latinos”.  
This thesis concerns the extent to which the pan-ethnic frame influences the “other Latinos” 
political participation. I will consider whether or not there are other conditions that might be more 
salient in predicting voting behavior of those Latino subgroups. I have identified a gap between 
those who strongly identify with being Latino and those who do not. While it may be true that the 
mentioned subgroups are not comparable in size with the main three —Mexicans, Cubans, and 
Puerto Ricans—, population concentration of some of them will become meaningful in a near 
future. This makes this analysis necessary for those who study and want to have a better 
understanding of Latinos in the United States. 
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Chapter IV 
Data Analysis: Are there Significant Differences Between Latino/Hispanic Subgroups? 
 
The insistence of the media, political elites, and state institutions on portraying a Latino 
voting bloc as an electorally decisive group (Mora 2014; Beltrán 2010) has been the strongest 
inspiration for this project. Not only are Latinos far from being a bloc, but also their political 
engagement is unpredictable, diverse, and significantly low. I argue Latinos/Hispanics political 
participation practices have not been thoroughly studied. Quantitative and qualitative research 
have addressed political participation from different fronts: voting behavior, turnout intention, 
grassroots movements, identity based politics, among others. However, such analyses have mainly 
been done from a pan-ethnic perspective, and just recently from a racial approach. If identity 
consciousness is the most likely indicator of political participation, yet pan-ethnic identification is 
not as strong as it is often portrayed, then is there a better predictor of electoral behavior for 
Latinos?  
Latino voting turnout numbers are lower than other minority groups in the country (Geron 
and Michelson 2008; Lopez, Motel and Patten 2012), and even when called the most important 
vote on every election, Latinos are disappointedly not inclined to vote. There are different theories, 
and much research has been done about this issue. However, as I have proposed, the problem is 
assuming Latin American immigrants and their descendants are a voting bloc, and thus we need 
to study them. To find out if the so called “other Latinos” participate in politics differently from 
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the recognized main subgroups, Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans, I have used data from the 
2012 National Survey of Latinos to analyze the existent data.  
The National Survey of Latinos (NSL) is a nationally representative survey of Hispanic 
adults conducted annually since 2002 by the Pew Research Center. According to the Pew Research 
Center, “the NSL explores the attitudes and opinions of the nation’s fast growing Latino population 
on topics ranging from identity to politics to immigration policy to education to religion and health 
care, among others.” (Pew Research Center 2012) The NSL is the most reliable source of 
information where respondents were only Latinos/Hispanics, and where they were requested to 
answer questions related to identity, politics, and policy issues. Most of the data available where 
voting behavior was measured, tend to group Latinos under umbrella terms, without keeping 
record of their countries of origin, which is strongly relevant for this case of study.  
This thesis considers the question of how the concept of Latinidad shapes political 
participation of Latinos who are not part of the Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban communities. 
Although political participation can be approached differently, it is important to define in clearer 
terms how the “other Latinos” vote, and what their electoral views are, given that the “other 
Latinos” perspectives about politics have been largely influenced and framed by the three major 
subgroups visions. Thus, is necessary to find out: 
1. To what extent does the concept of Latinidad influence practices of citizenship, like voting, 
for Latinos who are not Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban?  
2. To what extent do Latinos who are not Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban establish a 
political agenda influenced by group identity? 
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To answer these questions, I established different variables that could measure identity, politics, 
economy, and social integration. Given that the purpose of this research is to identify the influence 
of the pan-ethnicity upon Latinos/Hispanics, and the differences between the major Latino 
subgroups and those denominated as “other Latinos” with regard to political participation, 
questions referencing country of origin and ancestry were used as independent variables. While 
questions about politics, voting, political agenda, economy, and acculturation were used as 
dependent variables.  
Data and Sample 
I used the 2012 National Survey of Latinos (NSL) to investigate how the sense of Latinidad 
affects the political participation of Latinos who are not Mexican, Cuban, or Puerto Rican. The 
NSL is a bilingual telephone survey of Latino adults (older than 18 years) residing in the United 
States, covering a variety of questions about political and socioeconomic experiences. The survey 
was conducted between September 7, 2012 and October 4, 2012. The size of the sample was 1,765 
individuals, drawn from a nationally representative random sample of Latino households across 
the United States. The survey was conducted during ex-president Barack Obama’s (D) first term, 
while he was campaigning to be elected for a second term. (Pew Research Center 2012) 
Dependent Variables: Political Participation and Group Identity 
Political Participation 
In order to assess political participation, I used three different dependent variables: First I 
considered the “other Latinos” vote intention in the Presidential election of 2012. Second, I used 
a variable to reflect the perspective of the “other Latinos” about important issues discussed in the 
Presidential campaign of 2012. Lastly, I also considered the “other Latinos” perspective in regards 
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their sense of citizenship and pan-ethnic identity. Each of those variables contain a series of 
questions which were cross-tabulated with the independent variables (ancestry and nativity).  
Voting behavior 
As defined by McClain and Stewart, voting behavior refers to “the way people vote in elections 
and the forces that influence these votes.” (McClain and Stewart 2014: 76) To asses this variable, 
I rely in a set of questions that the Pew National survey used to measure voting: 
1. If the presidential election were being held today, would you vote for the Democratic ticket 
of Barack Obama and Joe Biden; the Republican ticket of Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan; or 
other candidates? This response was coded (1) for the Democratic ticket of Barack Obama 
and Joe Biden and (2) for the Republican ticket of Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan; (3) other 
candidate, (4) will not vote, (D) don’t know, and (R) if refused. 
2. Do you yourself plan to vote in the election this November? This question addresses vote 
intention without linking the vote to a candidate or party. The question was coded (1) for 
Yes and (2) for No, (D) don’t know, and (R) if refused. 
3. In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or 
something else? The answer was coded (1) Republican, (2) Democrat, (3) Independent, (4) 
Something else, (D) don’t know, and (R) if refused. 
4. Which party do you think has more concern for (Hispanics/Latinos), or is there no 
difference? This answer is coded as (1) The Democratic Party, (2) The Republican Party, 
(3) No difference, (D) don’t Know, (R) if refused. 
5. Now in thinking about the 2012 Presidential election, in your opinion, will the 
(Hispanic/Latino) vote have a major impact, a minor impact or will it have no impact at all 
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in determining who wins the 2012 Presidential election? The answers were coded as (1) 
Major impact, (2) Minor impact, (3) No impact at all, (D) don’t Know, and (R) if refused. 
Political agenda 
In the process to establish public policies, certain issues are prioritized by government institutions; 
as well, voters have their own opinions about issues that the government, the media, and politicians 
discuss on and off electoral campaigns. (McClain and Stewart 2014) I consider it important to 
know if the different subgroups had different perspectives about specific issues, since this could 
become a decisive factor when voting. To analyze this variable, I cross-tabulated the following 
questions: 
1. Now I'm going to read you a list of issues that might be discussed during this year's 
presidential campaign. For each item I name, please tell me how important this issue is to 
you personally. Is the issue of (a, b, c, d) extremely important, very important, somewhat 
important, or not too important to you personally? 
a. Education 
b. Jobs and the Economy 
c. Health care 
d. Immigration 
Each question had the same set of answers, which were coded as (1) Extremely important, 
(2) Very important, (3) Somewhat important, (4) Not too important, (D) don’t know, and 
(R) if refused. 
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  Acculturation 
  As explained by Portes and Rumbaut, “immigrants, even those of the same nationality, 
are frequently divided by social class, the timing of their arrival, and their generation […] 
Depending on the timing of their arrival and context of reception, immigrants can find themselves 
confronting diametrically different situations, and hence the course of their assimilation can lead 
to a number of different outcomes.” (Portes and Rumbaut, Legacies 2001: 45) Thus, I considered 
important to acknowledge the effects of senses of acculturation and/or belonging. The NSL 
includes different questions where acculturation can be measured, from which I have included two 
questions: The first one inquires respondents about their citizenship status; and the second one 
measures the sense of discrimination and/or adaptation by asking them about their experience as 
Latinos/Hispanics in the United States. Experience measured by economic, cultural, and 
educational facts.  
1. Are you a citizen of the United States? This variable was coded as (1) Yes, (2) No, (D) 
don’t know, (R) if refused to answer. 
2. In general, do you think being (Hispanic/Latino)– helps, hurts, or makes no difference 
when it comes to [a, b, c]? 
a. finding a job 
b. getting a promotion  
c. gaining admission into schools and colleges 
The three questions displayed the same set of answers, which were coded as (1) Helps, (2) Hurts, 
(3) Makes no difference, (D) don’t know, (R) if refused. 
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 Group Identity: Pan-ethnicity vs. Country of Origin 
To analyze group identity, I used the terms “Hispanic” or “Latino” as dependent variables. 
Then the information was cross-tabulated with three interrelated independent variables: ancestry, 
native born, and country of origin.  
1. The terms Hispanic and Latino are both used to describe people who are of Hispanic or 
Latino origin or descent.  Do you happen to prefer one of these terms more than the other?   
Independent Variables: Ancestry and Country of Origin 
  Ancestry and country of origin are used in this study as independent variables given that 
it is the purpose of this document to elucidate the differences in between subgroups within the 
Latino/Hispanic population. The National Survey of Latinos addresses these two variables in the 
following questions: 
1. Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, or are you and your 
ancestors from another country? Are you and your ancestors from Central America, South 
America, or somewhere else?  
a. What other country? 
This variable was coded (01) Mexican (Mexico); (0)2 Puerto Rican (Puerto Rico); (03) 
Cuban (Cuba); (04) Dominican (the Dominican Republic); (05) Salvadoran (El Salvador); 
(06) Other Central American (Central America); (07) Other South American (South 
America); (97) Other country [specify other country]; (DD) don’t know; (RR) Refused. If 
born in another country the answers were coded as follow: (01) Argentina, (02) Barbados, 
(03) Belize, (04) Bolivia, (05) Brazil, (06) Chile, (07) Colombia, (08) Costa Rica, (09) 
Cuba, (10) the Dominican Republic, (11) Ecuador, (12) El Salvador, (13) the Falkland 
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Islands, (14) Guatemala, (15) Guyana, (16) Haiti, (17) Honduras, (18) Mexico, (19) 
Nicaragua, (20) Panama, (21) Paraguay, (22) Peru, (23) Portugal, (24) Puerto Rico, (25) 
Spain, (26) Suriname, (27) Uruguay, (28) Venezuela, (29) French Guyana, (30) Jamaica, 
(31) Trinidad/the Caribbean Islands, (32) Italy, (33) Africa, (97) Other, (DD) don’t know, 
(RR) refused. 
2. Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United States, or in another country? 
The answers for these questions were coded (1) Puerto Rico, (2) U.S., (3) Another country, 
(D) don’t know, (R) refused. 
3. In what country were you born? If born in another country, answers were coded as in 
question 1(a). 
  By cross-tabulating the information above I was able to summarize the relationship 
between the variables to find out significant differences between Hispanic/Latino subgroups in 
regards political participation and voting behavior. As Latino politics’ scholars, have largely 
discussed, there are distinct variables which can impact vote decision making, such as educational, 
socioeconomic, and cultural conditions. (DeSipio and De la Garza 1996; de la Garza 2004; Barreto 
2007; Geron and Michelson 2008; Portes and Rumbaut 2001) I have included the mentioned 
variables, which will tell about the impact of these conditions over Latino electoral preferences. 
Lastly, it is important to analyze group identity, which will complement the analysis by testing if 
those subgroups that prefer to identify themselves in pan-ethnic or country of origin terms, hold 
the same vision about politics. 
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Data Analysis 
  Although the Pew Research Center itself analyzed the information obtained from the 
NSL, and published numerous articles about different topics with regard to the Hispanic/Latino 
community, none of these separated the Latino/Hispanic subgroups into categories. Given this 
study’s hypothesis, new tables were created through cross tabulation. It is also necessary to 
mention that not all tables showed significant differences between categories, however the results 
do lead to telling conclusions in regards electoral behavior of the different Latino subgroups. 
Group Identity — Independent Variable  
  Table 1.1 show results within the major subgroups along with Dominicans and 
Salvadorans, South Americans, and other Central Americans about pan-ethnic term preference. 
Overall more than half (53.9%) had no preference for either term. 30.5% chose the term Hispanic, 
and a 14.3% chose Latino. This trend repeated among all major subgroups, except for South 
Americans where 50% preferred the term Latino over Hispanic. However, this information can be 
contested in the sense that many respondents were classified under the category “other country.” 
Which can be attributed to the lack of specificity in regards country of origin. When contrasted 
with Table 1.3 it can be evidenced that the numbers changed when countries from South America 
are individualized. There, South American countries show a tendency for the category “no 
preference”. Only Perú and Brazil showed a preference for the term “Latino”. The case of Brazil 
is interesting given that Brazilians have contested the pan-ethnic terms before. However, as 
Maxine Margolis points out in her research about Brazilian identity in the United States, 
“Brazilians are not only embracing American ethnic stereotypes, but American ethnic hierarchies 
as well.” (Margolis 2007: 217) With regard to Central American countries, a clear majority had no 
preference for either term; similarly, a 51% of Dominicans said to have no preference with regards 
 68 
 
the term they use to describe themselves. These tables chi-square value is .000 which shows there 
is a 100% confidence the relationship exists. 
  Although the question is not expressly stated as rejecting either term, the fact that most 
of subgroups had no preference can be a result of a lack of group consciousness related to the pan-
ethnic terms. In this sense, by choosing the no preference category, respondents might have 
consciously avoided the pan-ethnic terms, since no other options were given. As Valdez suggests 
“survey instruments and quantitative research designs often constrain the identity of respondents 
to a single force choice category of ethnicity, pan-ethnicity, or race. Such studies neglect to 
consider how the group members themselves might choose to self-identify if given the option, or 
to adjudicate differences between them.” (Valdez 2011: 467) Despite the claims about the 
preference between one term or the other adducing social, political, or cultural issues against either 
Latino or Hispanic, the interchangeable use of the terms has been quite constant. Scholars and 
politicians often use both, but Latinos/Hispanics do not seem to have a clear picture of what these 
terms mean or entail. I suggest then, if group consciousness was strong enough, respondents would 
have preferred one of the terms, instead of indicating no preference. 
Political Participation—Dependent Variables 
  Electoral Behavior 
  When assessing electoral behavior, results are diverse. Some tables were more 
significantly conclusive than others, which is directly related to the broadness of the categories of 
each question. The respondents were asked about their political party identification, their intention 
to vote in the presidential election of 2012, and about their perception of Latinos/Hispanics in 
politics. Each question was analyzed in three ways: first, by major subgroups, which includes 
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Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans, as well as Dominicans, Salvadorans, Other Central 
Americans, and Other South Americans. Second, by nativity where respondents were categorized 
as born in Puerto Rico, born in the U.S., and born in another country. From the last group, a third 
analysis was made individualizing those who identified themselves as foreign born by their 
countries of origin.  
  Table 2.1 where respondents were asked about their vote intention in the Presidential 
elections for 2012 between former president Barack Obama (D) and Mitt Romney (R), shows that 
a 61.4% of Latinos/Hispanics had the intention to vote for Obama and Joe Biden; a 19.1% was 
going to vote for Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan; and a 5.1% preferred not to vote. However, some 
differences can be noticed when looking at every major subgroup. Although Mexicans are known 
for being strong Democrats, only a 60.6% said he or she was going to vote for Obama, the number 
results low in comparison to Dominicans (78.8%), Salvadorans (73.5%), and South Americans 
(77.8%).  These numbers are interesting because even when all the political strategies are mostly 
directed to the three major subgroups (Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans), the higher 
percentages of vote intention came from other subgroups. In this sense, Republicans are evidently 
lagging behind Democrats with regards to Latino/Hispanic vote, except in the Cuban community, 
which according to the table seems to follow the pattern established for their group, to vote for 
Republican candidates. As this table shows, most of the vote intention for each party candidate 
came from subgroups considered as less politically important. The Chi-Square value of this table 
is .001, which translates to a 99.9% of confidence in the significance of the variables relationship. 
  Table 2.2 is consistent with the previous results. Overall, the majority (60.9%) of 
Latinos/Hispanics born in the U.S. had the intention to vote for the Democratic candidates. In 
comparison, a 61% of foreign born Latinos/Hispanics, excluding Puerto Ricans, had the intention 
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to vote for Barack Obama. The abstention rate was also lower in foreign born Latinos than in native 
born. The chi-square value in this table was .093 which means it cannot be assured that the 
relationship between variables is significant. Table 2.3 on the other hand, shows higher tendencies 
leaning towards the democratic candidates. Even the lowest percentages were higher than 
Mexicans overall. Respondents from countries like Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru showed 
lower percentages than other countries like Argentina, Bolivia, or Venezuela in their intention to 
vote for Democrats, but overall the abstention category was lower in foreign born than in other 
subgroups. Individuals from other Central American countries and El Salvador showed lower 
numbers in support for the democratic candidates, which did not mean that they supported the 
other candidates, on the contrary responses in the categories “will not vote” or “don’t know” grew. 
The table’s chi-square value was 0.010 showing a significant relation between variables. 
  Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 asked participants to answer if they planned to vote in the 2012 
Presidential elections. Interestingly, only the tabulation of foreign born Latinos/Hispanics were 
significant. Table 3.1 chi-square value was .617, and table 3.2 value was .158; table 3.3 on the 
other side showed a significance value of .004. The latter can be an evidence of the necessity to 
assess country of origin as a category to analyze political behavior, and include it as part of the 
main categories of analysis. Table 3.1 shows consistent results among all major subgroups, 
although the Other Central American countries (91.7%) and Other South American countries 
(100%) have the highest percentages of vote intention. Table 3.2. results are similar, although 
foreign born Latinos/Hispanics intention to vote is higher than in native born. Table 3.3 shows 
more variations in regards vote intention, Colombian (72.2%), Ecuadorian (62.5%), Costa Ricans 
(75%), and Nicaraguans (72.7%) respondents intention to vote is lower than the average (82.5%). 
Even when the percentage is more than half, these numbers should be considered given that most 
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of the time, Latino/Hispanics that are foreign born tend to live in cultural enclaves, where matters 
such as politics are often socialized. 
  Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 address party affiliation. As expected, Latinos/Hispanics consider 
themselves Democrats. The current data shows many Cubans as Democrats, the percentage is not 
high (36.9%), but it is higher than the percentage of Cubans that see themselves as Republicans 
(27%). Lately, it has been argued that the time of the Republican Cubans is coming to an end. As 
argued by Dario Moreno and James Wyatt (2016) after the election of 2012, “no matter who won 
the Cuban Vote in 2012, the reality is that the Cuban ethnic vote has shifted from being staunchly 
Republican for the last 20 years to becoming a toss-up between each party in 2012. Many are still 
wondering how one of the most loyal Republican demographic groups in the country could so 
quickly become a swing vote.” (Moreno and Wyatt 2016: 255)  
  Younger Cubans, and second and third generations of Cuban ancestry do not see politics 
in the same way their migrant families did, in this sense, the foreign policy towards Cuba and Fidel 
Castro’s regime may not be a strong motivator for younger Cuban voters. It is also important to 
remember the NSL survey uses a representative sample of Latinos/Hispanics, however, there is 
always the possibility that not many Cubans participated, or that a fortuitous majority of Democrats 
responded. This table chi-square value .000 indicates there is a significant relationship between 
the observed data and the assigned variables. Notwithstanding, the Cuban case is not the only case 
where the numbers are not extremely high. In this sense, even when Latinos/Hispanics are 
expected to be mainly Democrats, table 4.1 shows the percentages are not that high. On the 
contrary, in most cases less than half see themselves as Democrats. Many respondents declare 
themselves to be independent, or something else. Different from other variables, in this question, 
the category “don’t know” showed double digit numbers.   
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  Table 4.2 and 4.3 show some similar results. For instance, table 4.2 shows that native 
born Latinos/Hispanics are more likely to be Democrats (49.1%) than foreign born (44.5%). On 
the contrary, foreign born Latinos/Hispanics are more likely to see themselves as independent 
(23.5%). Table 4.2 chi-square value is .000 indicating its significance, as well as table 4.3, which 
chi-square value is .005. Similarly, when foreign born data is brake down, numbers show that 
tendencies to the Democratic Party are consistent, but not significantly high. With exception of 
Bolivia (100%) and Costa Rica (75%), no other country passes the 70 percent bar. The latter does 
not mean the majority identify better as a Republican, rather, foreign born Latinos/Hispanics 
preferred other categories such as independent, something else, and don’t know. Those three 
options are somehow vague and do not offer further information of what other political affiliations 
the respondents might have. Given that table 4.3 accounts for foreign born respondents, it is 
possible that they still have attachments to politics and political parties from their countries of 
origin. What is certain is that the main political parties in the United States are not fully embraced 
by the foreign Latino population. Party affiliation is one of the characteristics that usually predict 
voting, but if a large share of Latinos/Hispanics do not have a strong party affiliation, it can be 
expected a low electoral participation from Latinos. 
  Following this thought, Table 5.1 shows the perspective of Latinos/Hispanics with regard 
to which party has more concern for Hispanics/Latinos issues. Answers again lean towards the 
Democratic party, although once again, numbers are not significantly high. Even for Puerto Ricans, 
who are historically Democrats, only 62.6% said that the Democratic Party care more about Latino 
concerns. Most respondents did not see the Republican Party as preoccupied enough for Latino 
issues, although a considerable portion (27.9%) sees no difference between the Democratic Party 
and the Republican Party. From this table, Dominicans (73.6%) and Other South Americans (75%) 
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are the ones who think of the Democratic Party as more preoccupied for Latino concerns. On the 
other side, Other Central Americans (35%) and Salvadorans (41.7%) are the ones with a lower 
perception of the Democratic Party. However, even when their perception of the Republican Party 
is not high either, Other Central Americans showed the highest percentage of perception of the 
Republican party (20%). Table 5.1 chi-square value is .002, which indicates that a significant 
relationship exists. When comparing native born Latinos/Hispanics with foreign born ones, there 
was not a significant relationship among data and variables as the Table 5.2 chi-square value (.129) 
indicates. That was also the case of Table 5.3 where the data was tabulated with foreign born 
respondents’ country of origin. In this case, the chi-square value was .715. 
  Lastly, when asked about Latinos/Hispanics perception about the impact the ethnic group 
was going to have in the presidential elections, the respondents were given four different categories 
to respond: major impact, minor impact, no impact, or don’t know. As table 6.1 shows, overall a 
67.8% of the respondents said Latinos/Hispanics would have a major impact, with Other Central 
Americans (80%) being the ones with the largest percentage of the share. On the other side, other 
South Americans (25%) where the ones who had the largest percentage saying Latinos/Hispanics 
would have a minor impact. Overall a 5.3% said Latinos/Hispanics would have no impact at all, 
and a 5.8% responded to not know.  
  The results of Table 6.1 showed no significant relationship, chi-square value was .483. 
On the contrary, Table 6.2 chi-square value (.000) shows a significant relationship. According to 
the table, while a 71.7% of foreign born Latinos/Hispanics said, the community was going to have 
a major impact, a 62.8% of native born said the same. When foreign born Latinos/Hispanics 
responses were individualized by country of origin, Bolivians and Costa Ricans were the ones to 
be surer that Latinos/Hispanics would have a major impact in the elections. Ecuadoreans (63.2%), 
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Chileans (33.3%), and Panamanians (60%) showed the lowest percentages expecting a major 
impact. What is interesting is that most of the foreign-born respondents did not considered that 
Latinos will not have an impact at all. Table 6.3 high chi-square value (.875) indicates no 
significant relation between the data and the established variables. 
  Political Agenda 
  Tables 7.1 Issues: Education, 7.2 Issues: Jobs and Economy, 7.3 Issues: Health Care, and 
7.4 Issues: Immigration, show different results of Latinos/Hispanics views of important issues 
discussed in the campaign for the presidential elections of 2012. Each issue was cross tabulated 
with different dependent variables: major Latino/Hispanic subgroups (ancestry); U.S. born and 
foreign born Latinos/Hispanics; and lastly foreign born Latinos countries of origin. Table 7.1.1 
shows there are no major differences between the three major subgroups, Mexicans (46.8%), 
Cubans (45.9%) and Puerto Ricans (49.3%) when rating education as extremely important. 
However, Other South Americans rate education as extremely important by a 75%, the second 
group to find education extremely important by a large percentage are Dominicans (65.3%). Other 
response categories are very important, which takes and overall percentage of 44.6%, somewhat 
important (5.2%), not too important (1.4%). The chi-square value in this table (.950) shows no 
significant relationship.  
  Table 7.1.2 shows a difference of perception in between native born and foreign born, 
while a 55.7% of native born Latinos/Hispanics see education as an extremely important issue, a 
43.3% of foreign born says the same. Contrarily, a 35% of native born Latinos/Hispanics say is 
very important, while a 51.7% of foreign born says the same. Tables 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 chi-square 
value is .000 for both, indicating a significant relationship. Table 7.1.3 shows mixed results, 
despite most of foreign born Latinos/Hispanics no matter what their country of origin is, said 
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education was either extremely important or very important, it is possible to see differences 
between responses from one country to the other one. Except for Costa Rica, most of Central 
American respondents including Mexico, preferred the category very important instead of 
extremely important. Similarly, South American respondents also seemed to considerer education 
an important issue, but not of extreme importance.  
  Table 7.2.1 Jobs and the Economy, are perceived in a similar way as Education. Numbers 
have slight changes in between major subgroups, although from the three major subgroups, Puerto 
Ricans are the ones to find Jobs and economy more “extremely important.” A 60.6% of Puerto 
Ricans said jobs were extremely important compare to a 45.5% Mexicans, and a 55% of Cubans. 
However, a large part of the share said economy was very important. Other South Americans and 
Other Central Americans also followed the same path, mostly rating jobs and the economy as very 
important instead of extremely important. Dominicans on the other side rate jobs mainly 
“extremely important” with a 56.9%. As it happened with table 7.1.1, the chi-square value of Table 
7.2.1 is high (.581), and indicates no significant relationship among data and variables. Table 7.2.2 
shows that 57.6% of U.S. born Latinos/Hispanics found jobs and the economy extremely 
important, compared to a 41.4% of foreign born. Table 7.2.2 chi-square values is .000.  
  Table 7.2.3 shows that when analyzed by country of origin, numbers are consistent with 
the other tables. In this sense, except for Chile (66.7%), Dominican Republic (51%), and Ecuador 
(63.2%), the other countries rated jobs and the economy rather very important than extremely 
important. Given that most of immigrants’ purpose when migrating is finding a job and being able 
to provide for their families, it is interesting that an issue like jobs and economy are not listed as 
an urgent top priority. Although respondents considered very important, in a time where people 
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were leaving an economic crisis behind, a major interest in the economy would have been 
expected. Table 7.2.3 chi-square value (.346) shown no significant relationship.  
  Table 7.3.1 measures the importance Latinos/Hispanics gave to Health care as part of the 
presidential debate for 2012 elections. In this case, as the table shows, Other Central Americans 
(60%) and Other South Americans (58.3%) rated health care as extremely important with larger 
percentages. A higher number of Dominicans (54.2%) and Cubans (42.3%) also gave health care 
the level of extremely important. Mexicans on the other hand, did not largely rate health care as 
an extremely or very important issue. Their responses were divided, and none reached more than 
50%. As with the previous variables, Education and jobs and the economy, Table 7.3.1 chi-square 
value (.577) shows no significant relationship among data. Table 7.3.2 shows that a larger share 
of native born Latinos/Hispanics (51.5%) think of health care as extremely important compared to 
foreign born Hispanics/Latinos where a 40% rated health care as extremely important. Table 7.3.2 
chi-square value (.000) indicated a significant relationship, as well as Table 7.3.3 (.000). When 
results are analyzed by country of origin, Table 7.3.3 shows some mixed results. For example, 
foreign born Dominicans do not follow the overall pattern, and the majority rated healthcare as 
very important instead of extremely important. A 61% of Salvadorans also see health care as very 
important but not extremely important, which is also the case for respondents of other Central 
American countries like Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Response percentages are mixed 
within South American countries.  
  Immigration importance perception is shown by Tables 7.4. These tables show interesting 
responses where it is noticeable that the immigration issue is not as important as the other issues 
mentioned before, besides it has more varied responses. According to Table 7.4.1, none of the 
major Latino/Hispanic subgroups rated immigration as an extremely important issue, overall a 
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33% of the respondents said immigration was extremely important. Numbers were higher in the 
very important category; however, the percentage was not higher than 44%; further, somewhat 
important (14.1%) and not important (7%) showed larger digits for the first time since measuring 
political agenda issues. Different from the previously assessed variables, immigration tables all 
show a significant relationship of data with variables. Table 7.4.1 chi-square value is .017, Table 
7.4.2 value is .000, and 7.4.3 value is .005. When comparing, native born and foreign born 
Latinos/Hispanics, results show that U.S. born Latinos consider immigration a less important issue 
than foreign born Latinos, however, the latter group does not significantly see immigration as an 
extremely important issue. When analyzed by country of origin, foreign born Latinos are consistent 
with the overall results, except for Chileans, where a 100% said to considered immigration as 
extremely important, and Colombians where a 46.4% rated it as extremely important as well, the 
rest of respondents rated it very important instead. Some others were divided evenly, like 
Guatemala, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Panama. 
  Acculturation  
  To measure acculturation, I used citizenship as a dependent variable because becoming a 
citizen is a measurable and visible indication of incipient political acculturation. When measuring 
electoral behavior, only citizens can vote, but more than that, becoming a citizen represent a 
commitment with the recipient country where individuals accept to be part of the different 
scenarios of public life. When the immigrant decides to become a citizen, he/she is acknowledging 
the recipient country as a new home, which should be a reason to participate actively of the 
decision making in political processes since the immigrant will be directly affected or benefited 
by decisions politicians and the government make. As part of this variable, I also included cross 
tabulations of the perceptions Latinos/Hispanics had of being Latino or Hispanic in the United 
 78 
 
States. To measure this variable, three different categories were measured: Finding jobs, getting a 
promotion, and gaining admission to school or college. I included these questions because if 
immigrants are acculturated enough they should not see any differences in between the mainstream 
population and themselves.     
  Tables 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 tabulate the number of respondents that are American citizens. 
The first table 8.1 breaks down the data between the major subgroups, and it shows differences 
not only between the major subgroups, but within the “other” subgroups. Puerto Ricans are for 
obvious reasons, all citizens; a 61.5% of Cubans said to be citizens compared to a 34.2% of 
Mexicans who said to be citizens. Citizenship is not judged here as an element of legality, but as 
an element required to participate of electoral processes. After Puerto Ricans, Latinos of South 
American (66.7%) and Dominican (61.5%) descent are the ones with the largest number of 
citizens. Salvadorans (34.5%) and other Central Americans (50%) numbers of citizens are 
comparable to Mexicans. This table chi-square value is .000 which indicates a relationship between 
data and variable.  
  Table 8.2 shows, foreign born Latinos/Hispanics number of citizens are lower than 50%; 
however, when analyzed individually there are some countries that are pushing the balance to one 
side more than other. Table 8.2 chi-square significance value is .962, which indicates no significant 
relationship. Table 8.3 shows that foreign born Latinos/Hispanics from countries like Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Venezuela 
said to be mainly citizens; on the other side, most Central American foreign born Latinos said they 
were not citizens, including Mexicans. The fact that Mexicans are usually the largest subgroup 
notably affects the percentage of non-citizens in the table. The reality is that South American and 
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Dominican foreign born Latinos/Hispanics tend to be citizens in a larger number. Table 8.3 chi-
square value is .000 indicating significant relationship. 
  Tables 9.1.1, 9.1.2, and 9.1.3 show the perceptions of Latinos/Hispanics of their ethnic 
label as helpful, hurtful or indifferent when trying to find a job. Although, within the major 
subgroups overall being Latino/Hispanic does not make a difference when finding a job, 
differences between the subgroups are noticeable. For instance, while a 32.9% of Mexicans, a 33% 
of Puerto Ricans, and a 35.1% of Cubans said being a Latino/Hispanic helps them to find a job, a 
50% of Other Central Americans and a 41.7% of Other South Americans said the same. Ancestry 
tends to be problematic in some tabulations because many respondents did not classify themselves 
as either Central or South Americans, but said other country instead. However, when tabulated 
with native and foreign born Latinos/Hispanics, results are clearer. U.S. born Latinos/Hispanics 
think of the ethnic label as less helpful than foreign born expressed, they also think of being 
Latino/Hispanic as an element that makes no difference when finding a job. When the variable is 
crossed with each country of origin the numbers are consistent with the previous tables. Apart 
from foreign born Cubans, all the other respondents seemed to agree that being a Latino/Hispanic 
was helpful when finding a job. 
  In tables 9.2.1, 9.2.2, and 9.2.3 information was crossed to find out if respondents felt that 
being Latino/Hispanic helped, hurt, or made no difference when getting a promotion. Different 
from the prior tables, a larger share of respondents said being Latino/Hispanic did not make any 
difference when trying to get a promotion. Overall a 44.2% used the category “no difference” to 
answer, followed by “helps.” Similarly, a 55.6% of U.S. born Latinos/Hispanics answered it made 
no difference, although a 38.8% of foreign born Latinos/Hispanics said being Latino/Hispanic 
helps rather than being ignored. It can be argued that Latinos/Hispanics do not see themselves 
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discriminated for being Latinos, on the contrary they see that can either help them or in the worst 
case, it would not make any difference when either trying to find a job or get a promotion in the 
current job. This is particularly interesting given that discrimination can foster political 
mobilization. When asked about how the ethnic label will impact admission to school or college, 
responses are not conclusive. Table 9.3.1 shows that a small majority perceives that being 
Latino/Hispanic makes no difference when applying to school. When the variable is contrasted 
between U.S. born and Foreign born Latinos/Hispanics, the major difference is that a larger share 
of U.S. born Latinos/Hispanics (41.3%) think the ethnic label makes no difference when it comes 
to apply to college or school.  In comparison, a 38.1% of foreign born Latinos/Hispanics think the 
same, and a 39.8% think it might help.  
Discussion   
First, it is necessary to acknowledge that even when some variables offered more insightful 
and significant results than others, each variable and category showed consistent tendencies within 
the ethnic subgroups. In some of the categories, it was not possible to establish a big difference in 
between the major subgroups (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans) and the subgroups 
categorized as “Other.” There were some variables where differences are noticeable. In the first 
place, group identity was a telling variable. Different from what is expected, a larger share of 
Latinos/Hispanics said not to have a pan-ethnic (Latino/Hispanic) term preference. The latter can 
be the result of different situations: detachment of pan-ethnic labels and/or a stronger attachment 
to country of origin/nationality terms; little knowledge of the pan-ethnic terms meaning and/or 
confusion; or adoption to the recipient label nationality, American.  
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As I have suggested, the fact that surveys such as the NSL (National Survey of Latinos) do 
not offer identity categories that include country of origin or hyphened racial labels in their 
questionnaires, causes that most respondents end up rejecting pan-ethnic labels when answering 
these surveys. I suggest, for instance, that if a native-born Latino/Hispanic that considers 
himself/herself a Chicano/a, a Cuban-American or a Colombian is not given these options in a 
questionnaire or survey, this person will say “he/she” does not have a preference between the terms 
given, before choosing a term he/she does not identify with. Following this line of thought, I argue 
that using pan-ethnic labels identification as a predictor of any kind of social or political behavior 
is not reliable. The vagueness of a category such as “no preference” and the lower percentages of 
those who identify either as Latino or Hispanic are an indication of the uncertainty of using 
Latinidad as a political predictor. 
When analyzing political participation, and comparing the percentage of respondents who 
identified themselves as Democrats and the percentage of those who said will vote for the 
Democratic candidate Barack Obama in the presidential election of 2012, the numbers did not 
exactly add up. The number of democrats was lower than the number of voters for the democratic 
team. This indicates that party identification is not always a vote predictor. The three subgroups 
with the highest number of respondents who said would vote for Obama and Biden were South 
Americans (77.8%), Dominicans (78.8%) and Salvadorans (73.5%), while the number of 
respondent of the same subgroups who identified themselves as Democrats were 50% for South 
Americans, 63.9% Dominicans, and 41.7% Salvadorans. The latter shows that even when party 
affiliation is a strong predictor of voting, there are other shares of people who do not identify with 
one of the main political parties, but that have the intention to vote. The case of Dominicans is also 
interesting, according to the tables, Dominicans are solid Democrat voters, even more than 
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Mexicans that are so often portrayed as such. There are variations in between subgroups, however, 
what it remains constant is the low number of Latinos/Hispanics that considered themselves 
Republicans, that see the Republican Party as interested in Latino issues, or that will be willing to 
vote for a republican candidate.  
Also interesting are the higher percentages of South Americans, Central Americans, and 
Dominicans who identified as Democrats compared to Mexicans. Mexicans represent the largest 
share of the Latino/Hispanic community in the U.S., which means they can contribute with more 
votes. The latter has made that Political Parties concentrate more on promoting and campaigning 
among them, however, as the results show, there are significant numbers indicating that other 
subgroups might be more strongly affiliated to a political party than what the traditional 
Latino/Hispanic subgroups like Mexicans or Cubans are. Attribute a political party preference to 
all Latinos/Hispanics is misleading. As the tables showed, large groups of respondents identified 
themselves as independent or something else, especially among those who identified themselves 
as foreign born. In fact, table 4.3 shows that Panamanian tend to have a stronger affiliation to 
Republicans, as well Guatemalans and Chileans party affiliation was evenly distributed, making it 
hard to assign a single label to them.  
When inquired about important issues discussed during the presidential campaign, 
responses where somehow consistent. Some variations were noticeable, although most of them 
consisted in that some subgroups chose “very important” instead of “extremely important”. Still, 
there were differences between the three major subgroups and the ones catalogued as “Other.” 
While no more than 50% of Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans said that Education was 
extremely important for the elections, more than 50% of Dominicans, Other Central Americans, 
and Other South Americans said it was extremely important. When asked about jobs, the economy, 
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and health care, results are not significantly different, which means that education can be more of 
a deal breaker among Latinos/Hispanics than the economy or health care. The other issue they 
were inquired about was immigration, which has been for decades portrayed as a vital issue for 
Latinos/Hispanics. As the tables show, less than 50% of the major subgroups and the “other” 
Latinos/Hispanics said immigration was extremely important, as well less than 50% said it was 
very important. Not even most foreign born Latinos considered the issue as extremely important, 
and when analyzed by country of origin, only a larger percentage of Chileans and Colombians said 
it was extremely important. This is important because other issues were rated as extremely 
important by a larger percentage of respondents rather than immigration, which should be 
considered by the media, politicians, and political parties’ organizations. 
Going through the established variables for acculturation, it is noticeable that much of 
Latinos/Hispanics do not see the ethnic label as an impediment for either finding a job, getting 
promoted or getting into school. Which is an indicator that discrimination is not a factor that has 
moved them to participate in politics. However, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Central Americans 
are the ones that had the most respondents saying that being Latino/Hispanic could hurt any of the 
mentioned processes. Percentages are not significantly high, but there are higher than in other 
subgroups, which makes sense with the political history of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in the 
United States. Still, numbers are not that high to make a statement. 
I have expected to find more notable differences among respondents in regards voting 
behavior, however, even when gaps are not extremely wide there are certain points to highlight: 
Hispanic or Latino are not terms inherently attached to those labeled under them; Political party 
affiliations of South Americans, Central Americans, and Dominicans are more consistent than in 
the other major subgroups, even when not targeted by the political parties’ campaigns with the 
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same strength as they target the major subgroups. Further, Dominicans are becoming a solid 
Democrat subgroup, with what it seems to be an active electoral engagement, which is supported 
by the high percentage of Dominicans who said to be planning to vote. Even when South 
Americans and Central Americans are diverse subgroups, congruencies can be found within those 
two subgroups, more than with the three major subgroups. Many respondents did not identify their 
ancestry with the major categories, instead a lot of them chose “another country”, which altered 
the cross tabulation. This situation might have impacted the percentages of the “Other” 
Latinos/Hispanics given that their countries of origin were not listed as a primary group. Analyzing 
the latter situation, I suggest that to obtain better and more accurate results from the variables 
utilized in this study is necessary to include more countries as main ancestry categories. By the 
amount of respondent who chose another country as an ancestry category, it looks like respondents 
did not know what to answer when asked about their ancestry and their country of origin was not 
listed. Subcategories such as Other Central Americans or Other South Americans do not seem to 
be viable alternatives.  
Finally, being able to obtain more precise information where subgroups and countries of 
origin were separated from the main Latino subgroups was itself an important gain. However, it is 
necessary to keep conducting research where these subgroups are detached from each other, which 
will allow better understanding of Latinos/Hispanics in the U.S. Which also makes necessary that 
more data is collected under such conditions, as well as more data should be available. Although 
the National Survey of Latinos has been conducted for many years now, data is only available until 
2013. In unpredictable and heated political times like the ones American society is living, 
understanding the political behavior of the largest minority in the country should be a priority. 
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Table 1.1. Pan-Ethnic term preference—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, or are you 
and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country of 
origin) 
The terms Hispanic and 
Latino are both used to 
describe people who are 
of Hispanic or Latino 
origin or descent.  Do 
you happen to prefer one 
of these terms more than 
the other? 
Hispanic 
 
316 55 30 27 21 4 0 79 3 3 538 
 
32.2% 27.1% 27.0% 37.5% 29.2% 20.0% 0.0% 28.5% 27.3% 42.9% 30.5% 
Latino 
 
117 32 20 7 9 7 6 53 0 1 252 
 
11.9% 15.8% 18.0% 9.7% 12.5% 35.0% 50.0% 19.1% 0.0% 14.3% 14.3% 
No 
preference 
 
531 113 61 38 41 9 5 143 8 3 952 
 
54.2% 55.7% 55.0% 52.8% 56.9% 45.0% 41.7% 51.6% 72.7% 42.9% 53.9% 
Don't 
Know 
 
13 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 18 
 
1.3% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% .4% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 
Refused 
 
3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 5 
 
.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% .4% 0.0% 0.0% .3% 
Total 
 
980 203 111 72 72 20 12 277 11 7 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 73.742a 36 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 54.203 36 .026 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .389 1 .533 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 1.1a. Pan-Ethnic term preference—Other Country[Specify] 
    Specify Other country 
    Argentina Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica Ecuador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama 
The terms 
Hispanic and 
Latino are both 
used to describe 
people who are 
of Hispanic or 
Latino origin or 
descent.  Do you 
happen to prefer 
one of these 
terms more than 
the other? 
Hispanic 0 0 1 0 1 9 0 5 7 2 4 0 
          0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 33.3% 26.5% 0.0% 27.8% 25.0% 10.0% 18.2% 0.0% 
Latino 1 0 1 3 1 7 1 3 8 4 3 1 
16.7% 0.0% 25.0% 75.0% 33.3% 20.6% 25.0% 16.7% 28.6% 20.0% 13.6% 16.7% 
No 
preference 
5 1 2 1 1 18 3 10 13 14 15 5 
83.3% 100.0% 50.0% 25.0% 33.3% 52.9% 75.0% 55.6% 46.4% 70.0% 68.2% 83.3% 
Don't 
Know 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Refused 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 6 1 4 4 3 34 4 18 28 20 22 6 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  
 
  
Total     Portugal Spain Uruguay Venezuela 
French 
Guyana Africa 
United 
States 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
    0 25 0 3 1 0 8 5 0 1 79 
The terms Hispanic and Latino are both used to 
describe people who are of Hispanic or Latino 
origin or descent.  Do you happen to prefer one 
of these terms more than the other? 
Hispanic 0.0% 43.9% 0.0% 27.3% 100.0% 0.0% 50.0% 38.5% 0.0% 50.0% 28.5% 
 1 1 1 3 0 1 1 3 0 0 53 
Latino 33.3% 1.8% 50.0% 27.3% 0.0% 100.0% 6.3% 23.1% 0.0% 0.0% 19.1% 
 2 30 1 4 0 0 7 5 1 1 143 
No preference 66.7% 52.6% 50.0% 36.4% 0.0% 0.0% 43.8% 38.5% 100.0% 50.0% 51.6% 
 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Don't Know 0.0% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .4% 
 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 Refused 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .4% 
  3 57 2 11 1 1 16 13 1 2 277 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Continue from Table 1.1a 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 95.238a 88 .281 
Likelihood Ratio 85.770 88 .547 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.752 1 .186 
N of Valid Cases 277     
 
Table 1.2. Pan-Ethnic term preference—Native/Foreign Born 
  
Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United 
States, or in another country? 
Total 
Puerto 
Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
The terms 
Hispanic and 
Latino are both 
used to describe 
people who are 
of Hispanic or 
Latino origin or 
descent.  Do you 
happen to prefer 
one of these 
terms more than 
the other? 
Hispanic 
 
32 245 260 0 1 538 
 
30.5% 32.3% 28.9% 0.0% 100.0% 30.5% 
Latino 
 
17 85 150 0 0 252 
 
16.2% 11.2% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 
No preference 
 
54 423 474 1 0 952 
 
51.4% 55.7% 52.7% 100.0% 0.0% 53.9% 
Don't Know 
 
1 5 12 0 0 18 
 
1.0% .7% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 
Refused 
 
1 1 3 0 0 5 
 
1.0% .1% .3% 0.0% 0.0% .3% 
Total 
 
105 759 899 1 1 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.640a 16 .288 
Likelihood Ratio 18.891 16 .274 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .296 1 .586 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 1.3. Pan-Ethnic term preference—Foreign born country of origin 
    In what country were you born? 
  
 
  
 
Argentina Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras 
Do you 
happen to 
prefer one of 
these terms 
more than 
the other? 
Hispanic 
0 0 1 0 1 7 0 23 20 5 15 7 4 
0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 25.0% 0.0% 25.8% 39.2% 26.3% 25.4% 25.9% 18.2% 
Latino 
1 1 1 2 1 4 0 18 5 5 6 8 2 
12.5% 100.0% 33.3% 66.7% 33.3% 14.3% 0.0% 20.2% 9.8% 26.3% 10.2% 29.6% 9.1% 
No 
preference 
7 0 1 1 1 16 4 48 26 9 37 12 16 
87.5% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 57.1% 100.0% 53.9% 51.0% 47.4% 62.7% 44.4% 72.7% 
Don't 
Know 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Refused 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 
8 1 3 3 3 28 4 89 51 19 59 27 22 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  
 
 
Total 
  Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru  
Puerto 
Rico 
Spain Uruguay Venezuela 
French 
Guyana 
Other 
Don't 
Know 
Refused 
    154 4 0 7 1 2 0 1 1 3 2 3 261 
2. Do you 
happen to 
prefer one of 
these terms 
more than 
the other? 
Hispanic 31.6% 20.0% 0.0% 33.3% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 12.5% 100.0% 11.5% 50.0% 60.0% 29.0% 
  70 4 2 9 0 0 0 2 0 7 1 1 150 
Latino 14.4% 20.0% 40.0% 42.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 26.9% 25.0% 20.0% 16.6% 
No 
preference 
253 12 3 5 0 2 1 4 0 15 1 1 475 
52.0% 60.0% 60.0% 23.8% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0% 50.0% 0.0% 57.7% 25.0% 20.0% 52.7% 
  10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
Don't Know 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 
  Refused 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 0.0% .3% 
Total 
487 20 5 21 2 4 1 8 1 26 4 5 901 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Continue from table 1.3. 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 
168.955a 96 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 
105.873 96 .231 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .358 1 .550 
N of Valid Cases 
901     
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Table 2.1. Candidate Choice—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, 
Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
If the 
presidential 
election were 
being held 
TODAY, 
would you 
vote...? 
for the Democratic 
ticket of Barack 
Obama and Joe Biden 
 
393 143 30 41 25 7 7 108 7 1 762 
 
60.6% 70.4% 39.5% 78.8% 73.5% 58.3% 77.8% 56.3% 77.8% 20.0% 61.4% 
for the Republican 
ticket of Mitt Romney 
and Paul Ryan 
 
125 24 33 6 4 3 2 37 1 2 237 
 
19.3% 11.8% 43.4% 11.5% 11.8% 25.0% 22.2% 19.3% 11.1% 40.0% 19.1% 
Other candidate 
 
19 5 2 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 31 
 
2.9% 2.5% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5% 
Will not vote 
 
36 13 1 1 1 0 0 11 0 0 63 
 
5.5% 6.4% 1.3% 1.9% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 
Don't Know 
 
63 11 9 4 2 1 0 27 1 2 120 
 
9.7% 5.4% 11.8% 7.7% 5.9% 8.3% 0.0% 14.1% 11.1% 40.0% 9.7% 
Refused 
 
13 7 1 0 2 1 0 4 0 0 28 
 
2.0% 3.4% 1.3% 0.0% 5.9% 8.3% 0.0% 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 
Total 
 
649 203 76 52 34 12 9 192 9 5 1241 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 80.245a 45 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 81.157 45 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 
4.759 1 .029 
N of Valid Cases 1241     
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Table 2.2. Candidate choice—Native/Foreign Born 
 
  
4. Were you born on the island of Puerto 
Rico, in the United States, or in another 
country? 
Total 
Puerto 
Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
13. If the presidential 
election were being 
held TODAY, would 
you vote...? 
for the Democratic 
ticket of Barack 
Obama and Joe 
Biden 
 
70 462 230 762 
 
66.7% 60.9% 61.0% 61.4% 
for the Republican 
ticket of Mitt 
Romney and Paul 
Ryan 
 
13 151 73 237 
 
12.4% 19.9% 19.4% 19.1% 
Other candidate 
 
1 25 5 31 
 
1.0% 3.3% 1.3% 2.5% 
Will not vote 
 
8 41 14 63 
 
7.6% 5.4% 3.7% 5.1% 
Don't Know 
 
9 67 44 120 
 
8.6% 8.8% 11.7% 9.7% 
Refused 
 
4 13 11 28 
 
3.8% 1.7% 2.9% 2.3% 
Total 
 
105 759 377 1241 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
16.238a 10 .093 
Likelihood Ratio 16.864 10 .077 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .967 1 .325 
N of Valid Cases 1241     
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Table 2.3. Candidate Choice— Foreign born country of origin 
          In what country were you born?                
    Argentina Bolivia Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic Ecuador 
El 
Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
If the 
presidential 
election 
were being 
held 
TODAY, 
would you 
vote...? 
Barack Obama and Joe 
Biden 
4 2 1 12 3 17 24 5 17 2 2 
80.0% 100.0% 50.0% 66.7% 75.0% 31.5% 77.4% 62.5% 81.0% 25.0% 33.3% 
Mitt Romney and Paul 
Ryan 
0 0 1 2 0 25 4 0 1 5 1 
0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 11.1% 0.0% 46.3% 12.9% 0.0% 4.8% 62.5% 16.7% 
Other candidate 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.6% 0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Will not vote 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 25.0% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 
Don't Know 0 0 0 1 0 8 2 3 1 1 2 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.6% 0.0% 14.8% 6.5% 37.5% 4.8% 12.5% 33.3% 
Refused 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 3.2% 0.0% 9.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 5 2 2 18 4 54 31 8 21 8 6 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
       In what country were you born?               
Total     Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru Puerto Rico Spain Venezuela French Guyana Other Refused 
If the 
presidential 
election 
were being 
held 
TODAY, 
would you 
vote...? 
Barack Obama and Joe 
Biden 
108 5 2 7 2 3 4 0 7 3 230 
66.3% 45.5% 40.0% 63.6% 100.0% 100.0% 80.0% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0% 61.0% 
Mitt Romney and Paul 
Ryan 
24 1 3 2 0 0 1 0 3 0 73 
14.7% 9.1% 60.0% 18.2% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 21.4% 0.0% 19.4% 
Other candidate 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 
Will not vote 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 14 
2.5% 18.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 0.0% 3.7% 
Don't Know 21 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 44 
12.9% 9.1% 0.0% 18.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 7.1% 0.0% 11.7% 
Refused 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 11 
2.5% 18.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 2.9% 
Total 163 11 5 11 2 3 5 1 14 3 377 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Continue from Table 2.3. 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 
135.560a 100 .010 
Likelihood Ratio 
120.436 100 .080 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.021 1 .884 
N of Valid Cases 
377     
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Table 3.1. Intention to vote—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, 
Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Do you 
yourself plan to 
vote in the 
election this 
November? 
Yes 
 
525 163 66 44 28 11 9 165 8 5 1024 
 
80.9% 80.3% 86.8% 84.6% 82.4% 91.7% 100.0% 85.9% 88.9% 100.0% 82.5% 
No 
 
103 34 8 5 5 1 0 16 0 0 172 
 
15.9% 16.7% 10.5% 9.6% 14.7% 8.3% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 13.9% 
Don't know 
 
21 6 2 3 1 0 0 10 1 0 44 
 
3.2% 3.0% 2.6% 5.8% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 5.2% 11.1% 0.0% 3.5% 
Refused 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .5% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Total 
 
649 203 76 52 34 12 9 192 9 5 1241 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.237a 27 .617 
Likelihood Ratio 26.503 27 .491 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.261 1 .261 
N of Valid Cases 1241     
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Table 3.2. Intention to vote—Native/Foreign Born 
  
Were you born on the island of 
Puerto Rico, in the United States, 
or in another country? 
Total 
Puerto 
Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
Do you yourself 
plan to vote in 
the election this 
November? 
Yes 
 
84 622 318 1024 
 
80.0% 81.9% 84.4% 82.5% 
No 
 
18 114 40 172 
 
17.1% 15.0% 10.6% 13.9% 
Don't know 
 
3 23 18 44 
 
2.9% 3.0% 4.8% 3.5% 
Refused 
 
0 0 1 1 
 
0.0% 0.0% .3% .1% 
Total 
 
105 759 377 1241 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.296a 6 .158 
Likelihood Ratio 9.446 6 .150 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.049 1 .306 
N of Valid Cases 1241     
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Table 3.3. Intention to Vote— Foreign born country of origin 
         In what country were you born?                 
    Argentina Bolivia Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
Do you 
yourself 
plan to 
vote in the 
election 
this 
November
? 
Yes 4 2 2 13 3 47 29 5 18 8 5 
80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 72.2% 75.0% 87.0% 93.5% 62.5% 85.7% 100.0% 83.3% 
No 1 0 0 3 1 6 1 0 3 0 1 
20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 25.0% 11.1% 3.2% 0.0% 14.3% 0.0% 16.7% 
Don't 
know 
0 0 0 2 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 1.9% 3.2% 37.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Refused 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 5 2 2 18 4 54 31 8 21 8 6 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
         In what country were you born?               
Total     Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru Puerto Rico Spain Venezuela 
French 
Guyana Other Refused 
Do you 
yourself 
plan to 
vote in the 
election 
this 
November? 
Yes 138 8 5 9 2 3 5 0 9 3 318 
84.7% 72.7% 100.0% 81.8% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 64.3% 100.0% 84.4% 
No 18 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 40 
11.0% 9.1% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 28.6% 0.0% 10.6% 
Don't know 7 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 18 
4.3% 9.1% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 7.1% 0.0% 4.8% 
Refused 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .3% 
Total 163 11 5 11 2 3 5 1 14 3 377 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Continue from Table 3.3. 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 93.220a 60 .004 
Likelihood Ratio 48.081 60 .866 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .423 1 .515 
N of Valid Cases 377     
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Table 4.1. Party self-identification—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, 
Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
In politics today, 
do you consider 
yourself a 
Republican, a 
Democrat, an 
Independent, or 
something else? 
Republican 
 
116 22 30 7 10 4 1 32 0 2 224 
 
11.8% 10.8% 27.0% 9.7% 13.9% 20.0% 8.3% 11.6% 0.0% 28.6% 12.7% 
Democrat 
 
436 126 41 46 30 10 6 134 5 3 837 
 
44.5% 62.1% 36.9% 63.9% 41.7% 50.0% 50.0% 48.4% 45.5% 42.9% 47.4% 
Independent 
 
222 20 25 11 17 1 4 67 4 0 371 
 
22.7% 9.9% 22.5% 15.3% 23.6% 5.0% 33.3% 24.2% 36.4% 0.0% 21.0% 
Something else 
 
113 24 6 5 6 2 0 27 1 0 184 
 
11.5% 11.8% 5.4% 6.9% 8.3% 10.0% 0.0% 9.7% 9.1% 0.0% 10.4% 
Don't Know 
 
76 7 6 3 8 2 0 11 1 2 116 
 
7.8% 3.4% 5.4% 4.2% 11.1% 10.0% 0.0% 4.0% 9.1% 28.6% 6.6% 
Refused 
 
17 4 3 0 1 1 1 6 0 0 33 
 
1.7% 2.0% 2.7% 0.0% 1.4% 5.0% 8.3% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 
Total 
 
980 203 111 72 72 20 12 277 11 7 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 95.259a 45 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 97.881 45 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .645 1 .422 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 4.2. Party self-identification— Native/Foreign Born 
  
Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United 
States, or in another country? 
Total Puerto Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
In politics today, 
do you consider 
yourself a 
Republican, a 
Democrat, an 
Independent, or 
something else? 
Republican 
 
12 115 97 0 0 224 
 
11.4% 15.2% 10.8% 0.0% 0.0% 12.7% 
Democrat 
 
63 373 400 1 0 837 
 
60.0% 49.1% 44.5% 100.0% 0.0% 47.4% 
Independent 
 
11 149 211 0 0 371 
 
10.5% 19.6% 23.5% 0.0% 0.0% 21.0% 
Something else 
 
10 93 81 0 0 184 
 
9.5% 12.3% 9.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.4% 
Don't Know 
 
5 23 88 0 0 116 
 
4.8% 3.0% 9.8% 0.0% 0.0% 6.6% 
Refused 
 
4 6 22 0 1 33 
 
3.8% .8% 2.4% 0.0% 100.0% 1.9% 
Total 
 
105 759 899 1 1 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
116.176a 20 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 75.403 20 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 30.190 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 4.3. Party Self-identification—Foreign Born Country of Origin 
   In what country were you born?  
    Argentina Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic Ecuador 
El 
Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
In 
politics, 
today, 
do you 
consider 
yourself 
a 
Republic
an, a 
Democr
at, an 
Indepen
dent, or 
somethi
ng else? 
Republican 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 24 5 0 5 4 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 27.0% 9.8% 0.0% 8.5% 14.8% 4.5% 
Democrat 3 1 3 0 1 18 3 34 33 9 24 9 8 
37.5% 100.0% 100.0% 0.0% 33.3% 64.3% 75.0% 38.2% 64.7% 47.4% 40.7% 33.3% 36.4% 
Independent 2 0 0 0 1 5 0 21 7 7 17 9 7 
25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 17.9% 0.0% 23.6% 13.7% 36.8% 28.8% 33.3% 31.8% 
Something 
else 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 0 5 2 4 
12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 3.6% 25.0% 1.1% 5.9% 0.0% 8.5% 7.4% 18.2% 
Don't Know 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 6 3 2 7 2 2 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 6.7% 5.9% 10.5% 11.9% 7.4% 9.1% 
Refused 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 1 0 
25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 0.0% 5.3% 1.7% 3.7% 0.0% 
Total 8 1 3 3 3 28 4 89 51 19 59 27 22 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
    In what country were you born?   
Total     Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru 
Puerto 
Rico Spain Uruguay Venezuela French Guyana Other Don't Know Refused 
In politics 
today, do 
you 
consider 
yourself a 
Republica
n, a 
Democrat
, an 
Independe
nt, or 
something 
else? 
Republican 42 2 3 2 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 97 
8.6% 10.0% 60.0% 9.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 15.4% 0.0% 0.0% 10.8% 
Democrat 202 9 2 10 2 3 1 4 0 15 2 5 401 
41.5% 45.0% 40.0% 47.6% 100.0% 75.0% 100.0% 50.0% 0.0% 57.7% 50.0% 100.0% 44.5% 
Independent 118 3 0 6 0 0 0 2 0 6 0 0 211 
24.2% 15.0% 0.0% 28.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 23.1% 0.0% 0.0% 23.4% 
Something 
else 
54 3 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 81 
11.1% 15.0% 0.0% 9.5% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 0.0% 9.0% 
Don't Know 59 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 88 
12.1% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 9.8% 
Refused 12 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 23 
2.5% 5.0% 0.0% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 2.6% 
Total 487 20 5 21 2 4 1 8 1 26 4 5 901 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Continue from Table 4.4 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 164.188a 120 .005 
Likelihood Ratio 159.965 120 .009 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.400 1 .237 
N of Valid Cases 901     
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Table 5.1. Party perception—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, 
or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Which party do 
you think has more 
concern for 
(Hispanics/Latinos) 
- or is there no 
difference? 
The 
Democratic 
Party 
 
517 127 56 53 30 7 9 154 5 3 961 
 
52.8% 62.6% 50.5% 73.6% 41.7% 35.0% 75.0% 55.6% 45.5% 42.9% 54.4% 
The 
Republican 
Party 
 
95 13 20 3 7 4 0 26 0 0 168 
 
9.7% 6.4% 18.0% 4.2% 9.7% 20.0% 0.0% 9.4% 0.0% 0.0% 9.5% 
No difference 
 
279 55 25 12 28 8 3 75 4 3 492 
 
28.5% 27.1% 22.5% 16.7% 38.9% 40.0% 25.0% 27.1% 36.4% 42.9% 27.9% 
Don't Know 
 
86 8 7 4 7 1 0 19 2 1 135 
 
8.8% 3.9% 6.3% 5.6% 9.7% 5.0% 0.0% 6.9% 18.2% 14.3% 7.6% 
Refused 
 
3 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 9 
 
.3% 0.0% 2.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% .5% 
Total 
 
980 203 111 72 72 20 12 277 11 7 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 100.172a 88 .177 
Likelihood Ratio 75.366 88 .829 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 2.371 1 .124 
N of Valid Cases 277     
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Table 5.2. Party Perception—Native/Foreign Born 
  
Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United 
States, or in another country? 
Total 
Puerto 
Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
Which party do 
you think has more 
concern for 
(Hispanics/Latinos) 
- or is there no 
difference? 
The Democratic 
Party 
 
63 445 452 0 1 961 
 
60.0% 58.6% 50.3% 0.0% 100.0% 54.4% 
The Republican 
Party 
 
6 74 88 0 0 168 
 
5.7% 9.7% 9.8% 0.0% 0.0% 9.5% 
No difference 
 
32 187 272 1 0 492 
 
30.5% 24.6% 30.3% 100.0% 0.0% 27.9% 
Don't Know 
 
4 50 81 0 0 135 
 
3.8% 6.6% 9.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.6% 
Refused 
 
0 3 6 0 0 9 
 
0.0% .4% .7% 0.0% 0.0% .5% 
Total 
 
105 759 899 1 1 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
22.459a 16 .129 
Likelihood Ratio 24.043 16 .089 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 10.539 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 5.3. Party Perception—Foreign Born Country of Origin 
    
   In what country were you born? 
  
    Argentina Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic Ecuador El Salvador 
Guatema
la Honduras 
Which 
party do 
you think 
has more 
concern for 
(Hispanics/
Latinos) - 
or is there 
no 
difference? 
The 
Democratic 
Party 
5 1 2 1 3 11 2 46 36 11 26 11 9 
62.5% 100.0% 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 39.3% 50.0% 51.7% 70.6% 57.9% 44.1% 40.7% 40.9% 
The 
Republican 
Party 
1 0 0 1 0 2 1 14 4 2 5 2 2 
12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 7.1% 25.0% 15.7% 7.8% 10.5% 8.5% 7.4% 9.1% 
No 
difference 
1 0 1 1 0 13 0 19 8 2 23 12 9 
12.5% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 46.4% 0.0% 21.3% 15.7% 10.5% 39.0% 44.4% 40.9% 
Don't 
Know 
1 0 0 0 0 2 1 7 3 4 5 2 2 
12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 25.0% 7.9% 5.9% 21.1% 8.5% 7.4% 9.1% 
Refused 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 8 1 3 3 3 28 4 89 51 19 59 27 22 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
    
    In what country were you born? 
  
Total     Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru 
Puerto 
Rico Spain Uruguay Venezuela 
French 
Guyana Other 
Don't 
Know Refused 
Which 
party do 
you think 
has more 
concern for 
(Hispanics/
Latinos) - 
or is there 
no 
difference? 
The 
Democratic 
Party 
234 9 1 14 2 4 1 4 0 16 1 3 453 
48.0% 45.0% 20.0% 66.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 50.0% 0.0% 61.5% 25.0% 60.0% 50.3% 
The 
Republican 
Party 
43 2 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 1 0 88 
8.8% 10.0% 40.0% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 11.5% 25.0% 0.0% 9.8% 
No 
difference 
160 7 1 5 0 0 0 2 1 5 2 1 273 
32.9% 35.0% 20.0% 23.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 100.0% 19.2% 50.0% 20.0% 30.3% 
Don't 
Know 
48 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 81 
9.9% 5.0% 20.0% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 20.0% 9.0% 
Refused 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
0.4% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .7% 
Total 487 20 5 21 2 4 1 8 1 26 4 5 901 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Continue from Table 5.3 
  Value df 
Asymptotic Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 87.718a 96 .715 
Likelihood Ratio 85.286 96 .775 
Linear-by-Linear Association 
.273 1 .601 
N of Valid Cases 901     
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Table 6.1. Latinos/Hispanics impact on elections—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, 
Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Now in thinking 
about the 2012 
Presidential election, 
in your opinion, will 
the (Hispanic/Latino) 
vote have a major 
impact, a minor 
impact or will it have 
no impact at all in 
determining who 
wins the 2012 
Presidential election? 
Major impact 
 
651 144 76 56 47 16 6 191 5 5 1197 
 
66.4% 70.9% 68.5% 77.8% 65.3% 80.0% 50.0% 69.0% 45.5% 71.4% 67.8% 
Minor impact 
 
220 34 17 12 14 3 3 61 2 2 368 
 
22.4% 16.7% 15.3% 16.7% 19.4% 15.0% 25.0% 22.0% 18.2% 28.6% 20.8% 
No impact at all 
 
53 9 9 2 4 1 1 12 3 0 94 
 
5.4% 4.4% 8.1% 2.8% 5.6% 5.0% 8.3% 4.3% 27.3% 0.0% 5.3% 
Don't know 
 
53 15 9 2 7 0 2 13 1 0 102 
 
5.4% 7.4% 8.1% 2.8% 9.7% 0.0% 16.7% 4.7% 9.1% 0.0% 5.8% 
Refused 
 
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 
.3% .5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .2% 
Total 
 
980 203 111 72 72 20 12 277 11 7 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 35.689a 36 .483 
Likelihood Ratio 33.084 36 .608 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .829 1 .363 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 6.2. Latinos/Hispanics impact in elections— Native/Foreign born 
  
Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United 
States, or in another country? 
Total 
Puerto 
Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
Now in thinking 
about the 2012 
Presidential election, 
in your opinion, will 
the (Hispanic/Latino) 
vote have a major 
impact, a minor 
impact or will it have 
no impact at all in 
determining who 
wins the 2012 
Presidential election? 
Major impact 
 
74 477 645 0 1 1197 
 
70.5% 62.8% 71.7% 0.0% 100.0% 67.8% 
Minor impact 
 
14 200 154 0 0 368 
 
13.3% 26.4% 17.1% 0.0% 0.0% 20.8% 
No impact at all 
 
5 47 41 1 0 94 
 
4.8% 6.2% 4.6% 100.0% 0.0% 5.3% 
Don't know 
 
11 34 57 0 0 102 
 
10.5% 4.5% 6.3% 0.0% 0.0% 5.8% 
Refused 
 
1 1 2 0 0 4 
 
1.0% .1% .2% 0.0% 0.0% .2% 
Total 
 
105 759 899 1 1 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 54.579a 16 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 41.301 16 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .830 1 .362 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 6.3. Latinos/Hispanics impact in elections—Foreign Born Country of Origin 
        In what country were you born?  
    Argentina Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic Ecuador 
El 
Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
Now in thinking 
about the 2012 
Presidential 
election, in your 
opinion, will the 
(Hispanic/Latino
) vote have a 
major impact, a 
minor impact or 
will it have no 
impact at all in 
determining who 
wins the 2012 
Presidential 
election? 
Major 
impact 
7 1 3 3 1 20 4 63 43 12 40 19 17 
87.5% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 33.3% 71.4% 100.0% 70.8% 84.3% 63.2% 67.8% 70.4% 77.3% 
Minor 
impact 
1 0 0 0 2 4 0 11 7 6 9 5 2 
12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 14.3% 0.0% 12.4% 13.7% 31.6% 15.3% 18.5% 9.1% 
No 
impact 
at all 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 4 3 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.9% 0.0% 0.0% 6.8% 11.1% 4.5% 
Don't 
know 
0 0 0 0 0 4 0 8 1 1 6 0 2 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 0.0% 9.0% 2.0% 5.3% 10.2% 0.0% 9.1% 
Refused 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 8 1 3 3 3 28 4 89 51 19 59 27 22 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
        In what country were you born?  
Total     Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru Puerto Rico Spain Uruguay Venezuela French Guyana Other Don't Know Refused 
Now in thinking 
about the 2012 
Presidential 
election, in your 
opinion, will the 
(Hispanic/Latino) 
vote have a 
major impact, a 
minor impact or 
will it have no 
impact at all in 
determining who 
wins the 2012 
Presidential 
election? 
Major 
impact 
340 17 3 19 1 2 0 6 1 19 1 4 646 
69.8% 85.0% 60.0% 90.5% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 75.0% 100.0% 73.1% 25.0% 80.0% 71.7% 
Minor 
impact 
91 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 4 0 1 154 
18.7% 10.0% 40.0% 4.8% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 25.0% 0.0% 15.4% 0.0% 20.0% 17.1% 
No 
impact 
at all 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 42 
4.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 50.0% 0.0% 4.7% 
Don't 
know 
30 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 57 
6.2% 5.0% 0.0% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 25.0% 0.0% 6.3% 
Refused 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .2% 
Total 487 20 5 21 2 4 1 8 1 26 4 5 901 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Continue from Table 6.3. 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 80.346a 96 .875 
Likelihood Ratio 78.918 96 .897 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .289 1 .591 
N of Valid Cases 901     
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Table 7.1.1. Issues: Education—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, 
Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Now I'm going to 
read you a list of 
issues that might be 
discussed during 
this year's 
presidential 
campaign. Is the 
issue of Education 
extremely 
important, very 
important, 
somewhat 
important, or not 
too important to 
you personally? 
Extremely 
important 
 
459 100 51 47 34 11 9 140 5 2 858 
 
46.8% 49.3% 45.9% 65.3% 47.2% 55.0% 75.0% 50.5% 45.5% 28.6% 48.6% 
Very important 
 
457 87 49 22 34 9 3 115 6 5 787 
 
46.6% 42.9% 44.1% 30.6% 47.2% 45.0% 25.0% 41.5% 54.5% 71.4% 44.6% 
Somewhat 
important 
 
51 12 9 3 3 0 0 14 0 0 92 
 
5.2% 5.9% 8.1% 4.2% 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 0.0% 0.0% 5.2% 
Not too 
important 
 
11 3 2 0 1 0 0 8 0 0 25 
 
1.1% 1.5% 1.8% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 
Don't Know 
 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
 
.1% .5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Refused 
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Total 
 
980 203 111 72 72 20 12 277 11 7 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 30.634a 45 .950 
Likelihood Ratio 33.484 45 .897 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .013 1 .909 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 7.1.2. Issues: Education—Native/Foreign Born 
  
Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United 
States, or in another country? 
Total 
Puerto 
Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
Now I'm going to read 
you a list of issues that 
might be discussed 
during this year's 
presidential campaign. 
Is the issue of 
Education extremely 
important, very 
important, somewhat 
important, or not too 
important to you 
personally? 
Extremely 
important 
 
44 423 389 1 1 858 
 
41.9% 55.7% 43.3% 100.0% 100.0% 48.6% 
Very important 
 
56 266 465 0 0 787 
 
53.3% 35.0% 51.7% 0.0% 0.0% 44.6% 
Somewhat 
important 
 
4 54 34 0 0 92 
 
3.8% 7.1% 3.8% 0.0% 0.0% 5.2% 
Not too 
important 
 
1 15 9 0 0 25 
 
1.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 
Don't Know 
 
0 1 1 0 0 2 
 
0.0% .1% .1% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Refused 
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
 
0.0% 0.0% .1% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Total 
 
105 759 899 1 1 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 57.075a 20 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 58.703 20 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.060 1 .303 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 7.1.3. Issues: Education—Foreign Born Country of Origin 
           In what country were you born?  
    Argentina Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic Ecuador 
El 
Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
Is the issue 
of 
Education 
extremely 
important, 
very 
important, 
somewhat 
important, 
or not too 
important 
to you 
personally? 
Extremely 
important 
4 0 1 0 1 14 3 41 30 12 27 10 9 
50.0% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 50.0% 75.0% 46.1% 58.8% 63.2% 45.8% 37.0% 40.9% 
Very 
important 
4 1 2 3 1 12 1 41 19 7 31 15 13 
50.0% 100.0% 66.7% 100.0% 33.3% 42.9% 25.0% 46.1% 37.3% 36.8% 52.5% 55.6% 59.1% 
Somewhat 
important 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 2 0 1 1 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 3.6% 0.0% 5.6% 3.9% 0.0% 1.7% 3.7% 0.0% 
Not too 
important 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 
Don't Know 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Refused 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 8 1 3 3 3 28 4 89 51 19 59 27 22 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
          In what country were you born?  
Total     Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru Puerto Rico Spain Uruguay Venezuela French Guyana Other Don't Know Refused 
Is the issue 
of 
Education 
extremely 
important, 
very 
important, 
somewhat 
important, 
or not too 
important 
to you 
personally? 
Extremely 
important 
190 11 2 12 1 2 0 2 1 11 2 5 391 
39.0% 55.0% 40.0% 57.1% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 25.0% 100.0% 42.3% 50.0% 100.0% 43.4% 
Very 
important 
274 9 2 8 0 2 1 5 0 12 2 0 465 
56.3% 45.0% 40.0% 38.1% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0% 62.5% 0.0% 46.2% 50.0% 0.0% 51.6% 
Somewhat 
important 
20 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 34 
4.1% 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 
Not too 
important 
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 9 
0.4% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 
Don't 
Know 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Refused 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Total 487 20 5 21 2 4 1 8 1 26 4 5 901 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100% 
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Continue from Table 7.1.3. 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 535.755a 120 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 82.292 120 .997 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .162 1 .688 
N of Valid Cases 901     
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 Table 7.2.1. Issues: Jobs and the Economy—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, 
Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Now I'm going to 
read you a list of 
issues that might 
be discussed 
during this year's 
presidential 
campaign. Is the 
issue of Jobs and 
the Economy 
extremely 
important, very 
important, 
somewhat 
important, or not 
too important to 
you personally? 
Extremely 
important 
 
446 123 61 41 33 7 6 138 6 2 863 
 
45.5% 60.6% 55.0% 56.9% 45.8% 35.0% 50.0% 49.8% 54.5% 28.6% 48.9% 
Very important 
 
473 75 44 28 34 12 6 124 4 4 804 
 
48.3% 36.9% 39.6% 38.9% 47.2% 60.0% 50.0% 44.8% 36.4% 57.1% 45.6% 
Somewhat 
important 
 
41 2 3 2 3 1 0 11 1 0 64 
 
4.2% 1.0% 2.7% 2.8% 4.2% 5.0% 0.0% 4.0% 9.1% 0.0% 3.6% 
Not too 
important 
 
16 3 3 0 2 0 0 3 0 1 28 
 
1.6% 1.5% 2.7% 0.0% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 14.3% 1.6% 
Don't Know 
 
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 
 
.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .4% 0.0% 0.0% .3% 
Refused 
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Total 
 
980 203 111 72 72 20 12 277 11 7 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 42.449a 45 .581 
Likelihood Ratio 41.602 45 .617 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .044 1 .834 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 7.2.2. Issues: Jobs and the Economy—Native/Foreign Born 
  
Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United 
States, or in another country? 
Total 
Puerto 
Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
Now I'm going to read 
you a list of issues that 
might be discussed 
during this year's 
presidential campaign. 
Is the issue of Jobs 
and the Economy 
extremely important, 
very important, 
somewhat important, 
or not too important to 
you personally? 
Extremely 
important 
 
52 437 372 1 1 863 
 
49.5% 57.6% 41.4% 100.0% 100.0% 48.9% 
Very important 
 
48 274 482 0 0 804 
 
45.7% 36.1% 53.6% 0.0% 0.0% 45.6% 
Somewhat 
important 
 
3 33 28 0 0 64 
 
2.9% 4.3% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 
Not too 
important 
 
2 13 13 0 0 28 
 
1.9% 1.7% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 
Don't Know 
 
0 2 3 0 0 5 
 
0.0% .3% .3% 0.0% 0.0% .3% 
Refused 
 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
 
0.0% 0.0% .1% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Total 
 
105 759 899 1 1 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
55.415a 20 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 57.239 20 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 9.494 1 .002 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 7.2.3. Issues: Jobs and the Economy—Foreign born country of origin 
        In what country were you born? 
    Argentina Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic Ecuador 
El 
Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
Is the issue of 
Jobs and the 
Economy 
extremely 
important, 
very 
important, 
somewhat 
important, or 
not too 
important to 
you 
personally? 
Extremely 
important 
3 0 1 1 2 13 2 52 26 12 25 10 11 
37.5% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 66.7% 46.4% 50.0% 58.4% 51.0% 63.2% 42.4% 37.0% 50.0% 
Very 
important 
5 1 2 2 1 15 2 35 24 6 31 17 11 
62.5% 100.0% 66.7% 66.7% 33.3% 53.6% 50.0% 39.3% 47.1% 31.6% 52.5% 63.0% 50.0% 
Somewhat 
important 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 5.3% 3.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
Not too 
important 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Don't 
Know 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Refused 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 8 1 3 3 3 28 4 89 51 19 59 27 22 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
          In what country were you born? 
Total     Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru Puerto Rico Spain Uruguay Venezuela French Guyana Other Don't Know Refused 
Is the issue 
of Jobs and 
Economy 
extremely 
important, 
very 
important, 
somewhat 
important, 
or not too 
important 
to you 
personally? 
Extremely 
important 
172 9 2 8 2 2 1 3 1 10 2 4 374 
35.3% 45.0% 40.0% 38.1% 100.0% 50.0% 100.0% 37.5% 100.0% 38.5% 50.0% 80.0% 41.5% 
Very 
important 
289 10 3 11 0 1 0 3 0 12 1 0 482 
59.3% 50.0% 60.0% 52.4% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 37.5% 0.0% 46.2% 25.0% 0.0% 53.5% 
Somewhat 
important 
17 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 0 28 
3.5% 0.0% 0.0% 9.5% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 
Not too 
important 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 13 
1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 25.0% 20.0% 1.4% 
Don't 
Know 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
0.2% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .3% 
Refused 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Total 487 20 5 21 2 4 1 8 1 26 4 5 901 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Continue from Table 7.2.3. 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 125.550a 120 .346 
Likelihood Ratio 92.234 120 .972 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 4.097 1 .043 
N of Valid Cases 901     
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Table 7.3.1. Issues: Health care—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, 
Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Now I'm going to 
read you a list of 
issues that might be 
discussed during 
this year's 
presidential 
campaign. Is the 
issue of Health care 
extremely 
important, very 
important, 
somewhat 
important, or not 
too important to 
you personally? 
Extremely 
important 
 
410 105 58 39 28 12 7 131 5 3 798 
 
41.8% 51.7% 52.3% 54.2% 38.9% 60.0% 58.3% 47.3% 45.5% 42.9% 45.2% 
Very important 
 
468 79 41 30 41 7 4 123 3 4 800 
 
47.8% 38.9% 36.9% 41.7% 56.9% 35.0% 33.3% 44.4% 27.3% 57.1% 45.3% 
Somewhat 
important 
 
68 14 9 2 3 1 1 19 1 0 118 
 
6.9% 6.9% 8.1% 2.8% 4.2% 5.0% 8.3% 6.9% 9.1% 0.0% 6.7% 
Not too 
important 
 
28 4 3 1 0 0 0 4 2 0 42 
 
2.9% 2.0% 2.7% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 18.2% 0.0% 2.4% 
Don't Know 
 
4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
 
.4% .5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .3% 
Refused 
 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
 
.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Total 
 
980 203 111 72 72 20 12 277 11 7 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 42.524a 45 .577 
Likelihood Ratio 41.713 45 .612 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.549 1 .213 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 7.3.2. Issues: Health care—Native/Foreign Born 
  
4. Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the 
United States, or in another country? 
Total 
Puerto 
Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
Now I'm going to 
read you a list of 
issues that might be 
discussed during this 
year's presidential 
campaign. Is the 
issue of Health care 
extremely important, 
very important, 
somewhat important, 
or not too important 
to you personally? 
Extremely 
important 
 
46 391 360 0 1 798 
 
43.8% 51.5% 40.0% 0.0% 100.0% 45.2% 
Very important 
 
52 269 479 0 0 800 
 
49.5% 35.4% 53.3% 0.0% 0.0% 45.3% 
Somewhat 
important 
 
5 69 44 0 0 118 
 
4.8% 9.1% 4.9% 0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 
Not too 
important 
 
2 26 13 1 0 42 
 
1.9% 3.4% 1.4% 100.0% 0.0% 2.4% 
Don't Know 
 
0 3 2 0 0 5 
 
0.0% .4% .2% 0.0% 0.0% .3% 
Refused 
 
0 1 1 0 0 2 
 
0.0% .1% .1% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Total 
 
105 759 899 1 1 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 102.821a 20 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 70.583 20 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.127 1 .288 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 7.3.3. Issues: Health care—Foreign Born Country of Origin 
          In what country were you born? 
    Argentina Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic Ecuador 
El 
Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
Is the issue 
of Health 
care 
extremely 
important, 
very 
important, 
somewhat 
important, 
or not too 
important 
to you 
personally
? 
Extremely 
important 
4 0 2 1 2 15 2 50 23 10 21 9 8 
50.0% 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 66.7% 53.6% 50.0% 56.2% 45.1% 52.6% 35.6% 33.3% 36.4% 
Very 
important 
4 1 1 1 1 13 2 32 28 9 36 18 13 
50.0% 100.0% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 46.4% 50.0% 36.0% 54.9% 47.4% 61.0% 66.7% 59.1% 
Somewhat 
important 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 0.0% 4.5% 
Not too 
important 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Don't 
Know 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Refused 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 8 1 3 3 3 28 4 89 51 19 59 27 22 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  
          In what country were you born? 
Total     Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru Puerto Rico Spain Uruguay Venezuela French Guyana Other Don't Know Refused 
Is the issue 
of Health 
care 
extremely 
important, 
very 
important, 
somewhat 
important, 
or not too 
important 
to you 
personally? 
Extremely 
important 
165 8 2 6 1 3 1 4 1 17 1 5 361 
33.9% 40.0% 40.0% 28.6% 50.0% 75.0% 100.0% 50.0% 100.0% 65.4% 25.0% 100.0% 40.1% 
Very 
important 
283 11 2 12 0 1 0 3 0 7 1 0 479 
58.1% 55.0% 40.0% 57.1% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 37.5% 0.0% 26.9% 25.0% 0.0% 53.2% 
Somewhat 
important 
28 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 44 
5.7% 0.0% 20.0% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 0.0% 4.9% 
Not too 
important 
9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 14 
1.8% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 50.0% 0.0% 1.6% 
Don't 
Know 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .2% 
Refused 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .1% 
Total 487 20 5 21 2 4 1 8 1 26 4 5 901 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Continue from Table 7.3.3 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 
363.560a 120 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 
110.118 120 .730 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .027 1 .869 
N of Valid Cases 
901     
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Table 7.4.1. Issues: Immigration—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, 
Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Now I'm going to read 
you a list of issues that 
might be discussed 
during this year's 
presidential campaign. 
Is the issue of 
Immigration 
extremely important, 
very important, 
somewhat important, 
or not too important to 
you personally? 
Extremely 
important 
 
324 55 37 29 25 6 4 100 1 2 583 
 
33.1% 27.1% 33.3% 40.3% 34.7% 30.0% 33.3% 36.1% 9.1% 28.6% 33.0% 
Very important 
 
460 82 48 29 32 10 5 106 3 2 777 
 
46.9% 40.4% 43.2% 40.3% 44.4% 50.0% 41.7% 38.3% 27.3% 28.6% 44.0% 
Somewhat 
important 
 
128 36 12 8 7 4 2 45 5 2 249 
 
13.1% 17.7% 10.8% 11.1% 9.7% 20.0% 16.7% 16.2% 45.5% 28.6% 14.1% 
Not too 
important 
 
53 22 13 4 7 0 1 23 1 0 124 
 
5.4% 10.8% 11.7% 5.6% 9.7% 0.0% 8.3% 8.3% 9.1% 0.0% 7.0% 
Don't Know 
 
13 7 1 2 0 0 0 3 1 1 28 
 
1.3% 3.4% .9% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 9.1% 14.3% 1.6% 
Refused 
 
2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 
.2% .5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .2% 
Total 
 
980 203 111 72 72 20 12 277 11 7 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
67.320a 45 .017 
Likelihood Ratio 58.853 45 .081 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .235 1 .628 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 7.4.2. Issues: Immigration—Native/Foreign Born 
  
Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United 
States, or in another country? 
Total 
Puerto 
Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
Now I'm going 
to read you a list 
of issues that 
might be 
discussed during 
this year's 
presidential 
campaign. Is the 
issue of 
Immigration 
extremely 
important, very 
important, 
somewhat 
important, or not 
too important to 
you personally? 
Extremely 
important 
 
25 234 322 1 1 583 
 
23.8% 30.8% 35.8% 100.0% 100.0% 33.0% 
Very important 
 
51 295 431 0 0 777 
 
48.6% 38.9% 47.9% 0.0% 0.0% 44.0% 
Somewhat 
important 
 
13 153 83 0 0 249 
 
12.4% 20.2% 9.2% 0.0% 0.0% 14.1% 
Not too 
important 
 
10 66 48 0 0 124 
 
9.5% 8.7% 5.3% 0.0% 0.0% 7.0% 
Don't Know 
 
5 10 13 0 0 28 
 
4.8% 1.3% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 
Refused 
 
1 1 2 0 0 4 
 
1.0% .1% .2% 0.0% 0.0% .2% 
Total 
 
105 759 899 1 1 1765 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
70.720a 20 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 67.906 20 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
24.619 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1765     
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Table 7.4.3. Issues: Immigration—Foreign Born Country of Origin 
          In what country were you born? 
    Argentina Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic Ecuador 
El 
Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
Is the issue 
of 
Immigratio
n extremely 
important, 
very 
important, 
somewhat 
important, 
or not too 
important to 
you 
personally? 
Extremely 
important 
1 0 1 1 3 13 2 32 22 9 23 10 8 
12.5% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 46.4% 50.0% 36.0% 43.1% 47.4% 39.0% 37.0% 36.4% 
Very 
important 
6 1 1 2 0 5 2 38 24 9 27 10 12 
75.0% 100.0% 33.3% 66.7% 0.0% 17.9% 50.0% 42.7% 47.1% 47.4% 45.8% 37.0% 54.5% 
Somewhat 
important 
1 0 1 0 0 5 0 8 2 1 4 4 2 
12.5% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 17.9% 0.0% 9.0% 3.9% 5.3% 6.8% 14.8% 9.1% 
Not too 
important 
0 0 0 0 0 4 0 10 1 0 5 3 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 0.0% 11.2% 2.0% 0.0% 8.5% 11.1% 0.0% 
Don't 
Know 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 0.0% 1.1% 3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Refused 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 8 1 3 3 3 28 4 89 51 19 59 27 22 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
          In what country were you born? 
Total     Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru Puerto Rico Spain Uruguay Venezuela French Guyana Other Don't Know Refused 
Is the issue 
of 
Immigration 
extremely 
important, 
very 
important, 
somewhat 
important, 
or not too 
important to 
you 
personally? 
Extremely 
important 
166 9 1 6 1 1 0 1 1 8 2 3 324 
34.1% 45.0% 20.0% 28.6% 50.0% 25.0% 0.0% 12.5% 100.0% 30.8% 50.0% 60.0% 36.0% 
Very 
important 
257 10 1 11 0 0 1 3 0 9 1 1 431 
52.8% 50.0% 20.0% 52.4% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 37.5% 0.0% 34.6% 25.0% 20.0% 47.8% 
Somewhat 
important 
38 1 2 1 0 3 0 3 0 5 1 1 83 
7.8% 5.0% 40.0% 4.8% 0.0% 75.0% 0.0% 37.5% 0.0% 19.2% 25.0% 20.0% 9.2% 
Not too 
important 
17 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 48 
3.5% 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 15.4% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 
Don't 
Know 
7 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
1.4% 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 
Refused 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .2% 
Total 487 20 5 21 2 4 1 8 1 26 4 5 901 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Continue from Table 7.4.3. 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 163.917a 120 .005 
Likelihood Ratio 120.294 120 .475 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .560 1 .454 
N of Valid Cases 901     
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Table 8.1. Citizenship—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, 
Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Are you a 
citizen of the 
United States? 
Yes 
 
172 4 56 32 20 8 6 76 1 0 375 
 
34.2% 100.0% 61.5% 61.5% 34.5% 50.0% 66.7% 47.2% 33.3% 0.0% 41.7% 
No 
 
329 0 35 20 37 8 3 85 2 1 520 
 
65.4% 0.0% 38.5% 38.5% 63.8% 50.0% 33.3% 52.8% 66.7% 50.0% 57.8% 
Don't Know 
 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
 
.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .2% 
Refused 
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
 
.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% .2% 
Total 
 
503 4 91 52 58 16 9 161 3 2 899 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  
 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
277.026a 27 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 63.166 27 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .617 1 .432 
N of Valid Cases 899     
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Table 8.2. Citizenship—Foreign Born 
  
Were you born on the island of Puerto 
Rico, in the United States, or in another 
country? 
Total 
Another 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
Are you a citizen of 
the United States? 
Yes 
 
375 0 0 375 
 
41.8% 0.0% 0.0% 41.7% 
No 
 
518 1 1 520 
 
57.7% 100.0% 100.0% 57.8% 
Don't Know 
 
2 0 0 2 
 
.2% 0.0% 0.0% .2% 
Refused 
 
2 0 0 2 
 
.2% 0.0% 0.0% .2% 
Total 
 
897 1 1 899 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
1.461a 6 .962 
Likelihood Ratio 2.193 6 .901 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .657 1 .418 
N of Valid Cases 899     
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Table 8.3. Citizenship—Foreign Born Country of Origin 
          In what country were you born? 
    Argentina Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
Are 
you a 
citizen 
of the 
United 
States? 
Yes 5 0 2 0 2 18 4 54 31 8 21 8 6 
62.5% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 66.7% 64.3% 100.0% 60.7% 60.8% 42.1% 35.6% 29.6% 27.3% 
No 3 1 1 3 1 10 0 35 20 11 37 19 16 
37.5% 100.0% 33.3% 100.0% 33.3% 35.7% 0.0% 39.3% 39.2% 57.9% 62.7% 70.4% 72.7% 
Don't 
Know 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Refused 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 8 1 3 3 3 28 4 89 51 19 59 27 22 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
           In what country were you born? 
Total     Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru Spain Uruguay Venezuela French Guyana Other Don't Know Refused 
Are 
you a 
citizen 
of the 
United 
States? 
Yes 163 11 5 11 3 0 5 1 14 0 3 375 
33.5% 55.0% 100.0% 52.4% 75.0% 0.0% 62.5% 100.0% 53.8% 0.0% 60.0% 41.7% 
No 323 9 0 10 1 1 3 0 12 3 1 520 
66.3% 45.0% 0.0% 47.6% 25.0% 100.0% 37.5% 0.0% 46.2% 75.0% 20.0% 57.8% 
Don't 
Know 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% .2% 
Refused 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% .2% 
Total 487 20 5 21 4 1 8 1 26 4 5 899 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Continue from Table 8.3. 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 
282.534a 69 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 
105.120 69 .003 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 10.278 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 
899     
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Table 9.1.1. Perception of discrimination[job]—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, 
Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
In general, do you 
think being 
(Hispanic/Latino) 
helps, hurts, or 
makes no difference 
when it comes to 
finding a job? 
Helps 
 
163 67 39 26 24 10 5 97 4 3 438 
 
32.9% 33.0% 35.1% 36.1% 33.3% 50.0% 41.7% 35.0% 36.4% 42.9% 34.2% 
Hurts 
 
107 49 23 11 14 4 3 66 1 2 280 
 
21.6% 24.1% 20.7% 15.3% 19.4% 20.0% 25.0% 23.8% 9.1% 28.6% 21.9% 
Makes no 
difference 
 
205 78 45 30 33 5 4 107 5 1 513 
 
41.4% 38.4% 40.5% 41.7% 45.8% 25.0% 33.3% 38.6% 45.5% 14.3% 40.1% 
Don't Know 
 
15 9 3 5 1 1 0 6 1 1 42 
 
3.0% 4.4% 2.7% 6.9% 1.4% 5.0% 0.0% 2.2% 9.1% 14.3% 3.3% 
Refused 
 
5 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 
 
1.0% 0.0% .9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .4% 0.0% 0.0% .5% 
Total 
 
495 203 111 72 72 20 12 277 11 7 1280 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.339a 36 .930 
Likelihood Ratio 25.192 36 .911 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.123 1 .289 
N of Valid Cases 1280     
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Table 9.1.2. Perception of discrimination[job]— Native/Foreign Born 
  
Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United 
States, or in another country? 
Total 
Puerto 
Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
In general, do 
you think being 
(Hispanic/Latino) 
helps, hurts, or 
makes no 
difference when 
it comes to 
finding a job? 
Helps 
 
42 150 246 0 0 438 
 
40.0% 28.2% 38.4% 0.0% 0.0% 34.2% 
Hurts 
 
26 118 136 0 0 280 
 
24.8% 22.2% 21.2% 0.0% 0.0% 21.9% 
Makes no 
difference 
 
37 238 238 0 0 513 
 
35.2% 44.7% 37.1% 0.0% 0.0% 40.1% 
Don't Know 
 
0 24 17 1 0 42 
 
0.0% 4.5% 2.7% 100.0% 0.0% 3.3% 
Refused 
 
0 2 4 0 1 7 
 
0.0% .4% .6% 0.0% 100.0% .5% 
Total 
 
105 532 641 1 1 1280 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
234.274a 16 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 44.166 16 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 2.051 1 .152 
N of Valid Cases 1280     
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Table 9.2.1. Perception of discrimination[promotion]—Ancestry 
 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, 
Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
In general, do 
you think being 
(Hispanic/Latino) 
helps, hurts, or 
makes no 
difference when 
it comes to 
getting a 
promotion? 
Helps 
 
146 56 38 30 27 7 4 83 1 3 395 
 
29.5% 27.6% 34.2% 41.7% 37.5% 35.0% 33.3% 30.0% 9.1% 42.9% 30.9% 
Hurts 
 
108 46 23 11 12 5 1 61 0 1 268 
 
21.8% 22.7% 20.7% 15.3% 16.7% 25.0% 8.3% 22.0% 0.0% 14.3% 20.9% 
Makes no 
difference 
 
220 90 46 30 32 6 6 125 10 1 566 
 
44.4% 44.3% 41.4% 41.7% 44.4% 30.0% 50.0% 45.1% 90.9% 14.3% 44.2% 
Don't Know 
 
16 11 4 1 1 2 1 7 0 2 45 
 
3.2% 5.4% 3.6% 1.4% 1.4% 10.0% 8.3% 2.5% 0.0% 28.6% 3.5% 
Refused 
 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 
 
1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .4% 0.0% 0.0% .5% 
Total 
 
495 203 111 72 72 20 12 277 11 7 1280 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 47.916a 36 .088 
Likelihood Ratio 43.985 36 .169 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .009 1 .926 
N of Valid Cases 1280     
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Table 9.2.2. Perception of Discrimination [Promotion]—Native/Foreign Born 
  
Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United 
States, or in another country? 
Total 
Puerto 
Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
In general, do you 
think being 
(Hispanic/Latino) 
helps, hurts, or 
makes no difference 
when it comes to 
getting a 
promotion? 
Helps 
 
39 107 249 0 0 395 
 
37.1% 20.1% 38.8% 0.0% 0.0% 30.9% 
Hurts 
 
25 105 138 0 0 268 
 
23.8% 19.7% 21.5% 0.0% 0.0% 20.9% 
Makes no 
difference 
 
36 296 233 1 0 566 
 
34.3% 55.6% 36.3% 100.0% 0.0% 44.2% 
Don't Know 
 
5 21 19 0 0 45 
 
4.8% 3.9% 3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.5% 
Refused 
 
0 3 2 0 1 6 
 
0.0% .6% .3% 0.0% 100.0% .5% 
Total 
 
105 532 641 1 1 1280 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 278.226a 16 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 78.793 16 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 3.598 1 .058 
N of Valid Cases 1280     
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Table 9.3.1. Perception of Discrimination[school]—Ancestry 
  
Now I want to ask you about you and your family's heritage.  Are you Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, 
Salvadoran, or are you and your ancestors from another country? 
Total 
Mexican 
(Mexico) 
Puerto 
Rican 
(Puerto 
Rico) 
Cuban 
(Cuba) 
Dominican 
(the 
Dominican 
Republic) 
Salvadoran 
(El 
Salvador) 
Other 
Central 
American 
(Central 
America) 
Other 
South 
American 
(South 
America) 
Other 
country 
Don't 
Know 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
Refused 
(your 
country 
of 
origin) 
In general, do 
you think being 
(Hispanic/Latino) 
helps, hurts, or 
makes no 
difference when 
it comes to 
gaining 
admission into 
schools and 
colleges? 
Helps 
 
184 70 38 31 24 7 5 109 5 2 475 
 
37.2% 34.5% 34.2% 43.1% 33.3% 35.0% 41.7% 39.4% 45.5% 28.6% 37.1% 
Hurts 
 
78 27 14 11 14 4 2 43 0 3 196 
 
15.8% 13.3% 12.6% 15.3% 19.4% 20.0% 16.7% 15.5% 0.0% 42.9% 15.3% 
Makes no 
difference 
 
208 99 53 30 30 8 5 117 5 1 556 
 
42.0% 48.8% 47.7% 41.7% 41.7% 40.0% 41.7% 42.2% 45.5% 14.3% 43.4% 
Don't Know 
 
21 6 6 0 3 1 0 8 1 1 47 
 
4.2% 3.0% 5.4% 0.0% 4.2% 5.0% 0.0% 2.9% 9.1% 14.3% 3.7% 
Refused 
 
4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 
 
.8% .5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% .5% 
Total 
 
495 203 111 72 72 20 12 277 11 7 1280 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 49.101a 66 .941 
Likelihood Ratio 54.099 66 .852 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .411 1 .522 
N of Valid Cases 277     
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Table 9.3.2. Perception of discrimination[school]—Native/Foreign born 
  
Were you born on the island of Puerto Rico, in the United 
States, or in another country? 
Total 
Puerto 
Rico U.S. 
Another 
country 
Don't 
Know Refused 
In general, do you 
think being 
(Hispanic/Latino) 
helps, hurts, or 
makes no difference 
when it comes to 
gaining admission 
into schools and 
colleges? 
Helps 
 
42 177 255 1 0 475 
 
40.0% 33.3% 39.8% 100.0% 0.0% 37.1% 
Hurts 
 
21 57 118 0 0 196 
 
20.0% 10.7% 18.4% 0.0% 0.0% 15.3% 
Makes no 
difference 
 
39 273 244 0 0 556 
 
37.1% 51.3% 38.1% 0.0% 0.0% 43.4% 
Don't Know 
 
2 23 22 0 0 47 
 
1.9% 4.3% 3.4% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 
Refused 
 
1 2 2 0 1 6 
 
1.0% .4% .3% 0.0% 100.0% .5% 
Total 
 
105 532 641 1 1 1280 
 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
  Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 245.860a 16 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 44.981 16 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .102 1 .750 
N of Valid Cases 1280     
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Chapter V 
Conclusions 
 
Pan-Ethnic Labels:  Are They the Solution for Political Inclusion? 
Pan-ethnic labels, also known as “umbrella” terms, have been used for decades by 
politicians, media organizations, and state institutions. Consequently, these terms have gotten 
entrenched in society, which has allowed the spread of the terms and its cultural 
institutionalization. However, what has been utilized as the way to group and classify people with 
certain characteristics for institutional purposes has appeared to be insufficient to thoroughly 
understand the group that has been named in the United States as Latinos/Hispanics. The growth 
of the Latino community has made Latino issues a reoccurring conversation, mostly when 
elections are near. The Latino electorate has been charged with large expectations. Which they 
have not been able to fulfill. Different arguments have been stated as to the reason why Latinos do 
not participate in politics in the way they are expected. These include lack of citizenship, lack of 
co-ethnic candidates, lower rates of naturalization, strong attachment to countries of origin politics, 
disinterest in American politics, and generational causes among others. As some Latino politics 
scholars have noticed, the notions of Latinidad, and the insistence of labeling those immigrants 
from Latin America as Latinos/Hispanics, has caused more division than cohesion.  
Although identity has been presented as the main element defining minority politics in the 
United States, it has been mistakenly taken for granted that Latin American immigrants identify 
themselves as Latinos/Hispanics. Twenty years ago, Luis DeSipio (1996) pointed out that Latino 
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immigrants tend to identify themselves in country of origin terms rather than in pan-ethnic terms; 
nowadays the situation has not changed dramatically. As the tabulations of this study showed, 
more than half of the respondents in the 2012 National Survey of Latinos had no preference 
between Latino/Hispanic, and a large number of them identified themselves by their country of 
origin as their ancestry, dismissing terms like South Americans or Central Americans. The 
vagueness of the category “no preference,” and the smaller percentage of those who chose either 
Latino or Hispanic, is a signal of the ambiguity of the terms.  
Understanding the role of identity in minority politics in the United States is of vital 
importance to understanding how Latino politics have been set up.  A strong sense of group identity 
translates to high levels of solidarity and group cohesion, which in theory results in civic and 
political engagement. Census institutions, state agencies, and political organizations can often tell 
that a person who identifies himself/herself as black will vote in a certain manner, and will be 
affiliated to a certain political party because of the sense of groupness among African Americans.  
Notwithstanding, that does not mean the same will happen with a person who identifies as Latino 
or Hispanic. The issue starts at the very moment a person is classified under the pan-ethnic term, 
which can be identified through different scenarios: First, if the official documents, surveys and 
census do not include a broad array of categories that include countries of origin to identify 
themselves; and second, if the individual does not see a proper category. That person might end 
up choosing a random category without giving it much thought. By not offering a proper term of 
identification, Latin American immigrants jump from one term to the other, in a meaningless 
process. Meaningless because there is not a strong attachment to the term, which would make 
political predictions inaccurate.  
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Pan-ethnic Labels: Predictors of Voting?  
Finding data where Latinos/Hispanics were inquired not only to indicate their ancestry 
and/or nativity, but to answer questions related to political engagement is not an easy task. The 
2012 NSL was by far the most adequate source of information. However, there were still gaps in 
the information that did not allow more definite conclusions. First, it is necessary to consider that 
even when country of origin was part of the information collected in the survey, it was a category 
recorded for those who said to be foreign born, or that did not categorize themselves in one of the 
major subgroups categories given in the ancestry question —Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, 
Dominican, Salvadoran, Other Central America, and Other South American— and said to be from 
another country.  
With the purpose of finding out if Latinidad had a strong impact in how those labeled as 
Latinos/Hispanics participated in politics, more specifically when voting, I decided to cross 
tabulate variables of identity —ancestry and nativity—, and questions related to political 
participation, political agenda, and acculturation. After analyzing a vast number of tables, I could 
establish the following: 
1. There is not a congruent relationship between self-identification with pan-ethnic terms 
and voting behavior. For instance, while a large percentage of self-denominated Dominicans did 
not to prefer a pan-ethnic term, Dominicans intention to vote in the presidential election of 2012 
was one of the highest. In the case of the major Latino subgroups —Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and 
Cubans— more than 50% of the respondents who self-identified with those terms said not to have 
a pan-ethnic term preference. Conversely, their intention to vote was higher than 80%. The other 
subgroups showed similar results. There was not a preference for either pan-ethnic term, and the 
voting intention was high. The latter suggest that a strong identification with the pan-ethnicity does 
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not define voting per se. If so, by the lower percentages of respondents identifying either as 
Hispanic or as a Latino, vote intention would have presented the same values. Despite the rejection 
of the pan-ethnic terms, respondents said to have planned to vote, more than that they have also 
decided which candidate they were voting for. However, the latter can indicate that ethnic 
identification is happening in other levels where country of origin is more influential than the 
umbrella terms.  
2.  With regard to those who self-identified as South Americans, Salvadorans, Dominicans, 
and Central Americas, the data is still unclear. As the results of the study show, Mexicans, Puerto 
Ricans, and Cubans have been established as ancestry categories, but they are also nationalities, 
which allows respondents to clearly identify their ancestry when asked. On the other side, 
categories such as South American or Central Americans are still too broad. Although respondents 
were given the option to choose a broader subgroup, many of them insisted on naming their 
countries of origin. The visibility of the three main groups allows us to have a better picture of the 
data while the tendency to group the other respondents into bigger categories, results in confusion, 
which can strongly impact the data. In this sense, despite the majority of respondents who 
classified themselves as Other Central Americans and Other South Americans said they had no 
preference for any of the pan ethnic terms, there was also a larger percentage who responded who 
prefer Latino or Hispanic, compared to Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. However, the 
number of respondents who classified themselves with these broader labels are significantly lower 
compared to those who chose “other country” as a category. Category in which the majority of 
respondents were either Central or South Americans.  When analyzed individually, the respondents 
from these countries mainly said to have no preference for Latino or Hispanic.  
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Although surveys like the NSL have a deeper approach to Latin American immigrants and 
their life in the United States, there is a gap in regards self-identity and group consciousness when 
creating surveys that are directed to Latinos/Hispanics. Not only that more countries of origin are 
not included as main categories, but also that racial and cultural identities are not conceived as 
identity categories. For instance, Central and South American countries have large populations of 
indigenous people, who as immigrants have had to use a label that does not define their culture, 
language, or ethnicity. Similarly, a large percentage of immigrants from the Dominican Republic, 
which has become one of the largest communities of Latin American immigrants in the U.S., 
consider themselves to be black, and their racial consciousness is stronger than their pan-ethnic 
one. As suggested by scholars like Valdez (2011) it is important to distinguish if immigrants from 
Latin American identify themselves racially or ethnically, and if that ethnic identification is pan-
ethnic or if it is linked to a sub-continent group, a country of origin group, or a particular etnia or 
indigenous tribe. In her own research, Valdez suggests that “panethnic-identified Latinos may 
attach a different meaning to their group membership than racial-identified Latinos, with 
consequent differences in political participation.” (Valdez 2011: 479) This is the reason why it is 
of vital importance to open the spectrum of categories in surveys and other type of studies when 
trying to assess Latinos/Hispanics political participation.  
Voting Behavior Among Latinos/Hispanics 
3. About voting behavior, it could be said that Latinos/Hispanics do vote equally, or at least 
in a similar way. According to the tabulations of this study, a 61.4% of the respondents, who have 
been identified by the organization that conducted the study as Latinos/Hispanics, said that for the 
presidential election of 2012 they intended to vote for the duo formed by Barack Obama and Joe 
Biden. Although, there are some variations, visible larger shares of each ancestry category were 
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planning to vote for the Democratic candidates. Yet, 60% is not a number that indicates an 
overwhelming majority, which makes it necessary to revise the results within categories, and most 
of all to consider that other factors can be impacting their electoral choice. Since those 
considerations are not included in the survey questionnaire, it is not safe to assert that all 
Latinos/Hispanics vote the same, or that they are expected to vote for a certain party or a certain 
candidate. On the contrary, differences are noticeable in between subgroups, perhaps not dramatic 
differences, but there are perceptual changes within subgroups which translate to thousands of 
people. To illustrate, when asked for whom would they vote in the 2012 election, respondents from 
Dominican Republic, Salvador, and South America vote preference for Obama and Biden reached 
and average of 70%, while respondents who identified as Mexican and Cuban intention to vote for 
the same candidates was of 60.6% and 39.5% respectively. A variable like this shows similar 
tendencies of vote between subgroups because they all show larger percentages of vote intention 
for the democratic duo, but the differences is important and can signify a difference depending on 
the state those other subgroups are located.  
It is important to see the tabulations in regard to political party considerations, intention to 
vote, and candidate choice. Even when a larger percentage of respondents said to have planned to 
vote for a Democratic candidate, not the same percentage of respondents said to consider 
themselves part of the Democratic Party. In the same manner, numbers do not match in regard to 
self-identified Republicans and votes for the Republican candidates Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan. 
Political party self-identification does not seem to be a voting predictor either. It is important to 
recognize the difference between self-categorization and party affiliation, given that party 
affiliation requires a more active participation either monetarily or ideologically. However, party 
self-identification is important because not many citizens engage actively in party organizations, 
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which does not mean they do not see themselves as part of a certain party. The 2012 NSL results 
are telling in this respect as well, because despite the larger percentage of Democrats among 
Latinos/Hispanics, there is a growing group, larger than Republicans, of those who considered 
themselves to be independent. These tabulations indicate that throughout all Latinos/Hispanics 
subgroups, there is a misconception of their political affiliation. While being portrayed as 
predominantly Democrats, those of Latin American origin or descent, are more disperse in regards 
party self-categorization than what is believed.  Subgroup differences are little; however, a higher 
percentage of central Americans identifying as Republicans it is noticeable. These tables evidence 
the voluble characteristics of Latinos/Hispanics as a group, but also as subgroups.  
Immigration and Other Issues 
4. Immigration is not a decisive factor for Latinos/Hispanics. An average of 30% of the 
respondents said immigration was an extremely important issue to discuss in the Presidential 
election for 2012; an average of 40% said it was very important; and a 14% said it was somewhat 
important. Latinos/Hispanics rate immigration in similar levels of importance to other issues, even 
lower. Not even a larger number of foreign born respondents said immigration to be extremely 
important. Other issues like jobs, the economy, or health care, were rated as extremely important. 
I am not suggesting that immigration is overrated, but it has been used as a political bait, and a 
media stereotype. It should not be obviated that when Latino/Hispanics migrate to the United 
States, they do it searching for better life conditions, better jobs, and health services. Similarly, 
those who are native born, do not see immigration as an urgent issue.  
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The Citizenship Impact 
5. From 1,765 respondents, 899 were born in another country, of those, 375 said to be 
citizens. This sample counts then with a 70.31% of citizens between native and foreign born. 
According to the tabulations, a larger percentage of foreign born Cubans, Dominicans, and South 
Americans said to be citizens, along with Puerto Ricans who are born citizens. The fact that most 
respondents said to be citizens is important because citizenship is determinant on how immigrants 
interact with the host society. Although variations were perceived in regards group consciousness 
and pan-ethnic perceptions, other variables were similar among all subgroups. The number of 
citizens among this survey sample might not be representative of the actual number of citizens in 
2012. This digit does impact the percentages, and responses given in the survey. Voter intention 
and political agenda are directly influenced by citizenship status. Citizenship can be the factor 
equalizing responses among subgroups more than pan-ethnicity or country of origin.  
Since most respondents said to be citizens, either born or naturalized, their visions in 
regards politics and state issues are markedly different. This can be evidenced in the tabulations 
that account for the perception held by respondents in regards discrimination. When asked if being 
Latino or Hispanic “help”, “hurt,” or “made no difference” at the time of finding a job, getting 
promoted or getting into school, most of the respondents said it either helped or made no 
difference. Among this sample, discrimination is not a perceived problem, at least not in important 
proportions. Similarly, respondents said to consume news form English and Spanish channels, 
most of them in equal proportion, with some exceptions. What can be observed here is a high level 
of acculturation, which is framed by citizenship. In this sense, I have come to notice that when 
citizenship is constant, other variables might not exert the same force as if citizenship was not 
controlled.  
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After analyzing the different tables and considering different scenarios, it is not precise to 
say that Latinidad and/or the self-identification as Latino/Hispanic have a major impact in voting 
behavior. As scholars have argued, there are other variables that might have more influence 
towards voting than pan-ethnic consciousness. Respondents of the 2012 NSL were aware of the 
pan-ethnic terms, however, they did not express to be strongly attached to them. The apparent 
detachment to the pan-ethnic terms did not diminished their vote intention, or impacted their party 
identification. However, as the data shows there are not major changes perceived in between 
subgroups when different variables are tested. The latter can signify that it might not be inaccurate 
to say that Latinos do behave similarly. Yet, as I pointed out, the number of respondents that were 
citizens was larger than the ones who were not, which has a major impact in the data.  
Possible Future Research 
To obtain a better spectrum of the issue here posed, I suggest that future research conducted 
among Latinos/Hispanics consider not only a broader scale of categories of self-identification, but 
also a bigger sample. It is also important that qualitative research accompanies quantitative studies, 
because only in depth research will be able to assess more details in regards identity perception 
and identity politics. Further, social and political scientist, as well as census and think tank 
organizations, should conduct research in other elections periods different to presidential elections, 
given that local and state elections might have more opportunities to have Latino/Hispanic 
immigrants or descendants of immigrants as candidates. It is certainly necessary to see if co-ethnic 
identification has an impact in voting choices.  
As far as my own research, I see these current results as the beginning of an ongoing 
research, where I can test with deeper methods to what extent do Latinos/Hispanics are conscious 
of their group identity, and if this has any impact in their political behavior. Having a wide picture 
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was necessary to recognize patterns and possible gaps in the theories of identity politics in regards 
Latinos/Hispanics. Hitherto, I have been able to show the unsteadiness of the responses of certain 
variables tabulations, which leads me to think that there is still a gap to fill as to minority politics 
focus on Latinos/Hispanics. As I have argued in previous chapters, Latino politics need a different 
outlook than minority politics. Trying to fit concepts and theories that were developed during 
African Americans fight for civil rights, has proven to be ineffective. New research should be 
directed to develop other methods and theories that understand better the composition of the so-
called Latino/Hispanic community.  
Race and racialization of Latinos need to be furtherly studied. The Latino label as an ethnic 
label is itself problematic, and its racialization in the United States has impacted immigrants and 
immigrant descendants’ identity formation. The problem is as broad as the large spectrum of self-
identification categories of those labeled as Latinos. Nationalities, sub-nationalities, racial 
categories, ethnicities, social classes, gender, etc. are a few variables that impact the identity of 
Latin American immigrants. These categories are not exclusive, and one individual might consider 
multiple of these options when self-identifying. It is important to mention that under this pan-
ethnic label fits a vast group of people, and that the category does not solely refer to immigrants 
or descendants of immigrants. There are also groups of people who never migrated, those who 
were inhabitants of the land that once belonged to Mexico, and who stayed after the United States 
acquired the territory. Although they never actually had to go through a migration process, their 
ancestry is tied to Latin America. They are a different group, and although they are linked to the 
pan-ethnicity, because of their complexity I did not addressed them in this research. 
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Along with racial and other important categories, as I learned from the results and data 
analysis of this study, citizenship is indeed an element that can impact the boundaries of Latinidad 
beyond nativity issues. However, those ancestry and country of origin differences are both 
determinant to access of citizenship, as Castro, Felix, and Ramirez point out “the very historical 
and cultural specificity of each Latino national origin subgroup in the United States has structured 
their political socialization and access to citizenship or lack thereof, in part accounting for 
differences in political ideology, party affiliation, and policy preferences.” (Castro, Felix and 
Ramirez 2016: 234) It is then important to consider citizenship and country of origin as inherent 
variables to assess any type of information that talks about Latinos/Hispanics in the U.S. I consider 
interesting and applicable to further research in Latino Politics to apply the categories suggested 
by Idler considering national identities and citizenship status, as follow: 
“The first group of Hispanics is composed of American citizens who identify themselves 
with the American nation […] A second group is composed of American citizens who 
identify themselves with their nation of origin in Latin America […] The third group of 
Hispanics: those who are not American citizens and do not identify themselves with the 
American nation […] And the fourth and last group consists of those who are not American 
citizens, but identify themselves with the American nation.” (Idler 2007: 126-127) 
These categories proposed by Idler combine ancestry, country of origin, and citizenship status into 
identity categories which can help to shorten the gaps of the actual classifications utilized by 
census and think tan organizations.  
Lastly, the current political environment should be another encouraging reason for Latino 
political scientist, sociopolitical scholars in general, politicians, and media entrepreneurs to assess 
Latino politics in a different way. The fact that the largest minority group in the country is the one 
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with the lowest electoral participation rates should be more than an accepted fact, or a drawer 
phrase everybody use when talking about Latinos/Hispanics in elections. This research was 
planned to identify causes for such a problem, but in the next years Latino politics research should 
morph into new forms where not only causes are sought, but new approaches are posed.   
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